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ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, a variety of states such as China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela,
France, South Korea, and Japan have funded 24-hour news stations, called international
broadcasters (IB), to frame their policies for foreign publics. While a variety of scholars have
acknowledged the proliferation of state-funded media channels, they have also elided key
features of IBs. Research in contra-flow theory, strategic narrative theory, and public diplomacy
analyze IBs as tools of state power intended to promote state interests, but do not analyze
content. Meanwhile, scholars of global media examine IBs as part of the global media system,
but omit the broadcaster’s state funding. Building on these complementary but often disparate
groups of inquiry into international broadcasting, this dissertation provides this dissertation

provides a comparative analysis of the economic coverage of four international broadcasters:
Russia Today, China Central Television, Al-Jazeera English, and Deutsche Welle. Using this
data, the analysis assesses the role of these broadcasters in the projection of state power. Using a
mixed-methodological approach combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis, I
compare economic newsmagazine coverage to official state positions on economic issues, which
allows an empirical and systematic test of the extent to which IB content conforms to the
respective state’s economic policy. Because specialist economic news caters to elite audiences,
this dissertation also analyze regular newscast coverage of economic protests reveal the gap, if
any, between IB’s coverage of economics and thereby determine if state interests determine
coverage.
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1

INTRODUCTION

On March 2, 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exhorted the Congressional
Foreign Policies Priorities Committee for increasing funding for State Department foreign
outreach efforts:
We are in an information war and we are losing that war. Al Jazeera is winning, the
Chinese have opened a global multi-language television network, the Russians have
opened up an English-language network. I’ve seen it in a few countries, and it is
quite instructive (quoted in RT 2011).
Clinton’s testimony called attention to the post 9/11 proliferation of international
broadcasters (IBs), what Price, Haas and Margolin describe as “a complex combination
of state sponsored news, information, and entertainment” produced for foreign audiences
with the goal of shaping public opinion abroad (2008, 152). New channels such as China
Central Television (2000), Russia Today (2005), Telesúr (2005), Press TV (2007), and
France 24 (2006) have joined older stalwarts like BBC (1932), Voice of America (1942),
and Deutsche Welle (1953) in competition for the attention of global audiences in an
increasingly crowded and complicated global media system. Clinton’s comments further
illustrated broader debates concerning the relationship between media and state power in
a global information environment as well as whether state interests are best served
through the circulation of private or state sponsored media. At stake were the hearts and
minds of publics around the globe, in the developed and the developing world, publics
whose allegiances could overturn the international system or preserve it.
Concurrent to the resurgence in attention to international broadcasting, the Global Financial
Crisis of 20081 damaged the post-Cold War consensus once pithily labeled by Francis Fukuyama

1

The Global Financial Crisis signifies the set of events immediately triggered by the subprime housing
crisis in the United States and spilling over into the European Debt Crisis and accompanying austerity
policies (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013; United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee 2011).
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(1992) as the “end of history.” That consensus, the result of the demise of a bi-polar world
system, was based on the idea that economic and class conflict were no longer drivers of history;
instead, political debates were to be based on culture (Huntington 1996). The end of history was
to be one where market capitalism inevitably led to liberal democracies grounded in Western
notions of private property, economic development, and individual responsibility. However,
unlike the polluting and tedious economy of industrial capitalism, with its workers unions,
workplace injuries, and soulless factories, this new economy traded in information and used
“knowledge workers.” These workers were so different from their industrial forebears that they
had “managed to reverse the traditional relationship between employers and employee” claiming
dignity and value with no need for the social protections previously guaranteed by the state
(Frank 2000, 202). The end of history was short-lived, however, as the Great Recession of 2008
led Newsweek to run a headline claiming “We are all Socialists Now” (Meacham and Thomas
2009). So ended, supposedly, the “Washington Consensus.”2 Certainly, cracks were apparent in
the façade before 2008 when citizen groups and social activists rejected the free-market policies
spread over the globe by the USA, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Nevertheless, the certainties of the Cold War’s ideological conflict, capitalism against
communism, developed against developing states, free flow of goods and ideas against state
control and sovereignty had been upended. In the aftermath, states project competing visions of
the global political and economic system. International broadcasting, the last bastion of state
controlled international media, arguably provides a critical conduit for the projection of these
visions. In turn, these visions may support the international system, as with America’s Al-Hurra.
Alternatively, they may, as Clinton warned of RT, CCTV, and AJE, challenge the hegemony of

2

The Washington Conesus was one name given to the collection of economic and trade policies
advocated by the US and international economic institutions during the 1990s. See Stiglitz (2003).
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liberal democratic capitalism. This confluence of forces, greater marketization and weakening
faith in capitalism as practiced, technological change opening space in international
communication for greater numbers of actors, and great power conflict presents a scholarly
opportunity to examine the relationship between state-run media and power articulation.
The increase in international broadcasting indicates that states with a variety of political and
economic systems seek platforms to disseminate their views at a global level. Scholars of
international communication, however, have rarely tested the extent to which IB content serves
as a direct articulations of state positions and interests, and have generally not engaged in
systematic and comparative content analysis of IBs (see for example Figenschou 2010; Kasmani
2013b; P. M. Seib 2010; Wu 2013). The relationship between ownership and content – that IBs
serve as conduits for state ideology and foreign policy articulation – is generally assumed rather
than empirically tested. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap in the literature through a
comparative case study of the economic news coverage of four state-sponsored television
channels – China Central Television (CCTV), Al-Jazeera English (AJE), Russia Today (RT),
and Deutsche Welle (DW). Specifically, I examine economic news with the understanding that
the global economic system is subject to contestation between states while also limiting potential
state narratives given the predominance of global capitalist institutions, which limits the ability
of a network to challenge the global system, their counter-hegemonic potential. In the remainder
of this introduction I explore the background and significance of my study, identify gaps in the
academic literatures that address international broadcasters, and conclude with an outline of the
dissertation.
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1.1

Background and Significance

Scholars have long acknowledged the historical role and status of international
broadcasters in the global media space as well as the recent increase in their numbers. When IB
networks were founded in the 1930s they served a variety of purposes, from wartime and
political propaganda to colonial administration (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999). The newswires and
shortwave radio systems that signaled the status of developed powers remained important during
the Cold War and became the subject of vigorous debate at the United Nations in their New
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates in the 70s and 80s
(Nordenstreng 2012). Even as American funding for IBs dropped post-Cold War (Cull 2009a),
other states either began or expanded international broadcasting efforts.
Table 1.1 English Language International Broadcasters
Host
Network
Launch Date
Funding
CounModel
try
Public/
France France 24 2006
Commercial
Deutsche
1953
Public
GerWelle
many
Press TV
2007
Public
Iran
3
Japan Nippon
1937
Public
Hoso
(international
Kyokai
radio) 1952
(NHK)
(resumes
World
international
News
broadcasting)
1995
(television)
2000 (global
Public
China China
Central
English)/2012
Television (America)
News
Public/Commercial
Qatar Al-Jazeera 1996/2005
English
(English)/2013
(America)
3

Annual
Budget

Audience/
Reach

Languages

€123m
(2010)
€271m
(2012)
N/A
N/A

43.5m
(2011)
80-90m
per week
N/A
273m
households
worldwide

3

N/A

170.92m
(2010)

6

N/A

100m
(Est.)

3

Information derived from NHK About website: http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/faq/

30
2
2 (TV)
18
(web
and
radio)
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Host
Country
Russia

Network

Launch Date

Russia
Today

South
Africa

Channel
Africa

South Arirang
Korea5
United
Kingdom
United
States

BBC
World
News
Al-Hurra
TV/Voice
of
America
(Radio)
Telesúr

Funding
Model

Annual
Budget

Audience/
Reach

Languages

2005 (global
Public
English)/ 2010
(America)
1994 (postPublic
apartheid);
2015 (24-hours
TV)4
1996 (2000
Non-profit
worldwide)

$147m
(2008)

200m

3

N/A

N/A

6

N/A

1991 (TV)
(1932
originally)
2006/1942

Public/
Commercial

£66m

123.69m
8
households
worldwide
74m
27
(audience)

Public

$208.8m 141m
(2010)
(audience
for all
media)

43

$10m
(est.)

2

2005
State
Venezuela
Data Sources: (Geniets 2013; Painter 2008)

<1m (est.)

As Table 1.1 shows, no fewer than nine countries have either expanded their IB capacities or
started new ventures since the mid-1990s. Notably, several of these networks started with
English language channels, indicating that their managers desired to communicate to wider
audiences. As a share of a potential global audience, however, English-speakers represent a
relatively narrow, but important, market. The English language is both an artifact of and a
facilitator of cultural and media globalization (Kuppens 2013). English language media, such as
the Financial Times, serve as conduits through which elites communicate and thereby solidify

4

Channel Africa began as shortwave and eventually internet radio. It has only recently made the
transition to television (“SABC Extends 24-Hour News Channel into Africa” 2015).
5
Information derived from Arirang About website:
http://www.arirang.co.kr/PrRoom/about_arirangn1.asp?sys_lang=Eng
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their connections with one another (Corcoran and Fahy 2009). In broadcasters such as AJE,
which are staffed by native-English speakers trained in British or American journalism
traditions, English serves as a means to “build bridges” between cultures but also to show that
AJE is a professional channel worthy of respect from its peers. As such, IBs use of English
indicates which populations they target as well as the kinds of journalists they may seek to hire.
This new wave of IBs, like the waves that preceded it in the 1920s and 1940s, serves as an
indication of state interest in influencing the information available in the global media system.
Scholars acknowledge these trends and examine international broadcasting from two
different groups of literature. The first group includes scholars of public diplomacy who consider
broadcasters to be one part of a broader set of government policies, including cultural diplomacy
and exchanges of citizens, used to reach foreign publics and shift target audience’s perceptions
of the state sponsor (Cull 2009b). Newer scholarship on “strategic narratives” suggest that states
promote specific narratives to frame issues, state actors, and the international system itself
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012). Doing so allows a state to constrain actors to
specific behaviors and influence potential outcomes in geopolitical conflict. Scholars of contraflow and counter-hegemony, for example, have suggested that the Chinese and Russian IBs
represent challenges to the Western dominated global news system (Rantanen 2007; Thussu
2007a). Within these frameworks, the state and state power occupies the foremost position of
analysis and grounds scholarly inquiry. While these scholars recognize IBs as important tools of
state power and often emphasize the potential of IBs to shape public debate. However, specific
content remains unexamined.
When considered as global news media, much of the contemporary literature elides the
role of the state in financing IBs. Scholars in this group approach IBs with a variety of concerns.

14

Scholars of media events examine the role of media, including IBs, in nurturing shared
experiences and identity during major events or disasters (e.g. Couldry, Hepp, and Krotz 2010;
Dayan 2010; Dayan and Katz 1992; Katz and Liebes 2007; Kyriakidou 2008). These scholars
argue that distant people watching those events may come to feel a sense of shared experience,
which is all the more important given the counter-hegemonic and news diversification missions
of several IBs. In turn, several scholars have examined media’s role in eyewitnessing events and
how doing so provides credibility for journalism and journalists (Chouliaraki 2010a, 2006b,
Mortensen 2011b, 2011a; Tait 2011; Zelizer 2007). Others have suggested “globality,” or the
ways in which news constructs the global system itself and its connections to the viewer, as a
means of understanding the power of news (Berglez 2008; Olausson 2013). Literatures on
eyewitnessing and globality emphasize the ways that content can construct a sense of global
citizenship and make distant happenings appear real to audiences, even as most media outlets
lack a truly global reach. Scholars have also begun to conduct ethnographic analyses of IB
journalistic routines (Figenschou 2012; Jirik 2005). Some scholars have also examined
television’s unique characteristics as a medium of images (Silverstone 2007) and its role as a
kind of institutional center of news media (Scannell 2013). These scholars call attention to IB’s
potential to influence global media flows, affect audiences, and diversify the views seen in news
profession. All of these scholarly and theoretical issues directly influence IB’s content and, thus,
ability to project the sponsoring state. However, most of these scholars leave the role of state
sponsorship, interests, and policies aside in favor of event driven coverage focused on particular
regions. The emphasis is not the network per se, but the content concerning particular stories.
My dissertation weds these two bodies of literature by analyzing the extent to which IB
content conforms to the sponsoring government’s policies as well as international
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communication theories of global news. I conduct a comparative case study of the economic
news coverage of four international broadcasters – China Central Television, Al-Jazeera English,
Russia Today, and Deutsche Welle – to test the extent to which each conforms to its sponsoring
state’s policy preferences and evaluate whether structural differences between them such as
journalistic training and/or domestic media system norms influence their content.
The scholarly significance of this project resides in bringing together the study of public
diplomacy, strategic narratives, contra-flow, and international media studies as well as the
particular contributions it makes to each of them individually. Scholars of public diplomacy,
strategic narratives, and contra-flows have registered the increase in the number of international
broadcasters (McNair 2006; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014; P. M. Seib
2010; Snow 2010; Thussu 2007a). At the same time, there have been few studies that engage
with the textual content of IBs; and these typically do not provide analysis of state interests (see
for example Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2013, 2014). The lack of comparative, contentoriented analysis of IBs represents a particularly important gap given that prevailing theories
emphasize the role of ideas and ideologies in international relations, state power, and global
news. In these theories, state power is derived from the attractiveness of a particular set of values
(Nye 2009), a narrative capable of constraining behavior (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle
2012), or control over media flows that lead to the normalization of one’s culture (Thussu
2007b). Given the rarity of comparative analysis of content, the actual discourse that serves state
interests remains poorly understood.
Second, this project shifts focus from political or military conflict to economics. The
normalization of neoliberal economic theory is one of the most important power shifts of the last
forty years but previous studies that engage with IB content tend to focus on political events,
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such as elections, (C. Boyd-Barrett and Boyd-Barrett 2010; Kasmani 2013a; Wu 2013) or routine
news coverage (Figenschou 2010; Painter 2008; A. Robertson 2010). Neoliberalism’s prevalence
as a post-Cold War ideological framework has engendered grassroots resistance (Steger,
Goodman, and Wilson 2013) and reconfigured the way states engage with global economic flows
(Harvey 2007; Ong 2006), arguably pitting states against each other in a drive to be more
competitive. In this context, international broadcasters are potential sites of economic
contestation that have been underexplored.
Finally, this dissertation is one of the few comparative analyses of IB news that uses
more than two broadcasters. Scholars that examine IB content tend to focus on Al-Jazeera
English (AJE), typically as a test of the extent to which AJE is truly an alternative to IB
mainstays such as BBC (Barkho 2008; Kasmani 2013b) or as a control for comparison with
newer broadcasters such as Telesúr (Painter 2008) or Channel News Asia (Wu 2013). Only the
work of Geniets (2013) on reception of IB content and Robertson’s (2015) book Media and
Politics in a Globalizing World attempt a large scale comparison between several international
broadcasters. Interestingly, studies of IB content tend to be grounded in contra-flow theory
(Thussu 2007a). They, thus, typically focus on whether a given network is “counter-hegemonic”
(i.e. does it represent an ideological alternative). Questions of the role of the state or political
power tend to get lost in the analysis. By analyzing content empirically, comparatively, and
systematically, this dissertation tests the prevailing theories of international broadcasting within
and beyond contra-flow theory, strategic narratives, and public diplomacy while examining the
ways content does or does not support state interests.

17

1.2

Plan of Dissertation

In the following chapters, I examine and compare international broadcasters’ economic
news content with particular attention to the degree it conforms to state economic interests. I also
situate international broadcaster’s role within each state’s public diplomacy program as well as
its larger national media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Chapter 2 contextualizes my study
within the broader literature and outlines the details of my mixed-methodological approach. It
establishes the need for analysis of content to test theories of global media, strategic narratives,
and public diplomacy. It also contextualizes the resurgence of IBs within trends of greater
marketization and neoliberalization of the global economy and national economic systems.
In Chapter 3, I provide a short founding history, analysis of each IB’s funding structures,
general programming, and its economic news programming analyzed in this dissertation. In
addition, I contextualize the place of each IB within each sponsoring state’s public diplomacy
program to deepen understanding of the role of IBs among the variegated tools states use to
reach foreign publics. Finally, I detail each state’s economic interests and recent policies to
provide a baseline to judge the conformity between broadcaster content and the state sponsor.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide the bulk of my analysis of economic news content. Chapter 4
examines the ways in which the flagship economic programs discursively construct domestic or
national economic news for their global audiences. In particular, I examine sponsoring state
narratives and test the degree to which IB content projects preferred state identities and
narratives. Chapter 5 follows a similar procedure to Chapter 4, but examines international news
items. It analyzes if and how IB news coverage reflects state interests concerning regional and
global economic policies as well as the status of the sponsoring state in the international
economic system. Because three of the four broadcasters claim to operate outside prevailing
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norms of the international media system, I also test the degree to which IBs instrumentalize
counter-hegemonic discourse in the service of projecting state narratives. Chapter 6 moves
beyond analysis of the dedicated economic news programs to examine how regular IB newscasts
cover economic protests. In contrast to the business programs, which rarely cover protests and
offer versions of the global economy unmarred by grassroots conflict, analyzing protest coverage
reveals the ways broadcasters project economic actions from below and if they vary from more
elite driven economic news. Chapter 7 draws together the findings outlined in Chapters 4
through 6. It provides a summary of my findings and analyzes how they inform theoretical views
of international broadcasting and global media. It also situates my findings within the large
political and populist shifts seen in the USA and Europe. I conclude with recommendations,
limitations, and recommendations for future research.

19

2

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS AND THE “GLOBAL WAR OF IDEAS”
The number of 24-hour private news outlets increased from a handful in the early 1990s

to well over a hundred by 2010 (Rai and Cottle 2010). The proliferation of private news outlets
was part of a broad set of patterns characterizing media and the world political system at the end
of the Cold War. The ideological conflict between capitalism and communism that typified the
post WWII world was to give way to what Fukuyama (1992) heralded as the “end of history;”
states would gradually wither as global networks of free trade and capital would lead, ultimately,
to prosperity. Seminal critiques of the economic consensus of the 1990s and early 2000s
emphasized variously the ideological uniformity of the business press (Frank 2000), the culturalideological package of Western media exports (Schiller 2009), and the homogenization of news
media around pro-business and infotainment models of journalism (McChesney 2008; Thussu
2007c). While such critiques existed, intensified market pressures suggested that states would
gradually succumb to capitalism just as communism had.
The number of actors on the world stage has also increased, with NGOs, citizens,
activists, terrorist groups, and stateless nations all contributing to the mix of global media voices.
In this milieu, states and their governments appeared anachronistic, unnecessary in an age of
hyper-capitalism. States, however, did not go meekly away, rather they continuously explore
new mechanisms for leveraging new communication technologies and in many cases are
zealously pursuing complex strategies for adding their own voices to this cacophony (Price
2014). Paralleling this rise in private broadcasters and social media, state-funded IBs have
proliferated, representing a renewal of direct state participation in producing global media.
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Several, such as Iran’s Press TV and Venezuela’s Telesúr, broadcast from the “periphery” to the
“core”6 nations of the industrialized capitalist world.
All this is to say that states, like other actors, are leveraging media to (re)assert power on
the global stage. In turn, greater financing of international communication strategies illustrates
increasing state interest in exercising power through language; international broadcasters, at least
theoretically, act as a conduit for that power articulation. This dissertation utilizes the definition
of power derived from Habermas and McCarthy’s (1977) analysis of Arendt, Weber, and
Parsons’ scholarship and holds that power is the ability to accomplish particular goals, either
individually or collectively.7 Leaving aside coercion, as it does not pertain to this discussion, I
am concerned here with states use of media, and through them language, to achieve their policy
aims, specifically economic ones. Price (2002) suggests that states achieve this power through
their sovereignty; the ability to make and enforce laws and monopolize the use of force,
supported by a connection between a given state and some form of identity. Media influence, in
Price’s thinking, reifies identity and rationalizes a state’s sovereignty through imagery, and as
such states would prefer to have a “monopoly over media imagery” (2002, p. 26). In the case of
international broadcasting, states challenge the media sovereignty of other states; and as I
demonstrated in the introduction governments in the developed West have taken notice (C-SPAN
2011; Nimmo and Eyal 2016).
States predicate their financing of international broadcasting’s renaissance, in part, on
diversifying news or providing different perspectives to CNN or BBC. For example, upon its

This language is taken from Wallerstein’s (2004) world system theory in which of the rich nations being
the core and the poorer ones the periphery.
7
This is not to simply ignore the substantive differences between the three scholars reviewed. They differ
on coercion and persuasion, self-interest and collective interests, power as a process versus teleological
point. One point they agree on is that power is the capacity to produce change in the world.
6
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launch, AJE’s Nick Parsons claimed the station would, “target an international audience and fill
a gap in international news… that is not filtered through the lens of the West” (as cited in Powers
2012, 19). Similarly the mission of France 24 is to “cover international current events from a
French perspective” (Kuhn 2010, 270). In turn, a variety of scholars have acknowledged these
goals and international broadcaster’s potential to fulfill them (e.g. McNair 2006; Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014; P. M. Seib 2010; Snow 2010; Thussu 2007a).
However, such scholarly engagement is fitful and relatively few have given IBs sustained
attention. We can fruitfully divide these scholarly efforts into two different but inter-related
strands of research. The first group – composed of scholars of strategic narratives, public
diplomacy, and contra-flow – emphasizes states and their role in the global communication
system (see for example Hayden 2013a; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Thussu
2007a). These scholars’ primary concerns lay with the actions and policies of states and the
actors within them. They highlight IBs as extensions of their state sponsor and their interests and,
thus, as tools of state power. The second group of scholars is united more by their interest in
global media and its immense potentialities to counter dominant ideologies, eyewitness news
events, and contribute to a sense of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism as opposed to the
role of states (see for example Berglez 2008; Chouliaraki 2010b; Cottle 2009; Figenschou 2011;
A. Robertson 2015; Zelizer 2007). These scholars in analyze and compare different network
content, typically as a means of evaluating a communication theory or exploring particular
events such as elections or armed conflict. In the process, the state’s role as broadcasting sponsor
tends to be lost and a possible explanatory factor in IB content remains underexplored. Both lines
of inquiry are necessary to account for IBs and to understand what they provide for both viewers
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and their state sponsor. The group, focused on state power, elucidate the primary logic of IBs’
creation while the second group provides additional detail on the journalistic practices IBs use.
While all media, arguably, play an important role as conduits between political
establishments and the public (sometimes foreign or domestic), international broadcasters are in
a unique position – they are embedded both within the structures of the state and also act as
media organizations subject to competition with other media actors as well as the demands of
their audiences. The research and methods of this dissertation evolved out of a pairing of these
two complementary but often disparate groups of literature: those who use theories of public
diplomacy, strategic narratives, and contra-flow who emphasize the role of states, and global
media scholar who emphasize the power of media. The first two sections of this chapter provide
a detailed analysis of these two approaches vis-à-vis my comparative study of Al-Jazeera (AJE),
China Central Television (CCTV), Deutsche Welle (DW), and Russian Today’s (RT) flagship
economic news programs. The third section examines the literature on the role of economic
journalism, media market liberalization, and the neoliberal ideological framework that
undergirds them. Using economic news with a case study approach facilitates analysis of a
bounded phenomenon, financial journalism, as it manifests in IB content. This manifestation, I
argue, should be influenced by state interests, journalism norms derived both from financial
journalism and national norms, and the broader ideological framework of capitalism itself. In
short, economics provides a playing field for state to state conflict, but also potentially for
ideological conflict. I then detail my research questions and methods and conclude with
limitations.
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2.1

Agents of State, Agents of Power

International broadcasters exist, at their most fundamental level, because a state made a
conscious decision to fund a broadcaster, among other methods, to reach foreign publics. As
such, when I say that strategic narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow literatures explore
international broadcasters as tools of states I am also saying, obliquely, that state power, the
ability of governments to achieve change in the world, is a primary concern of their analyses. In
turn, scholars examine IBs as one asset among several that states use to influence foreign public
opinion. However, even while the number of IBs has increased, and many scholars have
acknowledged this, IBs and their unique role as news outlets and their journalistic content are
overlooked. In particular, while the claim that IBs serve their state sponsor’s interests is logical,
it is rarely rigorously tested. As Painter, one of the few who has conducted analysis of IB
content, says: “there seems little doubt that many of the state-funded channels are a means of
augmenting national prestige in the way that a national airline might,” and in some cases, “they
also exist to propagate a particular political perspective favorable to the funder” (2008, 5).
Research grounded in public diplomacy has identified IBs as an element of state efforts to
reach foreign publics (Cull 2009b), but have not focused on them to a great degree. Scholars
such as Hayden (2011, 2013a) and Pamment (2012, 2013) both note the increasing numbers of
international broadcasters and suggest IBs’ importance as public diplomacy tools. However,
neither provides truly sustained attention to these networks. For example, Hayden’s (2011)
assessment of soft power policy rhetoric focuses on political elites, but does not engage with
many elites’ desire for an international broadcaster. Likewise, Pamment’s (2013) analysis of
German public diplomacy does not address the German international broadcaster Deutsche
Welle. Zöllner’s (2006a) analyses of Deutsche Welle’s Arabic channel uses interviews to
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understand Middle Easterners’ reactions to the network. However, Zöllner does not engage with
content or comparison, though he does suggest analysis of content as a site for future research (p.
178). Additional analyses of Russian (Avgerinos 2009; Simons 2014) and Chinese (Hong 2011;
Jirik 2005; J. Wang 2011; X. Zhang 2011) public diplomacy activities register the importance of
media, but then shift to the broader public diplomacy programs in which states embed IBs,
leaving broadcasters aside.
Similarly, scholars who study the attempts of states to put forward “strategic narratives”
as a means of binding action in the world system acknowledge the rise of IBs, but do not provide
it with lasting consideration. For example, in Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and
the New World Order, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle claim that several states have
“invested in multilingual transnational television in remarkably similar ways” (2013, 4).
However, they only examine the BBC, not new channels such as CCTV and RT and do not fully
explicate the specific role of international broadcasters in promoting strategic narratives. An
earlier paper suggests that IBs serve as one part of a broader communication infrastructure that
incorporates digital distribution and uses several outlets to disseminate narratives (Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012). Similarly, though Price has acknowledged international
broadcasting’s importance repeatedly (Price 2002, 2003; Price, Haas, and Margolin 2008), but in
his most recent work (2014) international broadcasting tends to be lost in the discussion of state
interests, technology, and infrastructure. For example, in a brief discussion of the ongoing
Ukrainian crisis, he notes only that Russia made use of its Russia Today network to foster its
own narrative of the crisis.
It was the perception of bias in Western news narratives that motivated states like Russia
(“About RT” 2016) or China (CCTV 2010) consciously market their IBs as a contribution to
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diversifying global information provision; and Thussu’s (2007a) often cited mapping of
dominant flows and subaltern contra-flows suggests that the West may be facing more
competition in news provision.8 While media flows scholars have typically focused on
entertainment television, likely because it constitutes the bulk of international media content
(Biltereyst and Meers 2000; Miller 2010), newer research on news flows suggests potential
contra-flows in the form of international broadcasters. Thussu argues that state sponsored
networks such as CCTV and RT represent potential subaltern flows and show “the importance of
the English language as the key to success for global commerce and communication” and that
IBs are part of a larger public diplomacy strategy designed to bring Chinese and Russian views
to a global audience (Thussu 2007a, 13). Unfortunately, that is all he says about new IBs; his
analysis focuses on the overwhelming economic dominance of Western media or the ideological
conversion of domestic news towards Western models. In another case, events like the Iraq War
motivated US networks to use and acknowledge the visual feeds of Al-Jazeera (Wessler and
Adolphsen 2008a). Similarly, Rantanen (2007) calls CCTV and RT, “recent attempts to provide
global contra-flows in news, supported by government” (p. 175). Hong’s (2011) analysis of the
Xinhua news agency, Sakr’s (2007) work on Al-Jazeera, and Keane’s (2006) examination of
new media centers in East Asia all acknowledge the potential for contra-flows, but, again, do not
engage with content and a rigorous testing of the theory remains elusive.
The lack of comparative, content-oriented analysis of IBs represents a particularly
important opening given that prevailing theories emphasize the role of ideas and ideologies in
international relations and state power. In these theories, state power is derived from the

While Thussu’s scholarship is primarily concerned with media, over states, he uses nations and national
economic data as the object of analysis in his work and, therefore, states remain the key focal points of
media production and distribution in his schema
8

26

attractiveness of a particular set of values (Nye 2009), a narrative capable of constraining
behavior (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012), or control over media flows that lead to
the normalization of specific cultural packages (Thussu 2007b). In these ways, language use is a
form of power exercised by a state via its international broadcaster.
Academic consideration of public diplomacy is intimately connected to work on soft
power pioneered by Nye and Keohane (1998), where soft power draws attention to the discursive
and ideational aspects of international relations (Cross 2013; Hayden 2011). As Hayden (2011)
notes, the emphasis in definitions of public diplomacy appears to be on “influence” (p. 9); and
“attractive power” and “soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye
2009, 333). Said attraction is not derived from force; instead, it is based in smart policy and
attractiveness of values, both of which rely on communication. In an increasingly interdependent
world, information flows are “vital for international interactive processes to occur. Therefore,
whoever exerts the greatest control over those processes, may find themselves in a greater
position of power” (Rogerson 2000, 425–26). IBs are one aspect of state efforts to secure soft
power; and in an interconnected world, where news networks seek images captured near events,9
IBs may have the capacity to alter information flows and thus shape soft power attraction.
Strategic narratives are a relatively new object of research pioneered by international
relations scholars such as Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2012). In their view, the
communication and dissemination of narratives in an ever more complex “media ecology” is a
primary means by which states attempt to influence and constrain other international actors; and
international broadcasters are a key dissemination platform for those narratives. Strategic
narratives have two functions: first, they shape behavior; second, they constitute identity.

9

For example, during the Iraq War, while AJ was being decried by the Bush administration, their images
were widely used by American cable and broadcast news (Wessler and Adolphsen 2008a).
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Narratives influence audiences by constituting actors, systems, conflicts, and information
infrastructures they also signal right and wrong behaviors. As such, actors who violate a given
narrative damage their legitimacy (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013).10 Theories of
strategic narratives suggest that IBs will deploy narratives that serve the interests of their state
sponsors and thus project state power. The focus of the theory is on the rhetorical power of
narratives to shape behavior; but international broadcasters, a key means of spreading that
narrative, remain an underexplored aspect of this work.
Similarly, Thussu’s (2003, 2007c) main complaint about uneven international media
derives from his concern that Western media carries with it the ideological package of
consumerism and spectacle. They also emphasize the degree to which Western news norms or
consumerism constrain the potential of contra-flow and thus possible resistance to the American
led global order. In each case, the theory emphasizes the expanding role of discourse in securing
a state’s desired policy or interpretation of events or, in the case of contra-flow theory, the
relative weakness of contra-flow, particularly ones operating outside of neoliberalism’s ideology
of consumerism in the face of dominant Western media flows. As such, scholars theorize,
logically, that IBs project state interests and do so via some form rhetorical action. Nevertheless,
content specific studies that test these propositions remain scarce.

10

Narratives are strategic to the extent that actors craft narratives to secure particular ends. But actors are
also constrained by the resources that can be crafted into a narrative in general, and hegemonic narratives
that resist new interpretations in particular (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013).
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2.2

International Broadcasters and the Global Media: Trends and Patterns in News
Norms
Without undermining the value of the preceding research, it is fair to say that few

scholars have engaged with the actual content output of IBs, despite calls for more “holistic”
research into them (Hanusch and Obijiofor 2008). Scholars who operate from a contra-flow
perspective and use methodologies such as content analysis (Painter 2008) and critical discourse
analysis (Barkho 2011) have analyzed IB content but typically without attention to states’ role in
international broadcasting. Furthermore, they have tended to focus on Al-Jazeera English. These
scholars provide important indications of what we can expect when studying IB content and the
ways in which they cover news. This is what I call their “news norms,” that is the ways in which
they use onsite reporting, interviews, and reporting in their coverage. As such, studies of global
journalism and IB content elucidate the form and contours of coverage, but less so its potential
function as a projection of state power. However, they have important limitations given their
focus on AJE over other networks and their focus on newscasts and web article content over
newsmagazines. Finally, much of this scholarship predates Qatar’s recent defunding of AlJazeera and other outreach efforts (BBC 2015b). For example, while scholarship shows that AJE
focuses on the Global South more than BBC or CNN, the extent to which networks like RT or
CCTV focus on underreported regions remains underexplored. In addition, previous
scholarship’s analysis of newscasts, while important, misses the specialized content that makes
up much of a 24-hour news station’s schedule. Nevertheless, these studies provide valuable
insights into the visual, journalistic, and editorial approaches of their respective objects of study.
Before reviewing scholarly analyses of IB content, I must register a caveat. While there is
a wide variety of scholarship on how global news covers crisis (Cottle 2009) or crafts a sense of
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global citizenship (Berglez 2008; Chouliaraki 2006b), I do not examine these possibilities with
great depth. First, journalistic depictions of crisis is not the subject of this dissertation and nor is
the possibility of producing a cosmopolitan frame of mind. All of these possibilities are
interesting, and certainly deserving of further study, but I am resolved in this dissertation to
question several fundamental assumptions about international broadcasters and the content they
carry. My primary focus is on whether or not IBs do serve the interests of the state by projecting
narratives or frames and how they operate to do so. Likewise, I am not concerned with counterhegemony and contra flow per se, but rather its potential instrumentalization by international
broadcasters and the possibilities of such to support state interests. Consequently, my emphasis
and review of the literature draws on work that either theorizes international broadcasting as an
aspect of state power or directly analyzes its content. At bottom, the key question addressed here
is how and if states use economic news to project state narratives.
Taken together, available analysis of IB content paints a mixed picture. Figenschou’s
(2010, 2011, 2012) developing body of work suggests that AJE, for example, is qualitatively and
quantitatively different from traditional Western outlets and is, thus, a form of alternative contraflow, at least in some limited sense. Conducting a quantitative content analysis of the main news
hour, she determined that AJE is a contra-flow in terms of geographical source of stories (South
vs. North), use of independent over establishment elites, and amount of coverage devoted to the
Global South. To the extent that any network defines itself in a similar way to AJE, we might
expect that the network will cover parts of the world ignored by traditional global news outlets
like CNNI and BBC, as well as use non-elite sources. Given its skill and intelligence, her content
analysis framework informs my own as a way of testing the extent to which the broadcasters
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analyzed here live up to any claim to diversify news flows and to uncover which features suggest
state interests.
Other scholars have conducted critical discourse analyses and shifted focus to power in
news discourse (Barkho 2008, 2011, Kasmani 2013a, 2013b; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Wu 2013).
The results of these studies suggest that new international broadcasters at least have the potential
to provide alternatives to traditional global news such as the BBC or CNN but fall short in key
respects. Kasmani’s (2013a, 2013b) analysis of BBC and AJE’s Iranian election coverage shows
that networks stake out different interpretations of political events, providing options for
audiences. Similarly, Barkho (2011) argues that AJE distinguishes itself from BBC through its
equity in source quotation and coverage. Wu (2013) analyzed Channel New Asia (CNA), as
compared to AJE, and found that CNA failed to “gather news images and opinions from people
on the ground, especially when it came to protests and demonstrations” (p. 95). Finally, OzohuSuleiman (2014) compared AJE and Iran’s Press TV coverage of the Israel Palestinian conflict
and found that both networks produced pro-Palestinian frames, but they also produced “war
journalism” that normalized armed conflict. Taken together, the preceding scholarship suggests
that AJE, compared to other new international broadcasters in particular, may function as a
contra-flow in terms of giving “voice to the voiceless” and covering traditionally under covered
parts of the world, but also conform to traditional patterns in coverage of specific topics. None of
these studies relates content to state interests.
Of the limited work that analyzes networks other than AJE, Robertson (2014) and Painter
(2008) stand out and helpfully complicate the idea that IBs connected to states opposed to the
West are necessarily propagandistic. Their analyses of Russia Today (A. Robertson 2014) and
Telesúr (Painter 2008) newscasts indicated networks that characterize themselves as “counter-
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hegemonic” are not uniform in their approaches to international stories and do not necessarily
falsify news. Instead, their story selection reflects both the interests of Latin Americans and the
Venezuelan government. For example, Telesúr emphasized Nicaraguan elections instead of
American elections, both of which occurred in 2008. Alternatively, Borchers (2011) argues that
RT consistently projects narratives of its Baltic neighbors that associate resistance to Russian
interests with fascism as a way to undermine Western oriented governments. These findings
further suggest that IBs cannot be simplified as crude governmental mouthpieces without
analysis of content and comparison between networks.
While the studies in the two groups of literature examined above provide useful insights
into international broadcasting, they often speak past each other and thus omit key aspects of
broadcasters. Scholars whose focus remains on states and their communication efforts argue that
IBs are a state tool. While logical, this claim remains more or less untested and the ways in
which IBs may or may not support state narratives remains unexamined. Scholarly examination
that treats IBs as artifacts of global news too often elide their origin as state tools for power
projection. While their observations inform my methodological approach, and my ultimate
argument, the key question of how states use the news to project power remains, likewise,
unexamined.
Another important feature of these studies is their focus on political content/conflict or
routine news coverage. As such, these analyses examine international broadcasters in political
terms, either as conveyers of political information, or as political tools. Nevertheless, IBs can
also disseminate discourse on wider fields of human endeavor, such as the economy. Because
neoliberalism was and is, in part, the product of contestation and debate, we can also expect that
IBs have the potential to contest it. The lack of focus on economic news might indicate that it is
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not a worthwhile subject of inquiry. However, economic theories and doctrines are also subject
to contestation, and IBs potentially play a role in that contestation.

2.3

The Neoliberal Turn and Financial Journalism: Making the Case for Economics
My analysis of the academic literature on international broadcasters suggests that there is

an academic opportunity to combine the best insights of the two groups of literature – statecentric and network-centric – described above through a comparative examination of IB content
and state’s specific policies and interests. Doing so complements both sets of research and help
to build theories that explain IBs content and their broader place in the global media system.
Having identified this gap, however, still leaves the question of what specific content to explore,
or put another way, what news beat to explore; what should form the basis of my case study of
IB content. We have seen that content and discourse analyses of IBs typically examine specific
political events or regular newscasts, however, I decided to conduct a case study on specialty
economic news.
A case study approach provides several advantages. First, case studies provide specific
examples of how phenomena function and allow scholars to check those examples against each
other to reveal essential qualities of that phenomenon. When it comes to IB content we are
lacking in such examples and a “discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case
studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 272).
Exemplars, importantly, serve as a signpost for future study, allowing disciplines to thrive and
develop. Second, case studies build theory when they provide thick descriptions and clear steps
which others can follow. Because in the specifics of the “case the potential to recognize a
universal truth” exists well developed case studies can elucidate the weaker parts of a given
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theory (Rule and John 2015, 3). In this dissertation, for example, while well-developed theories
of international broadcasting, such as public diplomacy, exist, they often have limited
examination of content or cases to support their assertions, instead relying on governmental
rhetoric to support their claims (for example Hayden 2013a; Pamment 2013; Zöllner 2006b).
Third, at least some scholars have adopted case study approaches to examining public diplomacy
in general and IBs specifically. Painter (2008), for example, conducted a case study comparing
Al-Jazeera English and Telesúr selecting examples of elections and political conflicts that
directly implicated their state sponsors and showed that the latter broadcaster was not simply
propagandistic. Cull (2009b) also selected several paradigmatic examples of success and failure
in public diplomacy to illustrate his broader taxonomy of the phenomenon. Case studies, in short,
permit a sophisticated analysis, which then informs theoretical understandings of international
broadcasting.
The rest of this section illustrates why economics represents a useful and valuable case
for examining IB content and testing its congruence to state interests. As seen above, several
scholars argue that international broadcasters articulate and project state power and have the
potential to diversify global information flows. When the subject is economics, however, they do
so within an ideological framework that has transformed the global economy and international
system of economic governance. I adopt Harvey’s position that neoliberalism is a “political
project” and a political economic theory that holds economic prosperity can be secured through
liberating “individual entrepreneurial freedoms… within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (2007, 2).11

Neoliberalism is the term describing the ideology while “neoliberalization” is the term used to describe
the process of making a given system more neoliberal in it makeup and functions.
11
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Developed in the 1940s, the application of neoliberalism intensified in the 1970s with
“stagflation” in the West, South American states’ debt crises, and its institutionalization in global
economic organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Prashad
2008).12 In the ensuing years, the US and Europe as well as the World Bank and IMF have
imposed neoliberalism on cash starved states who often had little choice but to radically change
domestic policies (Harvey 2006, 2007), and thereby give up a portion of their control over
domestic economic and media policy (R. H. Brown 2002). Economic news programs are, to
some extent, an extension of neoliberalization, reflecting the growing prevalence of finance as a
mode of economic activity and everyday life (Martin, 2002). In addition, the increase of
financial news in non-Western media markets, as documented by Chakravartty and Schiller
(2010), further suggests that the neoliberalization documented by Harvey (2007) remains
prevalent.13 In this sense, capital as personified by a global capitalist class has interests that
compete with other sectarian interests such as nationalism, religion, or other political ideologies.
However, even though neoliberalism has been successful in remaking the global order its
application has been uneven.
To some extent, it is certainly true that international economic organizations imposed
neoliberal economics on weak and cash starved nations. However, viewing neoliberalism as only
externally-imposed misses the variations of state responses to its imposition, which are
conditioned by their unique historical trajectories and interests (Beck 2005; Ong 2006). States
remain the primary site for media and communication lawmaking and regulation; therefore,

12

While its policy package of structural adjustment, austerity, and monetarism were often unpopular and
ineffective, they came backed by the considerable power of the United States and Europe through the
World Bank and IMF (H.-J. Chang 2008; Stiglitz 2003).
13
While neoliberalism remains a prevalent ideological force in economic discourse and policy, it has
never completely sidelined alternative forms of capitalism such as Keynesian economics or avoided
criticism, as evidenced by repeated protests at meetings of the G-7, G-20, IMF, and World Bank.
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states do shape the contours of domestic media neoliberalization to support their policy goals
(Morris and Waisbord 2001). In 2003, for example, the head of China Central Television
(CCTV) announced that all television, with the exception of news, would be judged on its ability
to pull in advertising revenues (Zhu 2012). As such, while non-news media content in China
proliferated and generated large profits for CCTV news content remained subject to strict
government monitoring.
In Russia, despite that country’s ostensible shift to liberal market democracy, the state
and media remain closely connected. Russian media firms, in theory private enterprises, hire
managers who work closely with the government in what Vartanova (2012) calls a
commercialized statist model. Like China, Russia needs profit driven media for government
revenue. However, instead of a profit driven liberal democratic media system promised by
neoliberalism (Steger 2008), because of the “combined function of political power and market
force[s],” media markets are defined by “parameters determined by the state and the mechanism
of state control evolves as media marketization develops” (Meng and Rantanen 2015, 7). Despite
the proliferation of media outlets in both Russia and China “most big media have remained
mainly under government control” (Rantanen 2007, 175). The Russian and Chinese states’
centrality in their respective political and economic systems means that government elites use
media to foster nationalist sentiments based on sovereignty or language, while transformations
concerning media’s function mean they also function as commercial ventures. As such, Russia
and China’s trajectory contrasts with traditional Western notions of media development (Meng
and Rantanen 2015; Rantanen 2007, 175; Zhao 2012).
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In those European states that are democratic and have public service broadcasters (PSB),
neoliberalization as well as Europeanization14 has signaled major changes in the role of the state,
but without the central role seen in Russia. European PSBs are drawn between neoliberalism’s
proscription to limit the role of the state (Jakubowicz 2010) and European Union policies
designed to foster a collective European identity (Połońska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2011).
Gollmitzer’s (2008) analysis of different drafts of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive
indicates that EU lawmakers shift their emphasis between PSBs’ role in fostering cultural
development through relevant programming and the desire of the European Commission to make
media a profitable sector of the economy. The BBC, for example, is now divided between a
publicly-funded domestic branch and a commercially-funded international branch (Chalaby
2010), and the German broadcaster, ARD faced court challenges when it attempted to enter into
digital television (Woldt 2010). In both cases, PSBs found themselves reacting to market forces
that constrained the potential of their cultural or political remit.
In the Middle East, where governments often tightly monitor media, private media firms
have run into a combination of religious conservatism and geopolitics. Kraidy (2013) observes
that a Bahraini version of Big Brother brought about conflict between traditional religious values
versus the fitness for foreign investment. He further suggests that conflict over content can
actually lead to “structural changes in industry” when states put pressure on private channels
who then must move to operate under different jurisdictions. In Qatar, the ruling family invested
in Al-Jazeera at the same time it connected itself to flows of people and capital to shift away
from petroleum extraction as their primary revenue source (Abduljawad 2015; Fromherz 2012).

14

Europeanization is the process by which European Union members legal and political system are
brought into line with broader rules defined by the European Parliament and Commission (Cowles,
Caporaso, and Risse 2001).
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Rather than a movement towards homogenization of media systems feared by some
scholars (O. Boyd-Barrett and Xie 2008; e.g. O. Boyd-Barrett 1980; McChesney 2008), these
examples suggest that states have adopted different media models in response to the pressures of
neoliberal media reform put forward by the World Bank, IMF, and US. Yet literature that
addresses neoliberalization tends to cast states, with the possible exception of the US, as more or
less passive recipients of neoliberal thought. While scholars have acknowledged that states
respond to neoliberalism in historically, political, and culturally situated ways, they tend to elide
the possibility that states may speak back to neoliberalism in particular ways. McChesney, for
example, writes, “The U.S. government… aggressively and persistently acted as if only a profitdriven media system… could be considered acceptable…. As many nations came up short in that
department, the government worked to eliminate barriers,” to US modes of commercial media
(2008, 313). While he does acknowledge that sectorial class interests in a variety of states may
support or oppose neoliberalization, he does not take into account that many states have newly
acquired international broadcasting capacities, and that those states might use those capacities to
support or challenge neoliberal economics or other state’s position within that framework.
Indeed, recent developments suggest that some states desire to reshape the global
architecture of neoliberal capitalism without necessarily promoting an alternative. Policy
initiatives such as Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2014; Eurasian
Economic Commission 2014) and China’s New Silk Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) projects (Tiezzi 2015; Simpfendorfer 2009) indicate that states are actively working
to craft different institutions and regional organizations alongside neoliberal mainstays such as
the IMF and World Bank. In the long term, it is an open question as to what these developments
mean for the global economy and geopolitics. They do imply, however, that neoliberalism drives
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states to be competitive as sites of global capital investment. On the other hand, forums like the
Eurasian Economic Union may also indicate that states are interested in changing the design of
economic governance.
The examples above indicate that state responses to neoliberal media reform vary given
the actual media system and political interests of the respective state. As such, neoliberalism
remains the dominant ideological framework that IB economic news must engage. Within this
framework, greater marketization necessarily shifts the ground on which states project economic
narratives as well as the language of dedicated financial media and economics broadly defined.
Following in the footsteps of McCloskey (1998), several rhetorical scholars explored the
“rhetoric of economics,”15 or the ways in which actors use language to legitimize particular
economic theories and ideologies. They suggest that rhetorical topoi (topics) and styles mediate a
public’s relationship with a particular economic system. Aune’s (2001) analysis of American
right-wing economic rhetoric suggests that free market proponents utilized a rhetoric of
“economic correctness” grounded in scientifically positivist theories of how the economy
functions.16 Because economic correctness produces social norms for discussion of the economy,
it also produces social norms that serve as a, “resource for condemning opponents and for
valorizing particular cultural constructions” about the economy (p.24). Economic correctness,
therefore, serves a kind of disciplining function for members of government and media by
demarcating the range of normal economic opinion. In the context of this dissertation, the
rhetoric of economics represents economists’ professional norms. In IB content, rhetoric of

15

See the following scholars for example: (Aune 2001; Chaput 2010; Cloud, Macek, and Aune 2006;
Greene 2004, 2010; Houck 2000; Levasseur 2000; Vivian 2006).
16
As McCloskey (1998) argued, economists tend to style their arguments in the same terms as the hard
sciences and rely on a positivist epistemology, which privileges knowledge derived from statistical
methods.
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economics provides a source of norms and topoi professional journalists and economists draw
upon to frame economic policies and events.
Given that IBs primarily function as news outlets, we must also connect with the
literature on financial journalism to understand how journalists and journalism discursively
construct economics. Lee’s (2014) meta-literature review of “financial journalism” scholarship
suggests that financial journalists typically rely on financial professionals and government
officials as elite sources (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010). In addition, some scholars have argued
that financial journalism does not play a “watchdog” function and fails to seriously question the
arguments of economists or experts (Usher 2013). The growth of finance as a prime area of
economic activity has also enabled the expansion of financial journalism out of print and into
television and cable (Arrese and Medina 2011; Lee 2012) and outside of the West to fast
developing economies in other parts of the world (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010; Shrikhande
2004). However, Lee (2014) suggests that scholars have by and large avoided television and nonWestern sources of financial news as scholarly objects. In addition, since this scholarship focuses
primarily on privately owned networks it does not easily match IBs. It is possible that IBs will
actively use different kinds of sources in the process of articulating state policy or contra-flow
compared to private networks, as scholars’ research on AJE illustrates. The preceding literature
suggests that IBs’ economic coverage may have to serve two masters, one corporate and the
other governmental.
International broadcasters operate at the intersection of state interests and journalism
norms. They must be news, but also something else that meets the needs of their state
benefactors. In addition, financial journalism as a news genre supplies its own norms and
expectations that constrain and enable particular interpretations of economic events.
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Acknowledging the potentially complex interplay of influences on IB content while also testing
the content for its conformity to state interests is crucial to understanding how these new
channels work in a complex media environment.

2.4

Addressing Critical Political Economy

Before moving on the research questions, several factors introduced in the preceding
sections suggest that critical political economy (CPE) and its various theoretical concerns. CPE
scholars “take it as axiomatic that the media must be studies in relation to their place within the
broader economic and social context” (Winseck 2012, 4). Within this framework, scholars study
media as industries, as institutions, their role in shaping and being shaped by market forces, and
their economic effects on society. This project has already tacitly elucidated IBs affinity for CPE
research. I demonstrated that neoliberalization has been a powerful force for media consolidation
but also the proliferation of private 24-hour news stations (Rai and Cottle 2010) and that all four
states analyzed herein have incorporated, to varying degrees, neoliberal polices of privatization
and marketization. I also demonstrated that finance and business media have expanded in size
and scope and have the potential to carry ideological packages concerning economic
development to local elites (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010). Finally, I briefly discussed, and do
so in more depth in the next chapter, that networks like RT, CCTV, and, though not analyzed
here, France 24 bear within their editorial statements and the circumstances of their founding a
profound sense that their state sponsors’ legitimate criticisms of American policies did not
receive due respect or were deliberately distorted. International broadcasters, therefore, enter into
and are a response to a media ecology with high consolidation of enterprises, increasing numbers
of private broadcasters ensconced in Western norms of news production (Thussu 2007b), and a
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hostile Anglo-American dominated global journalism system. CPE scholars would, then,
examine IBs as media institutions: their financing, distribution models, their similarities and
differences to established media companies, the role and effects on society at large, and their
place in the intellectual property regime, each emphasizing different influences in economics,
politics, and technological development.
CPE scholars are, however, not united in how they might situate IBs within the above
trends. A neoclassicist, for example, would likely see the greater number of outlets as signs of
robust competition (Thierer and Eskelsen 2008). In this sense, government intervention is only
necessary to achieve successful markets and IBs would be a wasteful effort to “pick winners” in
an already healthy media market. Thinkers inspired by Schumpterer’s (1942) concept of
“creative destruction” would point to changes in the global media as the inevitable results of
technological changes in media distribution systems. The proliferation of media actors seen by a
variety of scholars (see for example Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013) is the result of
technological change and efforts to preserve the central role of state in media would be an
exercise in futility. The radical school, to give one final example, emphasizes the role of media,
and journalism especially, as a public good which must be protected from complete
marketization for the good of the people and their responsibilities in a democratic system
(McChesney 2004; McChesney and Nichols 2010). Taken to a global level, media consolidation
must likewise be resisted given it potential to homogenize new content in the interests of
corporate bottom lines (Schiller 2009). IBs, in this school of thought, may represent needed
government intervention to correct diversity of perspectives and ideas in journalism and thus
their role as a public good. On the other hand, that CCTV and RT are, presumably, not interested
in informing their audience so as to enhance democracy may suggest that radical CPE thinkers
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would see those networks as state-funded networks that simply provide alternative ideological
packages.
The preceding paragraphs suggest that CPE would be rich theoretical grounds on which
to base my study of international broadcasting, especially given my emphasis on economic
discourse. Certainly this is true, in general, and a CPE analysis of IBs is well and truly needed.
Nevertheless, I do not substantively engage with CPE for three reasons. First, and as discussed
previously IBs are relatively small players in international journalism. They are important, and
the English speaking variants I analyze here are particularly important given their elite
audiences. However, figures of capitalization, consolidation, and revenue are not readily
available for these networks, nor is their raison d’etre profit generation. The amount of money
states invest in these ventures is important, and discussed above and in Chapter 3, but this money
is usually a small fraction of each state’s larger budget for foreign policy activities. With the
exception of AJE, who is part of a globally popular brand, these channels have targeted, rather
than more generalized, influence. Second, my focus remains on IBs and their relationship to their
state sponsor, not the larger media markets in which they operate. In their competition for limited
attention spans, understanding an IB in the context of market competition is also critical to
gaining a full understanding of state’s various public diplomacy efforts, but reception is also not
the main topic of this dissertation. Instead, the main purpose of this project is to first detect the
degree to which IBs project their sponsor’s economic policy and discourse and if so, how they do
so as journalism outlets. Finally, IBs unique status as journalism outlet and tools of state power,
their functionally limitless funding, and their position in a larger firmament of foreign outreach
tools make positioning them as media outlets in a CPE analysis a potentially arduous task. One
that is necessary, of course, but also one beyond the scope of this specific project. With these

43

caveats in mind, I return to the core scholarly home of this project, the role of IBs as tools of
state power and their use of journalism in that goal.

2.5

Research Questions

The literatures above argue that IBs operate as articulations of state power with the purpose
of enhancing the perception of the host state, a practice that is increasing in the early 21st
century. Concurrently, states across the geopolitical spectrum have adapted to neoliberal
economics domestically and internationally, indicating some amount of acquiescence to the
global economic system. These two trends sit uncomfortably next to each other, given that
neoliberalism entails limiting government activity and public diplomacy necessitates government
sponsorship. Certainly, IBs retain value by framing conflict and disputes as well as disseminating
particular political positions, but we do not know the degree to which they conform with state
interests. When the topic is the neoliberal global economy, a system that IB sponsors have
joined, do IBs contest it or support it? We can say that IB economic news content operates at the
intersections of neoliberal capital’s power and state power; but the literature on financial
journalism suggests that business news often fails to question the basis of the economic system.
When the audience and those featured are members of the global business elite, then what kind
economic discourse can be expected? The following research questions are intended to explore
these issues.
•

RQ1: Does an international broadcaster’s economic coverage serve as a direct articulation of
its sponsoring state positions and policies? What are the differences and similarities between
different IB network coverage?
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o

Sub: What national economic identity narratives do flagship economic news
programs project?

o Sub: What system narratives do flagship economic news programs project?
o Sub: To what extent do any of the preceding categories of coverage serve as a direct
articulation of the host nation’s economic policy?
o Sub: How do transnational news outlets discursively construct international economic
protest?
o Sub: Given that economic news output is typically oriented towards elites, what
narratives do international broadcasters project about economic protests?
o Sub: Do economic protest narratives conform to sponsoring state economic interests?
•

RQ2: Does IBs’ content output conform to expectations grounded in the major theories of
international broadcasting?
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to public diplomacy and soft power
theory?
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to strategic narrative theory?
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to contra-flow theory?

•

RQ3: What news norms and patterns of coverage do networks use; do networks that claim to
provide contra-flow and counter-hegemonic coverage actually do so?
These research questions draw our attention to several dynamics that potentially

influence international broadcaster content. First, the degree to which IB content projects state
narratives, as theorists of public diplomacy and strategic narratives suggest they will is unknown.
So too are the factors which may influence coverage. Second, the potential for any of these
networks to be counter-hegemonic, particularly if that is their stated editorial mission remains
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unknown as well. Third, and implied by the two preceding points, the extent to which any new
IB provides something qualitatively different from previous global news outlets and traditional
financial journalism, must also work in concert with state interests. To confirm or deny any of
the RQs, requires and analysis of both news norms, i.e. broadcast content’s particular use of
onsite reporting, interviews, and speakers who convey a news story, and how those features work
to project state narrative. In turn, the methods I apply need to access both features.

2.6

Methodology

In this dissertation, I compare AJE, CCTV, DW, and RT’s flagship economic news
content to each other as well as its respective state sponsors’ economic positions. Because
broadcasters do not confine economic news coverage to flagship programs, I also analyze and
compare newscasts coverage of economic protests both within and between broadcasters.
Dedicated economic news programing caters to elite business audiences (Corcoran and Fahy
2009), and thus provides a limited set of possibilities for state narrative projection and counterhegemony. In contrast, economic protests encompass economic discourse and activity from those
dissatisfied with elements of the economic system and may provide a wider range of discourses.
For each of the two sets of primary source materials I relied on a mixed-methods approach using
a qualitative content analysis and a complementary discourse analysis. Content analysis is
systematic and comparative while critical discourse analysis allows for deeper consideration of
power relationships between states, citizens, and economic actors. Combining these two
approaches ensures analytical rigor with comparative empirical data, while also attuning me to
the ways IB content discursively constructs economic activities. In this way my analysis of
economic news functions as a case study of international broadcaster economic content, which is
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an initial step in developing a more generalized theorization of international broadcasting and its
role in the global media system (Flyvbjerg 2006). In the rest of this section, I detail my discourse
and content analysis procedures and my justification for using these methods. I also examine the
materials I collected and the study period for this project and explain my coding schemes.

2.6.1

Mixed Methods – Content

My analysis began with coding all gathered media texts prior to a deeper textual analysis.
To test the extent that IBs function as public diplomacy, strategic narrative, or contra-flow in
relation to official economic agendas, the coding scheme (see all Appendices) identifies who
speaks, for whom, and of what. I adopted and modified Robertson’s (2010, 2014) coding
schemes from her analyses of mediated cosmopolitanism and IB economic newscast items. Her
(2010) scheme coded news items as domestic, international, or intersectional. Domestic stories
focus only on the network’s country of origin. Intersectional stories focus on the relationship
between the country of origin and one or more other countries. International stories focus on two
or more states that are not the country of origin. In the case of international or intersectional
news items, I also coded the non-host states names in the order they appeared inspired by Cohen
and Atad’s coding framework (2013).
Robertson’s (2014) scheme emphasizes speakers, and codes them as political, economic,
expert, ordinary people, or workers (see Appendices C and D). Political speakers are members of
government Bankers and business people/owners represent economic speakers. Experts include
individuals such as academics, independent economists, or think tank researchers.
Nonprofessionals are “ordinary people” on the street, market, or in their home, perhaps best
represented by the “vox pop” interview. I developed the worker category myself to account for
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speakers who were engaged in economic activity but did not have economic decision making
power.
I placed speakers into specific categories based on their organizational affiliation shown
on screen as well as the role they play as speakers. AJE, for example labeled Martin Lidegaard as
“Danish Foreign Minister,” a clear indication of his role in government. Political figures could
work at national levels as well as regional levels, say the governor or mayor of states and towns,
or supra-national levels, for example IMF President Christine Lagarde. I coded activists as
political figures as well as their activity reflects their engagement with political processes.
Economics figures, in contrast, were typically labeled with words like “president,” “CEO,”
“CFO,” “chairman/woman,” or “founder.” These terms signal that the speaker is in a leading
position in an business enterprise. For experts, the organizational affiliations sometimes confused
coding. If a speaker was affiliated with a university or a think tank and provided analysis of
economic policies or issues then their expert status was relatively clear. However, some speakers
in this category could be labeled “Senior Statistician National Bureau of Statistics” of China. Is
this person a political or expert figure? They are both, surely, but their role in this specific
example is to provide analysis and context, not stump for the government. At some levels this
distinction is unsatisfactory because it presumes neutral engagement with information on the part
of the speaker. That said, their role on the program is to provide authority of expertise. Networks
labeled ordinary people with affiliations like “Seoul resident” or “Hong Kong resident” and even
“mother.” Ordinary speakers spoke to the effects of economic issues and policies and their
remarks lack the authority of expertise or economic leadership. Finally, I distinguished workers
from economic figures as the former, while engaged in economic activity in the form of labor,
did not speak as leaders of business enterprises, as CEOs did. Examples of this category include

48

“sushi deliveryman” and “taxi driver.” While individuals can and do inhabit multiple roles, these
categories are not meant to be completely accurate representations of these individuals but rather
identify the roles which the speaker plays in IB content.
I coded each speaker’s name, organizational affiliation, gender, nationality, and the
network on which they appeared. Of these, nationality was the most difficult as accent, skin
color, and name may only dimly reflect a person professed national identity or citizenship status.
For political figures, for example, this code was simple; Chinese President Xi Jinping is clearly a
citizen of China.17 Several economic or expert figures were also relatively simple given their
high public profile, for example Lego CEO Jorgen Vig Knudstrop is an internationally known
businessperson. In cases where I could not find any secondary or primary sourcing affirming the
national identity of a speaker I left the variable blank. I also adapted Figenschou’s (2010) coding
of AJE newscasts for the location of the story and where the story was reported from i.e. in
studio, onsite, studio interview, onsite interview, or some mixture of the four. Studio items occur
entirely within the studio as a reading of the news by the anchor. Onsite items may be introduced
by an in studio anchor but spend the majority of their time with a correspondent at the location of
news events. Onsite items typically included several interviews. As such, studio and onsite
interviews are distinguished by their focus on a single interview subject, either in studio or at a
different location. Whether a report comes from in the studio or out of it is a reflection both of
relative importance given to the story and the degree the viewer can engage with the subjects of
the story (Chouliaraki 2006b; Figenschou 2012). Finally, I coded each story for the sources of
economic data, for example the UN or the World Bank or central banks like the Federal Reserve,
which were often clearly labeled on the screen. If there was no sourcing given for data (which

17

When speakers were from Hong Kong, they were labeled as such rather than Chinese to reflect the dual
governing structure present in the territory.
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was extremely rare) I noted the presence but not the source of the data. Finally, I coded the main
topic of a given story, labeled issue, as an indication of the principle subject of the story. As with
newspaper headlines (Henry and Tator 2002), the first sentences of a news item illustrate the
broader news topic being discussed. Oil prices, for example, were a common topic during the
study period and anchors introduced items with clear verbal indications that oil was the primary
topic of the item; for example, “the price of oil continues to decline.” Anchor’s subsequent
statements then focus the report; for example, “having an effect on Russia’s economy.” Another
way to think of this distinction is that oil prices are the phenomena or cause and the Russian
economy is the effect. These basic variables allowed me to discern patterns in each broadcaster’s
content and thereby direct my subsequent discourse analysis.

2.6.2

Mixed Methods – Discourse

Critical discourse analysis has many variants and no individual piece of scholarship
incorporates all of them. However, I take inspiration from Dialectical-Relational CDA as a
method designed to engage with the “semiotic dimensions” of social practices, and in turn link
those dimensions to other areas of scholarship in a “transdisciplinary” way (Chouliaraki and
Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1989, 2001). Fairclough (1999; 1989, 2010) argues that social
actors use language in “orders of discourse” that dialectically constrain and enable particular
discourses through the creation of spoken, written, and visual texts. In this dissertation, order of
discourse include state economic interests, norms derived from sponsoring state media systems,
and financial journalism practice. I argue that these orders of discourse interact in the production
of international broadcaster content. Analysis from a CDA perspective encourages the scholar to
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“unmask” ideological discourses and how those discourses maintain, justify, or resist relations of
power through hegemonic closure of possible discursive choices.
CDA is appropriate for this dissertation for several reasons. First, it theorizes and
examines language’s role in naturalizing and contesting power. In addition, CDA can address
large amounts of material, but also provide the analytical and theoretical tools needed to
understand language use at a micro level. IB news content, should it work to project state
narratives, is fundamentally enmeshed in competing power relations between states and is, as
such, amenable to CDA. These materials are semiotic and thus contain a discursive dimension
shaped by the structures in which they were produced. Second, while there has been scholarly
attention to IBs from a variety of perspectives (Hayden 2011; Jowett and O’Donnell 1999;
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2003; Thussu 2007a), very few have
systematically and comparatively examined their content (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2014).
CDA’s focus on deep textual analysis and the role of power in shaping discourse means that this
dissertation provides one of the first empirically grounded analyses of economic news coverage
by IBs in comparative perspective with an emphasis on state power.
CDA, in addition to being an appropriate method, has been applied to the materials
gathered here, thus illustrating this project’s alignment with previous research. Scholars who
applied CDA to international broadcasters generally examined AJE as a new form of
oppositional or alternative journalism (e.g. Barkho 2008, 2011, Kasmani 2013a, 2013b; Wu
2013). Of these scholars, Barkho (2008, 2011) and Kasmani (2013a, 2013b) examined specific
events, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and an Iranian election respectively. As such, events
constrained their samples and their analyses. Wu (2013) pulled news stories from the BBC and
Channel News Asia’s websites and selected the two events with the highest rate of reporting as
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measured by number of bulletins. Other scholars have analyzed IBs using different methods than
CDA, but provide useful coding schemes to be modified here (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson
2010, 2014). By combining analysis of routine economic news coverage, official economic
discourse, and economic protests with a focus on power, this dissertation unravels IBs potential
in disseminating alternative economic discourses as an facet of state power.
Finally, Kaufer and Hariman (2008) suggested that CDA and rhetoric developed from
different intellectual traditions and rarely speak to each other, a situation that has changed little
since they wrote their article (Tracy et al. 2011). However, the two have much to offer each
other. In this dissertation, I combine the rigor content analysis provides in data collection and
initial coding with scholarship on the rhetoric of economics. Doing so moves my analysis past
Widdowson’s (1995, 1998) now classic criticism that CDA misapplies the knowledge of formal
linguistics and thereby engages in a form of literary criticism. Using the analytical rigor of
content analysis provides a check on my close textual analysis, while also incorporating the
range of findings from rhetorical analyses of economic rhetoric. Combining these two
approaches to the study of language, thereby, permits a multi-level of analysis of my texts’
broader patterns and close textual levels.
Procedurally, CDA does not apply any single correct or rote means of gathering data or
analysis (Carvalho 2008; Tenorio 2011). Because of its fundamental concern with unmasking
power relations in society (van Dijk 2008), CDA begins with a “social wrong” or problem in
society. They work from the literature on the problem to determine what object(s) of analysis are
most appropriate. Having identified a wrong and topic, the researcher then collects data that
reflects or speaks to the topic, organizing and coding it for later, in depth semiotic analysis. I
have already examined the relevant literatures and describe the materials below. Nevertheless, it
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is important to consider the nature of the “wrong” studied here and why CDA is a useful method
to examine it.
International broadcasting efforts signal a greater role for states in the global news
system, one increasingly defined by the presence 24 hour private news channels (Rai and Cottle
2010). Private media proliferation resulted, partially, from neoliberalism’s incorporation into
global economic governance, and several scholars regard such channels as harbingers of news
homogenization, Americanization, or infotainment (O. Boyd-Barrett and Xie 2008; Harvey
2007; McChesney 2004; Thussu 2007b; Wasko 2013). Nevertheless, states reliant on the global
economy such as Russia and China have made providing different views on international news
their stated goal (Avgerinos 2009; P. M. Seib 2010; Zhu 2012). In turn, this suggests that several
states desire an IB in direct contravention of the global media system shaped by neoliberalism.
While neoliberalism may be economic orthodoxy, state IBs grounded in counter-hegemonic
editorial stances, like RT and AJE, may undermine such orthodoxies. This complex interplay of
power relations is an important and under analyzed aspect of the global system grounded in
competing discourses, and therefore open to CDA and rhetorical analytical approaches.
CDA, in addition to its attention to power dynamics, distinguishes itself from agendasetting or content analysis (Scheufele 1999; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) by doing deeper
forms of textual analysis. CDA’s attention to power in its semiotic dimension and its insistence
on deep textual analysis after initial coding entails that practitioners engage in interdiscursive
and semiotic analysis following initial coding. Semiotic/linguistic analysis seeks to detect
ideological constructions in a “text” and understands these constructions as both shaped by
power and the application of power. The researcher looks for a variety of linguistic features such
as: synonymy, antymony, hyponymy, nominalization, metaphor, pronoun use, passive/active
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voice, synecdoche, and expressive and relational values (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999;
Fairclough 1989, 2001). No single text contains all of these features, but particular language
choices enable and limit interpretations of actors, ideas, institutions, and governments that reflect
the position of their author. Schumpeter’s (1942) “creative destruction,” for example, assumed
the status of a paradigmatic metaphor for neoliberal capitalism. Schumpeter used it to illustrate
the processes by which free-market capitalism fosters innovation by replacing old industries with
new ones. The juxtaposition of “creative” and “destruction” shades the unemployment, poverty,
and social dislocation that accompany many macroeconomic decisions with a positive and
progressive valence. Likewise, the linguistic means IBs use to frame state policies, the global
economy, and geopolitical rivals carry within them presumptions about their legitimacy or lack
thereof.
Interdiscursive analysis connects a given text with the discursive resources the author
draws upon in its production and highlights the intertextualities that constitute texts. Given my
research questions, the interdiscursive analysis necessitates comparison between IB content and
primary and secondary sources on state sponsor economic policies. Concretely, interdiscursive
analysis of my selected texts requires determining the extent to which IBs carry or reproduce
government economic policy rhetoric. The greater the overlap between these two areas,
government policy papers and IB content, the greater likelihood we can definitively say that state
interests influence broadcaster’s content.
Procedurally, the CDA I use here involves the following steps that follow the initial
content analysis outlined above. First, I examine the results of the coding, investigating particular
patterns seen in the data. CCTV’s consistent reporting on the Two Session, the period when
legislative councils debate government policies, serve as an excellent example. Analysis of the
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issue variable, which coded for the main topic of story as introduced by the anchor, illustrates
that CCTV reported on the Two Sessions in 3% of their total items. While apparently a small
number, it is still higher than a variety of other issues. In addition, while the coding does not
account for these features, Two Sessions items were always at the beginning of the program,
sometimes with multiple individual items on the many parts of the sessions themselves. These
features signaled that these news items were ripe for deeper analysis, especially as these items
represented a clear opportunity for Chinese leaders to address network audiences directly.
Second, I reexamined the episodes with particular attention to repeated words, phrases, and
metaphors and several immediately stood out. Among these were China’s new normal,
innovation society, belt and road initiative, and market-oriented reform. As part of this process, I
also looked for the verbal context of these phrases, were they presented positively or negatively,
who was permitted to speak about them (political figures, economists, experts). In addition, I
asked how reporters and speakers discursively connected actors, like the state, to the terms and
how have these terms been used in other contexts (notably economic reports, academic studies,
and journalistic accounts).
I will use new normal as an example. Anchors and reporters used this term frequently,
inside and outside of Two Sessions reporting. The term itself juxtaposes the concept of newness,
or change, with normality. It suggests an irrevocable shift from a previous condition to a new
one, and, therefore, could cause fear. Anchors connected the term, discursively, to the larger
changes in the Chinese economy including: slower growth, weakened housing markets, slower
manufacturing growth, and government attempts to increase consumer spending and internet
commerce. Analysis of Chinese government communication (ChinaFile 2013; Xinhua 2015),
academic analysis (Shambaugh 2013), and news items (BBC 2015a) illustrated that China is, or
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is perceived to be, enduring a transformation of its economy from a manufacturing export based
system to a consumption and service based economy. In each item that used the term new normal
anchors claimed the CPC and Chinese state implemented reforms to addresses the marcochanges in China’s economy, but were proactive in doing so. In a January 20 episode, for
example, Jeremy Stevens of Standard Bank argued that China’s slowdown was the result of
structural factors like a weak housing market. The host, then, claimed that the government was
planning reforms around the slowdown and used interviews with Bert Hofman of the World
Bank, Liu Baocheng of the University of International business and Economics (China), and
Jurgen Conrad of the Asian Development Bank to highlight the positive aspect of CPC reforms
and the overall strength of the Chinese economy. In this sense, CCTV used the new normal in
ways that associated it with the CPC and their reform policies, supported by Chinese and foreign
experts, and rendered structural changes in the Chinese economy knowable and less worthy of
anxiety. CDA illustrates that the use of language is both a reflection of power in that CCTV
journalists use the language of the Chinese government without skepticism, but also an
application of power to the audience in attempting to shape their understanding of the Chinese
economy in ways that the CPC may prefer. I apply content analysis and CDA, therefore, as a
mixture of rigorously empirical analysis of news item features as well as a flexible discourse
analytic tool to unmask the power dynamics at play in IB content.

2.6.3

Material and Data Collection: Economic News Programs

My primary data falls into two categories: flagship economic programming and economic
protest news coverage. While both come from the broadcasters, gathering them required different
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procedures, and coding them required some limited changes to my coding scheme. Here, I take
each in turn and then describe collection for government primary sources.
Previous studies of IB content have tended to engage with regular news content in the
form of newscasts (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2014) or pulled only those items that related
to particular events via searches (Barkho 2011; Kasmani 2013b). In contrast, flagship economic
news programs cover economics as a specialist form of journalism catering to elite audiences
(Corcoran and Fahy 2009). This might suggest that I should examine newscast content.
However, Robertson (2014) found that IB newscasts devoted between 4.4% (CNNI) and 7.74%
(RT) of their stories to economic news, indicating a relative lack of coverage in newscasts. On
the other hand, financial journalism relies more on official sources (Fahy, O’Brien, & Poti, 2010)
and its practitioners often have close relationships with financial professionals (Manning, 2013),
which undermines their ability to be critical. This might mean the IB economic programs are
limited by the conventions of their genre. Alternatively, these programs air on networks designed
to forward the perceived interests of the sponsoring state. This means economic news programs
are pulled between the interests of their sponsor and the norms of financial journalism. As such,
economic news programs are richer sites than traditional newscasts for assessing IBs’
articulations of economics and serve as a window into IB content aimed at economic elites
possibly constrained by state interests (see Table 2.1).18 Each program has its own website and
archives individual episodes for an unspecified period. I downloaded and stored all episodes.
(See coding and analysis procedure below.)
I based my selection of Russia Today, China Central Television, Deutsche Welle, and AlJazeera English on several factors. First, they are geographically dispersed: one from Europe,
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That said, economic protests are also an object of analysis for this project. Data on these protests will
encompass economic programs, newscasts, web articles, and state communications and positions.
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one from the Middle East, one from East Asia, and one from Eurasia. Each network comes from
different political systems: one democracy (Germany), one illiberal democracy (Russia), a
constitutional monarchy (Qatar), and a one party state (China). Given, Price’s (2003) suggestion
international broadcasters are torn between the desire for political exigencies of the network’s
effectiveness and the knowledge that naked propaganda is unlikely to affect audiences. As such,
the journalists working for these networks work in conditions shaped by political needs and
journalistic norms. Discourse analysis of the resulting content of these networks may shine light
on this relationship in different political systems.
Table 2.1 Network Flagship Economic News Programs
Host
Network Program Air Time(s) Format/
Country
GMT
style

Russia
Boom
Daily
Today
Bust
Al-Jazeera Counting Weekly
Qatar
English
the Cost
(Saturday)
China
Global
Daily
China
Central
Business19
Television
Weekly
Germany Deutsche Made in
Welle
Germany
Sources: Network’s relevant webpages
Russia

Length

Anchor w/
interviews
Anchor w/
interviews
Anchor w/
interviews

Approx.
30 min
Approx.
30 min
Approx.
45 min

Archive
period
available
10/16/13
-present
11/15/14
-present
12/29/14
-present

Anchor w/
interview

Approx.
26 min

03/30/14
-present

I selected these programs because they are all flagship economic news for their respective
networks. In addition, they share the same basic format, using anchors in a studio and reporting
news items, as seen in Table 2.1. News items can be both on location or reported from the studio.
All use in studio and televisual interviews. Three of these programs are a standard 22-30 min in
length, with Global Business being the exception. These program features, in turn, justify coding

19

Global Business transitioned from the program Biz Asia, their episodes are catalogued together on the
CCTV website.
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the total number of news items instead of the length of a given item. DW’s Made in Germany,
for example is significantly shorter than CCTV’s Global Business, using long form news items
instead of short bulletins. Because of these features, comparisons of length are not as valuable as
comparing the overall number of items and their individual features. Table 2.2 shows the total
number of episodes and total number of news items for each network. Although two programs
are daily and two are weekly, the programs still have more commonalities than differences.
Subsequent analysis pairs the daily and weekly shows for validity and compare in between the
groups afterwards.
Table 2.2 Episode and News Item Frequencies
AJE
CCTV
13
64
Total episodes
57
738
Total News
Items

DW
15
60

RT
56
207

I derived information on state economic policy from a combination of secondary
journalistic sources and government authored documents, speeches, and policy papers. While I
do not conduct a full discourse or content analysis of formal government documents, where
necessary I gathered and analyzed these documents as a check for analysis of IB content. I
collected government materials from the various government ministries connected to economic
affairs as shown in Table 2.3. News items constitute the unite of analysis for this dissertation.
Using the lede (or headline) of each item to signal its beginning and switches to different ledes or
news items signaling the end. They can be of varying lengths but still indicate in absolute
numbers the attention given to particular issues.
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Table 2.3 Government Economic Ministries and Offices with English language websites
Germany20
Russia
Qatar
China
Ministry of
Federal Ministry for
Ministry of
Ministry of
Communications and
Economic Affairs and
Development
Commerce
Mass Media of the
Energy
Planning and
Russian Federation
Statistics
Ministry of Labour and Federal Ministry of
Ministry of Economy 18th National
Social Protection of the Economic Cooperation and Commerce
Congress of
Russian Federation
and Development
the Communist
Party of
China21
Russian Federal
Federal Ministry of
Ministry of Energy
Communist
Treasury
Finance
and Industry
Party of China
Ministry of Economic
Federal Ministry of
Ministry of Finance
The State
Development of the
Labor and Social
Council
Russian Federation
Affairs
Office of the President
German Federal
Ministry of Labor and
Government
Social Affairs
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs22

2.6.4

Material and Data Collection: Economic Protest News Items

Dedicated financial news provides a rich site for analyzing state economics narratives.
However, my initial analysis indicated that they also portrayed a limited range of economic
activity, dominated by states and elites with workers and nonprofessionals excluded and no hint
of economic discontent except that between states. Hence, I determined that a full reading of
state economic narratives required two data sets; one for elite driven financial news and one for
economic activity from below, here represented by protests. Analyzing economic protests
required changes to my data gathering approach applied in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, protests

20

Germany has five ministries directly related to economic affairs.
While not strictly a government ministry, the Congress is a big moment of political transition in China
that last occurred in 2012. The current Chinese premier gave lengthy remarks, and the website has a
variety of economic news.
22
This is counter-intuitive, but the office of the Emir does not have a specific website devoted to his
office, like the office of the President does for Russia. Consequently, the most appropriate website
available for the Emir appears to be Foreign Affairs as it hosts the Emir’s particular speeches and policies.
21
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were required that met several requirements based on geography, likelihood of coverage, and
economic dimensions. However, changes to the coding scheme were relatively minor and
allowed me to code for the differences between regular newscasts and dedicated economic news.
First, I added a variable called “section” that codes for the typical news “beat” the story belonged
to, for example: politics, economics, science, arts/culture, and sport. I divided politics into two
categories, politics/domestic and politics/world, which apply to the actions of government and
politicians in these respective spheres. If I coded the story as intersectional, covering the
sponsoring state and its relationship with another state then it was coded as world. In addition,
science encompasses all environment, technology, and health reporting for ease of analysis. I
kept the “topic” variable, and combined with the section variable allowed a finer analysis of the
specific subject of each news item, for example, “Iran Negotiations” was used as a catch all term
to code for the Iran nuclear negotiations of summer 2015 and I coded these stories as
politics/world given their multilateral dimensions. Otherwise, the coding schemes used in
preceding Chapters remains unchanged and codes for geography, speaking actors, and economic
sources.
Next, I selected protests for analysis. I began by developing a list of protests that
occurred either right before, during, or after the January to March 2015 study period. The list
eventually encompassed anti-austerity protests in the UK, Spain, and Greece from 2009 to
present; the “Blockupy” anti-ECB protests that started in 2014 and continue to present; protests
over economic performance in Venezuela from 2014 to present; anti-corruption protests in Brazil
during March 2015; university tuition protests in Quebec in March 2015; minimum wage
protests in the USA from 2013 to present; and, the Umbrella protests in Hong Kong from
September 2014 to early 2015.
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Table 2.4 News Item Frequencies
Blockupy
Umbrella
Brazil Protest
Greece Protest
1
11
2
1
AJE
0
16
0
0
CCTV
1
5
1
3
DW
1
5
0
4
RT
3
37
3
8
Totals
Ultimately, I selected Umbrella, Brazil, and Greek Bailout negotiations. The German
Blockupy protests also received coverage during the Greek protests and I therefore include it but
I do not have a complete week worth of coverage for it. These protests have several features that
recommend them for selection, including their duration, location, and economic character. First,
Umbrella and the Greek protests are part of long lasting movements while two occurred on one
or two days of activity. Table 2.4 shows the total number of news items coded. As with
economic news programs, these are individual news items recognized with the “issue” variable
(see Appendices E and F) using the lede of each item to signal its beginning and switches to
different ledes or news items signaling the end. The table also indicates that differences in the
length of protests lead to differences in total amount of coverage, in turn, allowing us to see how
narratives of protest movements take shape under different conditions. We know that long-term
protests like Occupy or the Arab Spring fall into particular narratives over time (Gottlieb 2015).
While Blockupy and Brazil’s protests reflect long present socioeconomic and political divisions
in their respective societies, the actual events of civil disorder and protest occurred so quickly
that new narratives, arguably, could not take shape. In addition, state sponsors showed keen
interest in some protests, as seen in CCTV’s sustained attention to Umbrella. These conditions
are important limitations on news discourse, which often changes and molds itself to events over
time.
Second, the protests are geographically dispersed, in some cases directly effecting
sponsoring states as in the Greek Crisis and Umbrella movement for Germany and China
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respectively. In other cases, sponsoring states are connected indirectly or obliquely to protest
events; for example, Greece to Russia and the Brazilian protests to all sponsoring states. They
also reflect a spectrum of economic development with Greek and Blockupy protest action taking
place in the developed world and Umbrella and Brazil in the developing though emerging
economies.
Third and most importantly, each has a clear though often underreported economic
dimension. The Greek protests and the Blockupy protests are the most directly economic based
protests in the sample. Blocupy’s stated mission is “to connect our struggles and powers beyond
nation-state lines. Together we want to create a common European movement, united in
diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity
from below” (Blockupy 2015 emphasis mine). In addition, they direct their protest against an
official symbol of international finance, the European Central Bank (ECB). The Greek Debt
Crisis is also directed at economic institutions like the IMF and ECB, but is also directed at the
current German government (Kutter 2014).
Brazil’s recent and ongoing political turmoil, though often framed in terms of political
corruption, reflects class divisions within the Brazilian political and social structure. Some
Western outlets suggested that anti-government protestors grievances lay in corrupt use of funds
from state firms like Petrobras to finance political candidates (BBC 2016a). At the same time,
some protestors cite a recent recession and weakening economy as the cause of their anger
(Watts 2016). Meanwhile, Rousseff draws protest support from the trade union networks and
groups sympathetic to her Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party) who protested in “defense
of democracy and the rights of the working class” (Douglas 2016). As we will see in Chapter 6’s
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analysis, the colors protestors wore to rallies carry symbolic power as Rousseff’s supporters
wore the red of the labor movement and her opponents wore the yellow of the national flag.
Likewise, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong reflects overlapping layers of
grievance on the part of protestors. For example, Li writing in the Washington Post argues that
the “central theme” of democracy in the protests is misguided as the region has greater
representation than others parts of China. Instead, he suggests that, “General discontent has
provided fertile soil for this movement, and the sources of that dissatisfaction have nothing to do
with imaginary diktats from Beijing. Hong Kong is going through a tough period of economic
and social dislocation” (2014). In contrast, Cheung writing in the Diplomat argues the protests
are a “warning of the comprehensive breakdown of confidence in Hong Kong’s governing
institutions – it reflects growing public disillusion with the institutional means of making their
voices heard” (2014). At the same time, those same governing structures reflect the collusion of
Hong Kong’s wealthiest with the Beijing leadership to maintain both stability and economic
growth. As David Zweig of the City University of Hong Kong observes, “The conservatives, the
tycoons, the business elite can really control the legislature and prevent any kind of social
welfare policy… Beijing has to realize that they have a social problem—it’s not just a political
problem” (quoted in Schroeder 2014).
I collected data from an archive of global news broadcasts housed at the institutionen för
mediestudier at Stockholm University. The programming broadcast by each network at 7:00pm
Central European Time were selected because they are typical evening newscasts. Sometimes
this process did not yield usable programming, as in the case of DW where programs on
environment, science, and culture were aired during these timeslots or when in July 2015 CCTV
replaced the regular newscast with one devoted to Asian news. However, data collection still
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found n=807 total news items. I followed the same analysis procedure as in Chapter 4 and 5,
coding each episode as described here, while also coding for common metaphors, arguments,
and discourse in each item.

2.6.5

Study Period

The study period for this project was constrained by the available materials. CCTV’s
Global Business was, at the time of collection, archived back to December 29, 2014, and this fact
constrains the start date of the study period. I collected, economic news programs from each
network from December 29, 2014 to March 31, 2015, yielding 12 episodes for weekly programs
and approximately 80 episodes for daily programs. This is the primary study period and the study
periods for the other two sets of materials follow from this. For economic protest coverage, I
used that same study period to determine the extent to which economic protests are a subject of
specialist economic news. I collected sources of state economic rhetoric during and immediately
preceding the same study period.
The study periods for the economic protests centered on events such as strikes, protests,
or riots that draw media attention. The study periods are one week long, with the event date in
the center, thus giving three days both before and after the event. First, the Greek Debt
negotiations and Parliamentary vote led to strikes on July 15, 2015 with a date range of July 12
to July 18. Second, the Umbrella movement from September 28 to October 4 encompasses the
beginning of the protests, but also the first use of violence by the police to clear financial areas of
Hong Kong. Third, anti-Dilma Rousseff protests in Brazil between March 12 and March 18,
which include a major rally for the opposition in addition to pro-Rousseff protests earlier in the
week. Finally, March 18 was the date of the Blockupy protests in Frankfurt and while the study

65

period does not encompass a full three days after, it does encompass three days prior. With this
limitation in mind, I included news items covering those events.
Applying a mixed methodological approach, across several texts, and across different
types of economic activity provides a complex picture of IB content. Content analysis combined
with discourse analysis permits a transparent and nuanced examination of IB news items and the
extent to which it conforms to state interests. Comparison of elite economic news to economic
protest illustrates the potential of a given broadcaster to insturmentalize counter-hegemony for
state interests. As a case study, with a reproducible procedure, this mixed methodological
approach provides clear examples of how IB content supports, or does not, state interests.
2.6.6

Clarification of Terminology

Because this dissertation draws from several different literatures – strategic narratives
and global media studies – and appeals to different academic communities – international
relations and international communication – I want to clarify terms that appear with great
frequency. These terms are: states, frames, and narratives. All three have specific academic as
well as colloquial definitions and their use requires clarification. I do not believe that my
definitions are the last word, but readers going forward should bear in mind the following
caveats in my use of terminology.
Like scholars of strategic narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow, I use the state as
a primary unit of analysis. Furthermore, I consider international broadcasters as state agencies,
even though it must be acknowledged that individual IBs have varied relations with their state
sponsors. However, I do not adopt the realist view that states are monolithic entities that are
rational in their actions. I am more persuaded by newer theories such as Castells (2011) or
Mann’s (2012) understanding of the state as a network of institutions, each with power deriving
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from it relationships with other entities. Even an entity that might seem monolithic, like the US
State Department, contains many subsections and offices. For example, Price (2002) observes
that the 1998 NATO intervention in Serbia involved both jamming Serbian media as well as
supplying their own news and information, the latter being a form of international broadcasting.
However, American IBs are normally under the purview of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, an independent agency that is in turn supervised by the Committee on Foreign
Relations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House.23 As will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, all of the networks analyzed for this dissertation have their own
histories and evolving relationships with the sponsoring state, and states or organs of states can
place competing or complementary pressures on broadcasters. Therefore, when I use a sentence
construction such as “X content projects Y policy as an articulation of state power” the reader
should not assume that I believe that states immediately respond to conscious dictates from a
unitary leader. Some states are more similar to this model than others, for example China under
the CPC, but even there struggles over ideology, institutional power, and political legitimacy
shape civil society and role of the party-state apparatus (T. Zhang 2016). When I invoke “the
state” as an actor, the reader should recognize the actual complexities of states and the many
forms states take in practice.
Just as the concept of “state” carries with it ambiguity, so does the concept of frames or
framing. Several decades ago, Entman wrote that framing a “scattered conceptualization” (1993,
51). Subsequent analyses show that this remains the case (Gottlieb 2015; Scheufele 1999;
Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Framing as a concept represents the “assumption that how an
issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by

23

For more information, see the BBG’s About Page at: http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/
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audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). It is in this most basic sense that I use framing,
as a signal that news items do not provide all the relevant details of a story, but make selections
and thereby raise the salience of specific details. On some levels this is an unsatisfactory
simplification, especially given the high number of framing studies used in Chapter 6’s analysis
on economic protests. However, rather than involving this study in the lengthy debates over what
a frame is, or framing’s relationship to other theories such as agenda-setting, I want to emphasize
that frame or framing here have limited meanings and should be seen in relation to the topic
variable. Recall the example above where “oil prices” was the main topic of the news item.
Several broadcasters covered low oil prices, and that fact suggests several factors that may
influence IB content. However, the variable does not indicate the nature of the coverage. Are low
oil prices the result of short-sighted over investment in the USA, as AJE suggests, or are they the
Machiavellian plan of Saudi Arabia and the USA to destabilize Iranian influence in the Middle
East, as RT claims? In this sense, my use of the term “frame” is less theoretically robust than
those of other scholars. That said, my use should signal to the reader that I am considering the
ways in which news items selectively present real phenomena, like oil prices, in ways which
differ from other IBs.
Finally and relatedly, narratives must be distinguished from frames. Fundamentally,
narratives are distinguished from frames by virtue of their temporal and causal structure. As
Miskimmon et al. write, “It is that temporal dimension and sense of movement that distinguishes
narrative from… frames. Narratives can orient audiences to a future” (2013, 7). Narratives also
possess actors, events, settings, and a sense of time and conclusion. Frames, on the other hand,
while they may have these but, in Entman’s (1993) definition, are not required to. To be sure,
this is also a limited comparison; Gottlieb’s (2015) analysis of Occupy Wall Street points to what
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he calls “framing cycles” which shift frames over multiple news items, newspaper articles in his
case. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, narratives work to craft a sense of past,
present, and future, and function strategically, intentionally or not, when they bind the actions of
actors. To use the oil example one final time; RT airs items with the topic of oil prices, and
frames low prices as the result of American and Saudi dumping on international markets.
However, the USA in Miskimmon et al.’s reading is a “great power”; a power whose identity is,
in part, related to its responsibility towards weaker powers (2015, 35). Dumping oil, then, lowers
prices, which damages economies around the world, Iran and Russia of course, but also the UK
and allied Gulf States. In addition, the eventual rebound of oil prices will, inevitably, mislead
economic actors who will make decision based on faulty information and greater economic
dislocation will result. A frame, which says low oil prices are the USA’s fault, may not lead to a
negative judgement of the USA, the viewer may dislike Russia and see American actions as
justified. However, a narrative with this dystopian future of oil prices shocks invites the viewer
to judge the USA as a bad actor, and correspondingly see Russia as a victim. In this sense
narratives are temporal, future oriented, but also causal, in that they can proscribe blame. Good
stories, after all, need a good villain. On final point, is that I do not use Miskimmon et al.’s
(2013) concept of aligned and non-aligned narratives, which suggest that when to actors, like
states, project narratives that are aligned in their basic framework of causes, actors, and potential
action, they can then work to achieve non-violent change in the global system. I address this
more fully in the limitations but I omit this concept for two reasons. First, my data set is
relatively limited in terms of length and lacks the robustness to make any clear claims about the
possibilities of narrative alignment. Oil, for example, is unlikely to see such alignment given the
vicissitudes of the market. Second, the degree to which narratives allow cooperative state action
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is not the subject of this dissertation, the degree to which IBs project state power and serve state
interests is. Future scholarship based on these ideas may incorporate this alignment, but here the
focus remains steadfastly on state’s and the factors that shape IB content in service of that state.
Likewise, I have avoided the use of a strict narrative analysis. Narrative analysis has a
long history in rhetorical criticism (Fisher 1984) and a developing one in international relations
(Hayden 2013b). While narrative analysis is an important approach I have not used it for two key
reasons. First, Hayden’s application views “narrative as a kind of independent variable for
influence” (2013b, 5). Neither influence, or a narratives effectiveness, nor the larger
epistemological questions thinkers like or Fisher examine are the primary focus here. Instead we
are examining the degree to which IB content conforms to sponsor policy as well as how IBs use
journalism as a projection of state power. On the question of power CDA is more useful, being
specifically attuned to questions of power through language. In any case, new work has
suggested that narrative analysis and CDA can be fruitfully combined (Souto-Manning 2014),
but narrative analysis remains outside the scope of this project.

2.7

Conclusion

This chapter shows that states create and fund broadcasters to shape the views of foreign
publics, to improve the sponsor’s ability to act and exert power in the international system.
However, broadcasters are also, typically, 24-hour news channels and face similar pressures as
their private cousins, such as issues of credibility, access to news events, and competition.
Scholars who examine international broadcasting illustrate this bifurcation. Scholars of strategic
narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow connect IBs to states while global media studies
analyze them as components of the global media system. They are in fact both; and
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understanding state power projection via IB requires seeing them as outlets for journalism as
well as instruments of the state. Combining literatures that examine IBs alternatively as
instruments of government as well as journalism outlets is not the only contribution this study
makes. I also situated international broadcasting within the broader marketization and
neoliberalization of both national and international media. I showed that in the realm of
economics, states act but are acting within a system that they may have had a limited role in
creating and now have a direct stake in. In turn, these literatures – strategic narratives, global
media study, and neoliberal critique – emphasized the importance of language as a means of
achieving state goals and projecting state power. Methodologically, I drew from the strongest
theoretical and analytical scholarship on IBs and melded them to provide a holistic analysis of IB
content.
Nevertheless, there are several limitations to my content and discourse oriented approach.
Because I am using a discourse analytic method, this dissertation does not explore reception
(Geniets 2013) or the journalistic culture of these networks (Figenschou 2012). This project will
need to rely on extant analysis of reception and the history and funding models for these
networks to fill those gaps. Following from the previous limitation, this study is not contributing
new knowledge of the networks’ structure or working culture. As such, it is not possible to
determine the extent to which journalists understand their role in terms of theories of soft power,
contra-flow, or strategic narratives. As such, any claims must be limited to broadcaster output. In
addition, because this study does not engage with reception, I cannot verify that non-academic
viewers will share my interpretations of a given news item. However, deep analysis of content is
often the first step in proposing ideas for reception studies or news room ethnographies (Fürsich
2009). Official economic communication from a given state is unlikely to comment on how
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states understand the role of their IB. States are not monolithic and even one such as China, with
its centralized Party control, has many agencies, bureaus, and layers of governing structures and
institutions. At most, I can examine content and test the degree to which it conforms to state
economic policy and rhetoric. While a limitation, I must presume that there is some connection
between the state and the international broadcaster. Finally, analyzing only specialist economic
news programs means that the content I examine is for a specialist audience. The operating
assumption of those scholars who have analyzed IB newscasts (Figenschou 2012; A. Robertson
2014) or particular news stories (Barkho 2011; Kasmani 2013a) appears to be that more people
watch newscasts or devote attention to particular stories. In short, the presumed audience for
these programs is small and any claim I can make as to the reach of the content must also be
small.
This dissertation also has a weakness in terms of what it can tell us about state
perceptions of international broadcasting. Unlike Hayden’s (2011, 2013a) rhetorical analyses of
policy discourse, this project analyzes the outputs from international broadcasters as a reflection
of those policies. While both objects are connected, my analysis cannot answer the question of
how states view the content of their IB or if they approve of it, we can only infer if they do.
While these limitations are real, they do not fundamentally undermine the argument I
have presented so far. IBs reflects both state interests and journalism norms; they serve two
masters or purposes so to speak. However, the IBs – AJE, CCTV, DW, and RT – are also
institutions, and they reflect the circumstances of their founding, their funding, their staffs, and
the broader political and economic goals of their sponsors. These factors, in addition to a
broadcaster’s status as news outlet and state project, influence and shape the form of the channel
and, ultimately, their content.
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3

THE RISE OF THE NETWORKS

International broadcasters are unique among media organizations; they are constrained
not only by the political and economic dictates of their state funding bodies but also by the
journalistic norms of their sponsoring state and trends in global news flows. They are neither
solely media nor solely governmental organizations – but must serve as both in order to secure
audiences in a crowded global media environment and to retain and expand funding from their
government sponsors who have ever-evolving foreign policy goals and priorities. While the bulk
of this dissertation is concerned with exploring the extent to which the content of international
broadcasters conforms to broader perceptions of these organizations as sources of state power
articulation and public diplomacy, this chapter is focused on the organizational and institutional
factors that shape that content. It provides critical context that will help to round out the analysis
of broadcaster content in Chapters 4-6. The Chapter also provides concrete information on each
network’s founding, funding, and the larger bureaucratic context of its sponsoring state. The goal
is to situate each network in a larger world of international broadcasting specifically, public
diplomacy generally, and specific state policies states designed them to, theoretically, project. It
provides this analysis in three parts: First, I situate each broadcaster individually with the broader
history of international broadcasting as well as the specific exigencies that led to their founding
as well as the national media systems of their state sponsors. Second, I examine each sponsoring
state’s public diplomacy programs to contextualize their international broadcasting efforts. Third,
I examine the economic policies and interests of the state sponsors to provide a baseline against
which to test the extent of broadcaster conformity to state interests.
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3.1

International Broadcasters and National Media Systems

States develop international broadcasting capacities as responses to exigencies in the
international political system when political leaders see that reaching foreign publics may be
necessary to achieve policy goals. While propaganda has existed for centuries (Jowett and
O’Donnell 1999), radio signaled a new potential for mass persuasion. Subsequently, and when
the states of Europe developed IB radio networks in the 1920, they served a variety of purposes
from wartime and political propaganda to colonial administration (Taylor 1990). The BBC,
founded in 1932 to combat Nazi influence, established many of the principals for subsequent IBs
and remains today the prototypical international broadcasting network. IBs flourished in the
wake of WWII. Both the US and Soviet Union developed networks as part of their respective
Cold War policies. The US launched Voice of America in 1947 as a means of combating Soviet
influence in countries where media systems were tightly controlled. The US followed VOA up
with several radio networks dedicated to particular regions like Radio Free Europe (1949) and
Radio Marti (1983) that responded to the particular political context of the target region (Heil
2003).The conclusion of the Cold War undermined the urgency of networks like VOA and Radio
Free Europe. Some in government felt new private networks like CNN, carried by satellite
around the world, could accomplish the goals of VOA (Price 2003) and American and British
funding for IBs fell in the 1990s as a result (Cull 2009a). Events such as the Arab Spring, the
Color revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the war in Iraq, however, prompted the USA, Russia,
China, Germany, Venezuela, Iran, and France to either reinvigorate or found new international
broadcasters built on a 24-hour television news model (Geniets 2013; P. M. Seib 2010). These
new channels, marked a new age of international broadcasting in a significantly more complex
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media environment (see for example Price 2014; Rai and Cottle 2007; Roselle, Miskimmon, and
O’Loughlin 2014).24
As this section will demonstrate, each of these broadcasters are best understood when
viewed in the context of their peer institutions, the normative domestic conditions that limit or
propel their respective missions, and the particular journalism culture of their newsrooms. VOA,
for example, committed itself to providing “accurate, objective, and comprehensive” news while
also representing American values, such as journalistic objectivity, abroad (Heil 2003, 65). Voice
of America’s commitment to accurate journalism, and the countervailing pressure to be an
effective policy tool, reflected the values of American media. Likewise, the networks analyzed
here reflect the prevailing media system norms (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012) and public
diplomacy practices of their sponsoring state.
While they did not examine IBs, Hallin and Mancini’s model for comparing media
systems provides a useful framework with which to begin my analysis of the institutional context
of each broadcaster. Specifically, their work is avowedly comparative in approach, which
“sensitizes” researchers to similarities and differences between systems, and allows for a fuller
testing of hypotheses than single nation studies and lets me respond to calls from other scholars
for more comparative work (Meng and Rantanen 2015). Their typology contains four
dimensions: the development and structure of media markets (the degree to which a mass
circulation press developed); political parallelism (the degree to which the media system reflects
the political system and its stakeholders); professionalization (composed of the factors that make
journalism distinct profession such as autonomy from other professions, distinct professional
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I am not trying to say that these event are the same, the world is very different from the 1920s.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering that technological change over time does have a relationship with the
decision of states, NGOs, and other actors to engage in communication across borders.
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norms, public service orientation, and the potential for instrumentalization by the government);
and the role of the state (characterized by the legal, social, and economic frameworks states
implement to govern media). Some measures, like role of the state, may seem inappropriate as
states founded and financed all of these networks. However, IB are not cookie cutter
organizations. Each broadcaster is legislatively and legally tied to their state sponsor in different
ways. Neither are journalists tabula rasas who mindlessly repeat a broadcaster’s editorial
positions. As Robertson argues, “understanding power relations [between media and other
actors] should thus maintain an analytical distinction between” media institutions and the
journalists who staff them (2015, 55).

3.1.1

Russia Today

Founded in 2005, Russia Today is part of a broad strategy to counter perceived Western
media bias against Russia. Central to this feeling was the Russian belief that Western reporting
on Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was unfairly negative and
represented weakness in Russian “political technologies” of information management (Saari
2014). With these criticisms in mind, the Russian state threw its weight behind founding RT to
cover “stories overlooked by the mainstream media to create news with an edge” and provide an
“alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaint international audiences with a
Russian viewpoint” (“About RT” 2016). RT is the foremost component of Russian plans to
counter Western news; as Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesperson, said in 2016 “We are
currently in a state of information warfare with the trend-setters in the information space, most
notably with the Anglo-Saxons, their media” (RT 2016). The Kremlin has amply funded that
war.
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RT claims to use a combination of private and public funding, however, Geniets (2013)
suggests that the reality is somewhat different. RT is largely state-funded, but its private funding
originates from banks and commercial entities with close ties to Putin and his United Russia
Party. The network is operated by RIA Novosti, the state owned and operated press agency,
which was placed under the Press and Information Ministry by Presidential decree in 1991
(Geniets 2013). RT’s budget has gone from US$30 million in 2005 to US$300 million in 2013
and was expected to rise again for 2015 (Rawnsley 2015b). Studios in New York, London, and
Moscow broadcast in English, Arabic, and Spanish.
RT’s funding and position in the Russian media system reflects their relatively high
degree of political parallelism and government intervention. Vartanova (2012), using and
updating media systems theory, characterized this as a “statist commercialized” system in which
high levels of commercialization and economic pressure coexist with a superior role for the state
and the political-business elite who define the informal and formal rules that shape media
content. This means that both high levels of political parallelism, which means news aligns itself
closely with Putin’s United Russia party, and media market development, which means a high
degree of commercial pressure, particularly in television, combine in a state control apparatus.
The state reportedly controls 80% of Russian media either through direct ownership, subsidy, or
through the informal rules that govern the limits of acceptable political conversation in Russia
(Sakwa 2014). These structural factors cause news outlets to self-censor; their content typically
avoids criticism of the government. The role of Vladimir Putin in centralizing and constraining
media activity in Russia is difficult to overstate.25 Indeed some of his first and most controversial
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Vartanova (2012) is also careful to note that even Putin has not completely constrained political
factionalism, merely severely restrained it. Media outlets exist who are willing to criticize Putin and the
Russian state, but always mindful of the informal restrictions that guide such actions.
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political actions involved punishing dissident oligarchs and placing media holdings under gas
company, Gazprom (Sakwa 2014). Given their history as an autocratic and then communist state,
Russia had late media market development and journalistic professionalism. This means that
Russian journalists operate under twin pressures of the market and the state, with younger
journalists sometimes eschewing a public service role (Erzikova and Lowrey 2010) and
journalists’ work is tightly intertwined with the interests of the state (Roudakova 2009). RT’s
journalists, however, appear to be mostly Western, specifically British and American, but
features of the Russian media system do shine through, particularly the informal rules that keep
Russia off the channel’s radar, the presence of younger journalists in key positions, and a focus
on Russia’s geopolitical rivals.
Russia Today broadcasts it programming 24 hours a day and focuses predominantly on
political news. Avgerinos (2009) and Rawnsley (2015b) note, and my subsequent analysis
shows, that RT’s programming is fixated on North America and Europe, not typically reporting
on Russia directly, except in the case of an ongoing news event like the Ukraine crisis (Price
2014) or relations with its “near-abroad” in the Baltic Sea region (Borchers 2011). Unlike AJE or
CCTV, who have programing dedicated to specific geographic regions like 101 East or Spectrum
Asia, RT’s programming does not directly focus on particular regions. In addition to political
debate and interview programming common on other networks, RT has political comedy
programs such as Redacted Tonight and News Thing as well as programs headed by recognizable
British and American political or media figures. For example, former professional wrestler and
Minnesota governor Jesse “the Body” Ventura hosts Off the Grid and former Respect Party
British MP George Galloway hosts Sputnik, and venerable US interviewer Larry King hosts two
programs. Despite the presence of Larry King, most RT journalists are actually young,
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inexperienced, and Anglo-American. Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan, for example, was only
25 when appointed to her post. She subsequently took out ads in the British Guardian newspaper
and staffed RT with young British and American journalism majors, most of whom were straight
out of graduate programs (Bullough 2013). It is not clear why RT’s Russian managers would hire
Simonyan given her lack of experience, but this is indicative of the larger muddled structure of
RT itself.
The actual organizational structure of RT is somewhat opaque, as is information on their
journalism culture, and the majority of evidence either for or against the independence of its
journalists is anecdotal. At its founding in 2005, the majority of RT on air talent came from the
UK, and were often fresh out of advanced journalistic training (Bullough 2013), in turn
suggesting that they have low professional capital. Ioffe (2010), a vociferous critic of Putin,
claims that RT reporter William Dunbar was reprimanded for reporting rumors that Russian
forces had inadvertently bombed Georgian territory during the South Ossetia War in 2008.
Dunbar subsequently tendered his resignation. Ioffe has also claimed that Simonyan has regular,
maybe daily, meetings with Kremlin officials. On the other hand, correspondent Abby Martin,
who criticized Russia’s policies live on air during the Ukraine crisis, defended her editorial
independence and freedom of action while working at the network. During an interview for On
the Media, Martin claimed she worked with “passionate American journalists,” who, “can speak
out against different things that other corporate entities can't speak out against that are beholden
to their advertisers or parrot the establishment line” (Mayer 2014). She also argued that speaking
positively about Russia was the price one paid to work in media, where money comes from
“questionable entities” that limit a reporter’s ability to speak truth to power (Mayer 2014).26
Despite Martin’s claim during the interview that her bosses accepted her on air editorializing, her
program Breaking the Set last aired on February 28, 2015, just shy of one year after her on air statements.
26
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Whoever’s interpretation one chooses to believe, the precise relationship between individual
journalists and RT’s executive structure remains unclear, however, it is possible that the same
informal rules of self-censorship that pertain in domestic Russian television (Vartanova 2015)
also apply to RT’s staff. However, Martin’s statements hint that the American and British
journalists who staff RT have made a calculation; to report on under covered American and
British policies and issues they are willing to accept Simonyan’s and other managers’ mission to
question Anglo-American news norms.
Russia Today developed out of Russia’s journalistic tradition where journalists work
under conditions characterized by high levels of political parallelism, and thus deference to the
state and its managers, while also lacking a clear tradition of journalistic professionalism. High
levels of commercialization push journalism towards tabloidization while close connections
between media oligarchs and Russian government leaders keep criticism of the state to a
minimum. To be sure, the financial pressures Russian domestic media operate under are less
important given RT’s state funding. In addition, RT journalists often come from the developed
West and received training in the Western journalistic tradition and Abby Martin’s comments
suggest that they see themselves not as dupes but as intrepid journalists unearthing
uncomfortable truths (Mayer 2014). RT’s management, however, comes out of the Russian
media system and presumably expects an appropriate amount of deference to the interests of the
Russian state. These countervailing pressures may account for various on air resignations by RT
journalists. While on the ground interviews are needed to test manager to journalist relations, RT
clearly relies on Putin and his regime to set a tone for journalists to follow and self-censor,
giving RT latitude to frame news according to Russia’s political interests.
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3.1.2

Al-Jazeera English

Founded in 2005, Al-Jazeera English is part of the larger Al-Jazeera media conglomerate,
sponsored by the ruling Al-Thani family of Qatar. The network bills itself as “the voice of the
voiceless,” and claims to report more from the Global South. In order to truly understand AJE,
one must actually begin with its older Arabic language sister station (AJA) as the former grew
directly from the latter.27 Following a bloodless coup against his father in 1995, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa al-Thani, motivated by a desire to modernize, democratize, and enhance the power of
his tiny kingdom, offered US$140 million to create Al-Jazeera (El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002).
Into this mix, 150 BBC-trained and mostly Arab journalists, released from a defunct
British/Saudi media venture, provided Western journalistic training to compliment al-Thani’s
directive that AJ coverage would be independent from government interference (Powers 2012).
AJA’s openness complimented Qatar’s larger foreign policy role as mediator between rival states
and political factions as well as a safe haven for divergent opinions in the Middle East (Fromherz
2012; Khatib 2013). Nevertheless, the openness and public service orientation stands in stark
contrast to Qatari control of domestic media and foreign journalists.
Following 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera Arabic found
itself inundated with calls from English speakers asking for information and international news
outlets interested in buying the network’s visuals, at that point the only from Taliban controlled
territory (Powers 2012). The interest from Westerners and their news organizations enticed the
station’s managers to repackage Arabic content with English subtitles. As Powers (2012) reports,
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The only other station analyzed here that really seems to follow this kind of organic offshoot growth is
China’s CCTV International as the network comes out of the official Chinese broadcaster CCTV.
However, unlike CCTV, AJ was always intended to be a tool of public diplomacy whereas CCTV was
charged with fulfilling this role after the institution had already been established for Chinese domestic
audiences.
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this strategy failed to take into account the differing narratives Western audiences might expect.
Emir Khalifa lent his support, and reportedly US$1 billion, to create a fully-fledged English
language news station, separate from the Arab staff who had blazed the trail of BBC style
journalism in the Middle East.
Al-Jazeera’s funding comes from the Emir of Qatar through a grant system; and the
various channels earn some revenue through advertising and cable fees, though precise numbers
can be difficult to come by (Geniets 2013). The Emir reportedly gives a US$100 million annual
grant to the network (Powers 2012). In addition, al-Thani issued a directive that AJ coverage
would be independent from government interference (Powers 2012). In this sense, Qatar might
be one of the freest countries in the Middle East. On the other hand, Qatar ranks 115 out of 180
countries on press freedom (Reporters Without Borders 2015a). All media are subject to
censorship from the government (Freedom House 2015b). In this sense, there is little if any
domestic media market development and little journalistic professionalism. At least two heads of
the Doha Center for Media Freedom have been dismissed for criticizing the Qatari regime,
presumably with irony (Freedom House 2015b; Jalbert 2009), suggesting a high degree of
political parallelism and state intervention. Finally, foreign journalists have been detained for
reporting on labor abuses related to construction activities for the 2022 Qatar World Cup, itself a
centerpiece of Qatar’s PD efforts (Reporters Without Borders 2015b). While the various AlJazeera channels claim to have independence from the interests of Qatar’s rulers, some
scholarship and recent events suggest that the leadership uses the channel to achieve foreign
policy goals. Samuel-Aran’s analysis suggests that AJA coverage of Saudi Arabia is “limited by
the boundaries of Qatar’s crucial interests,” but “operates as a private network on most affairs”
(Samuel-Azran 2013, 1307). Likewise, the leaked US State Department cables suggested that
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Qatari royals pressured Al-Jazeera to tone down their coverage of the Saudis and calls their
independence into question (Booth 2010; NDTV 2010).
In addition to potential governmental interference, Al-Jazeera faces challenges due to
falling oil prices and an unstable Middle East. While the English wing of the network gained
attention for their coverage of the Egyptian uprising in 2011, their dedicated American channel
failed to attract audiences and folded in 2016 amidst allegations of sexual harassment and
mismanagement (Greenwald 2016; Ibish 2016). Several Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain charge Al-Jazeera with pro Muslim Brotherhood
bias in its news and support for rebel groups in Syria, charges that caused some states to recall
ambassadors (Bakr 2014). Former Al-Jazeera English journalist Mohamed Fahmy, at the time of
writing on trial in Egypt for spying said that the “Arabic station redubbed our English-language
news packages with inflammatory commentary” and accused them of using the English arm of
the broadcaster to meddle in Egyptian politics (2015). When Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani
became Emir in 2013 reports claimed that he wanted to “quiet down” the channel’s coverage.
Hafez al-Mirazi, formerly of AJA, says the channel made “‘Qatar a household name, influencing
politics, at one point it was a powerful tool of foreign policy but all of that is over now’” and that
job cuts were on the horizon (quoted in Finn 2016). Taken together, the evidence suggests that
AJE has more independence than its sister Arabic channel has, but that their relative freedom
faces greater restrictions and greater financial difficulties than in the past that undermine their
journalism model.
Al-Jazeera follows a “public service” model of journalism oriented to reporting on under
analyzed parts of the world, with particular attention to underrepresented viewpoints. Within this
model, journalists have, in theory, a great deal of freedom to pursue stories that interest them.
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Nevertheless, we have seen AJA’s coverage of Saudi Arabia often reflected Qatar’s rivalry with
their neighbor (Samuel-Azran 2013). When the AJ entered the American market with Al-Jazeera
America (AJAM), managers endeavored to make the network as American as possible,
eschewing the hard hitting journalism that made it famous in the Arab world (Greenwald
2016).28 These two points taken together suggest that AJ is more open to government
intervention and journalistic instrumentalization than the managers back in Doha would likely
admit.
Al-Jazeera English broadcasts 24-hours a day out of Doha, London, Washington D.C., and
Kuala Lumpur. Their programming tends to focus on political magazine and chat shows, but also
covers technology, health, and the environment as well as geographically focused programming,
primarily on Asia and Africa. Cohen and Atad (Cohen and Atad 2013) claim that the roughly
26% of AJE’s news items focus on Arab League members, indicating that a great deal of content
focuses on the network’s region of origin.
One of Al-Jazeera’s hallmarks is its hiring of local journalists to increase it’s on the ground
knowledge and credibility. According to El-Nawayay and Iskander (2002), Al-Jazeera resonated
with Arab audiences in large part because it contained reporting by fellow Arabs about their
concerns and interests. While there were controversies when the network branched out into
English content, the network ultimately hired Waddah Khanfar to run the whole Al-Jazeera
operation and instill a “public service” ethic in all members of staff. Powers (2012) writes that
notable Western journalists like Sir David Frost of the BBC and Riz Khan of CNN International,
were combined with journalists from over 65 different countries to staff the network. This is a
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As of this writing, AJAM has officially stated that it will terminate all broadcast and internet
broadcasting sometime in 2016, having failed to gain appreciable market share in the American news
market. In addition, some employees of the network have sued for sex discrimination. It remains to be
seen if this means AJE will become available in the American market.
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similar structure to RT in that the working journalists are not from the state sponsor but the
managers are. Figenschou’s ethnographic analysis of the AJE newsroom suggests that Western
journalists’ difficulties in adjusting to their new role on AJE are “symptoms of the structural
contradictions in the AJE project.” AJE’s editorial line positions the network as an alternative
news source, “whereas AJE’s editorial agenda and production strategies aim to professionalize
the alternatives” (Figenschou 2010, 367). As such, while AJE’s journalists operate outside their
traditional journalism norms and mediate between Qatari interests and global publics accustomed
to specific news norms.
Unlike the other broadcasters I selected, Al-Jazeera in either English or Arabic does not
clearly derive from Qatari journalistic traditions. While Qatar is, like many Middle Eastern
states, autocratic in terms of free speech, AJ’s editorial independence and ability to question the
shibboleths of Gulf states is what made it popular in the first place (Sakr 2007). The mechanisms
that influence channels like CCTV, such as their media system model and journalism norms, are
not present in the same way for AJE. While Qatar’s press freedoms are week, AJE journalists
have a relatively free hand to report what they wish. Qatar possesses no indigenous journalistic
tradition to draw on – as China, Russia, and Germany do – and so they imported one from their
former British colonial master. In a sense, this means Qatar operates two media systems, one
typically Middle Eastern characterized by high levels of state intervention and political
parallelism, and AJ characterized by British journalism norms. This is not to say that AJE is free
from interference, as we have seen above, but that the degree to which the channels serves as a
direct articulation of Qatari interests is less a result of media system influence and more likely to
reflect direct interference.
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3.1.3

Deutsche Welle

Founded in 1953 as a German language radio network by West Germany, Deutsche Welle
is the only network analyzed here that started outside of television. Given the channel’s age, its
purpose and editorial line have changed over the decades. DW’s early German language
broadcasting served a rehabilitating role for West Germany following World War II and during
the Cold War (Geniets 2013). The channel began television broadcasting in 1992 and after the
end of the Cold-War shifted its focus from rehabilitation to communicating a broader European
framework of values (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg 2009). The 2004 Deutsche Welle Gesetz
(Deutsche Welle Law)29 codifies the network’s mission to “convey the image of Germany as a
cultural state in the European tradition and as a free and democratic constitutional state”
(German Federal Republic 2004, 8). In addition, the law gives DW a mission to provide a
“forum in Europe and on other continents” for the exchange of ideas concerning politics,
economics, and culture. DW also promotes the German language facilitates Germany’s
international development goals (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015).
DW receives annually approved funding from the Bundestag, with a budget around €271
million per year (Geniets 2013). Merkel recently has pushed for greater funding to counter
Russian PD efforts (Gummer 2015). DW is, thus, subject to the interests of the German
government and potentially not as free from interference or instrumentalization as its
constitutional protections might suggest.
Constitutional protection, editorial independence, and a high level of professionalism
characterize Germany’s press system. Germany’s press market developed early, and this is
reflected in the high level of political parallelism in the media with several newspapers and
I have seen gesetz translated as “law” (Geniets 2013) or “act” (2016) and will use them interchangeably
as meaning is not really affected.
29

87

broadcast outlets catering to various shades of the political spectrum (Hallin and Mancini 2004).
While the press market is competitive (Freedom House 2015a), Germany, like most European
states, has a strong public service broadcasting tradition, though it is facing greater commercial
pressure (Jakubowicz 2010). The Deutsche Welle Gesetz makes the channel unique amongst the
others analyzed here in that the German Constitution guaranteed and codified its editorial
independence in law. In Section 2, Subsection 1, § 26 of the Gesetz guarantees the editorial
“independence” of managers and journalists and several other clauses limit certain actions, like
seeking sponsors, when they diminish that independence. In addition, Article 5 of the German
Constitution guarantees DW’s, and all other German media, freedom from censorship. This
makes DW the only network analyzed here that can appeal to a broader constitutional framework
to secure its interests and independence. At the same time, DW fulfills a key role in Germany’s
broader public diplomacy strategies. Zöllner quotes then director-general of DW Bettermann as
saying DW “conveys a part of the Federal Republic of Germany’s significance and all her social
and political positions” (2006b, 171). Among these are development in Africa (PołońskaKimunguyi 2015) and cultural dialogue between the Western and Muslim worlds (Zöllner
2006b). Recent tensions between Russia and Germany over Ukraine and migration have led
Merkel to advocate for a new multimedia outlet called DWNews, which DW President Peter
Limbourg says is meant to “‘defy Putin’s propaganda’” (Gummer 2015).
DW broadcasts 24-hours a day in English, Spanish, German, and Arabic and is based in
Bonn and Berlin, and has bureaus in Washington D.C., Brussels, and most recently, Moscow.
The network’s programming, befitting its editorial mission to represent both Germany and
Europe, has several programs that focus on European politics, culture, and arts. Other programs
focus on Germany specifically. It also is the only channel with a program devoted to
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automobiles, perhaps reflecting Germany’s automotive heritage. DW also airs the usual array of
chat, debate, interview, and politics programming.
DW journalists come from over 60 countries (Deutsche Welle 2012). For example, Sumi
Somaskanda is a newsreader for DW who was raised in New York State, while Phil Gayle is a
British sports caster. Examination of news presenter profiles further indicates that most have
journalism training and extensive experience (Deutsche Welle 2015a). As with DW’s funding
model and relationship to the state, the level of journalistic independence at DW is unlike the
other networks analyzed here. The Deutsche Welle Gesetz and Article 5 guarantee editorial and
journalistic independence and so the suspicion that RT, CCTV, and AJE coverage receives is less
common. Silcock’s (2002) ethnographic study, however, suggests that foreign reporters at DW
must work to bring their stories in line with a German perspective on reporting, which
historicizes events as a means to contextualize the news in line with the German mythic past.
The example he uses is of Daniel Goldhagen’s book tour for Hitler's Willing Executioners:
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. While both Anglo30 and German news producers felt the
tour was newsworthy, “Germans saw the story as an opportunity to expose a challenge to their
national past as such… Anglos saw the Goldhagen story as one about an individual challenging
the consensus of the group” (Silcock 2002, 345). While German producers rejected the idea that
the government enforced picking and framing stories based on German history, Anglos
sometimes reported feeling frustrated with having to conform to German, over international,
expectations for news reporting. While most DW journalists come from the developed West, this
does not mean that there is alignment between station managers and journalists. At the same
time, most of their journalists, and all in Made in Germany were European or German
In Silcock’s article, “Anglo” simply means English speaker or non-German, and is used to describe
Americans and English.
30
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specifically. DW journalists, then, are diverse but also reflect the differences in Western
journalism broadly. In all, even if the government does not mandate story selection, the culture
of the DW newsroom suggests that, at least at the time of Silcock’s writing, that cultural
pressures constrained DW journalists.
Germany’s media system encompasses a well-developed media market with high levels
of political parallelism with a pluralist political framework. Even though media reflects political
parties, low levels of state intervention mean that media mirrors the interests of various segments
of the political spectrum. International broadcasting complicates these presumptions. Germany is
not financing several different broadcasters to accurately reflect the panoply of German political
opinion and, therefore, we should question which specific political beliefs DW projects. In
addition, Germany serves a useful function in this dissertation as a representative of democratic
values of freedom of expression notably absent in the other states analyzed herein. Whereas
Chinese journalists see little conflict between promoting government policy and journalistic
professionalism, German journalists reflect a tradition of objective if partisan reporting. In other
words, while its is reasonable to assume that CCTV’s content will reflect Chinese interests, DW
content will likely reflect tensions between government interests and journalistic
professionalism.

3.1.4

China Central Television

Unlike the other networks analyzed here, CCTV International is an outgrowth of the
Chinese domestic broadcasting system. Established in 1958 as Beijing TV Station, CCTV served
the information management and propaganda role of the media system in Cold-War era
communist countries (Zhao 2012). CCTV and China’s wider public diplomacy efforts, much like
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Russia’s motivation behind RT, reflect the CPC’s concerns with China’s image abroad and was a
prime factor in their support for public diplomacy in general and the expansion of CCTV in
particular. The 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, and the negative international attention
following their suppression, signaled to the CPC that China needed to be proactive in
disseminating its policy positions abroad as well as building a positive image of China more
generally. Additionally, the discourse of the “China Threat,” popularized in the West convinced
Chinese leaders of the need to communicate with foreign publics (Shambaugh 2013). CCTV
began international broadcasting in 1992, using Mandarin and targeting Taiwan, Macao, Hong
Kong, and large overseas Chinese populations (X. Zhang 2011; Zhu 2012). The first English
language broadcasts came as early as 1986 with an English translation of the National News
Bulletin, but serious efforts to create an English language news station began in 1996. In the
early 2000’s, CCTV’s English channel was given a basic remit to present China “objectively” to
the world and to become a credible international news station along the lines of Al-Jazeera and
BBC, pursuing accurate and timely news (Shambaugh 2013; Zhu 2012). The network’s
promotional material describes the channel as “your link to Asia” and “China's contribution to
greater diversity and wider perspectives in the global information flow,” with a special focus on
Chinese news and events (CCTV 2010).
The actual level of funding for the channel is not available, but Shambaugh (2013), citing
an interview he conducted with Qiao Mu of the Beijing Foreign Studies University, claimed that
the 2009 budget for the “Big Four” Beijing based outlets was RMB60 billion or US$8.79
billion.31 All news media in China are officially state run, though this does not mean that there is
ideological homogeneity in the Chinese media system (Zhao 2012). CCTV’s English and foreign
The Big Four are Xinhua News Agency, The People’s Daily, China Radio International, and China
Central Television.
31
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language channels serve as an interesting illustration of the flexibility of the Chinese media
system and those who staff them, while at the same time illustrating the high degree of
parallelism between government and media outlets.
Zhao argues that understanding the Chinese media system requires scholars to move
beyond frameworks that see state intervention as antithetical to journalism and to capitalist
development. Instead she suggests that the CPC’s “regime of control has been both a
precondition and a consequence of China’s accelerated development in the post-1989 era” (2012,
150). As with Russia, the media market in China is large and subject to commercial pressures as
well as direct political pressure. But unlike Russia, the CPC owns all news media and provides a
framework of journalistic ethics grounded in a hybrid of Confucian and Marxist values with a
strong public service orientation (Zhao 2012).32 CCTV, therefore, seems to hybridize the
imagery and style of Western news, but remains very much understood by its Chinese staff, at
least, as a tool to inform foreigners in the same way the state informs Chinese citizens. In this
sense, China’s journalists view themselves as professional and even independent, but their
professional identity remains interwoven with a communist ideological framework that
emphasizes state development over criticism of the state.
CCTV’s external broadcasting, as an arm of Chinese public diplomacy, falls under the
State Council of Information Office (SCIO) as well as the State Administration of Radio, Film,
and Television (SARFT). As such, journalists working for the network understand their purpose
is to promote China’s image abroad, not to provide confrontational watchdog news coverage. At
the same time, managers at CCTV have made substantive efforts to shed the older Stalinist style
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The cases of both Russia and China are especially instructive when considering the relationship
between markets and states. In both, the state had a dominant role in media systems before reforms, but in
the Chinese case the state maintains part of its legitimacy by controlling media directly whereas Russia
uses informal systems of control (Meng and Rantanen 2015).
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propaganda formats that defined Chinese news in the past in favor of more recognizably Western
style journalism. Under the doctrine of nei wai you bie different standards are applied to internal
versus external communications and as such CCTV-International has more leeway than domestic
broadcasting in its coverage (Zhu 2012).33 For example, in 2003 the channel was revamped and
began hiring foreign news anchors, an unprecedented step in Chinese media history (X. Zhang
2011). Taking a lighter approach with the IB wing of CCTV allows the channel to adopt the
visual and journalistic idioms of the West, such as the unscripted on air interview, and thus
potentially increases credibility with foreign audiences while remaining consistent with Chinese
journalism norms (Rawnsley 2015b).
CCTV broadcasts 24 hours a day and has a wide range of programming, in contrast to the
very specific focus seen in RT. The channel broadcasts out of Beijing in six languages including
Arabic and Spanish. Where CCTV particularly stands out, however, is its very clear focus on
China specifically, Asia in general, and African affairs. For example, the channel has no fewer
than three programs devoted to Africa,34 four programs devoted specifically to Chinese news and
culture,35 and three devoted to Asian news broadly.36 There are also many debate and chat
programs as well as dedicated sports and business news. Based on programming, it appears that
CCTV’s managers have taken their mission to make the channel a peer of mainstays like AJE,
CNN, and BBC seriously, designing a diverse line of programs one might expect to see on any
24-hour news channel.
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However, the following subsection on broader PD efforts shows that CPC ideological view of the role
of journalism in a society is not explicitly affected by differing strategies to communicate with foreign
audiences.
34
These programs are Africa Live, Talk Africa, and Faces of Africa.
35
These programs are My China, China Insight, China 24, and Closer to China.
36
The programs include Spectrum Asia, Assignment Asia, and Asia Today
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CCTV’s modernization extends to the reporters they hire. Zhu (2012) reports that there
were at least a dozen foreign copy editors and anchors during a research visit in 2009 including
New Zealand journalist Edwin Maher who works as an anchor and voice coach.37 Other foreign
journalists include Beatrice Marshall, a Kenyan who hosts Africa Live, and Anand Naidoo, a
South African host of The Heat. Both hosts have experience at other broadcasters like KTN
Kenya and CNN respectively. Zhang (2011) suggests that many of the networks’ Chinese
journalists are young and have received training in Western journalism practice. She further
argues that CCTV journalists adhere to standards of journalistic professionalism and do not
approve of government interference, but must respond to such interference as a matter of course.
It isn’t necessarily clear how journalists from places like the United States, New Zealand,
or Kenya, places where there are press freedoms and differing views of the role of journalism,
negotiate the twin directives of being a world class news channel while also promoting China,
which boils down to promoting the CPC and its policies. Zhu (2012) observes that the network
sends its staff to CNN for training, but that foreign anchors also practice the self-censorship that
Chinese journalists practice in a domestic context. Jirik claimed that the “Party Line” is enforced
less through diktats than through a constant pressure not to “make certain kinds of mistakes”
(2005, 141). In this sense, Zhao (2012) argues Chinese journalists are highly professional in a
system with a high degree of parallelism. The state in the Chinese context exists in part to
promote “correct orientation to public opinion” (zhengqu yulun daoxiang) and Chinese
journalists are a key resource in that process. If their work informs the people and contributes to
the historical goal of public service as defined by Chinese journalistic history, then the Chinese
staff of CCTV International may not see promotion of China and the CPC as propaganda in the

37

Zhu relates a story in which she asked Maher how he felt about criticisms from his native country that
he was a “paid mouthpiece for Chinese propaganda.” His response was “Ah well.”
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negative sense. Rather they might see it as the application of Chinese journalistic norms on a
global stage in service to their country. In sum, CCTV’s Chinese managers likely influence
Chinese journalists through familiar mechanisms seen in authoritarian media systems while
Western journalists, like their AJE counterparts, must learn to navigate their new environment.
Concluding this section with China means, in a sense, we have come full circle from
Russia. These countries share several features: communist history, strong states, domination by
one political party, and late commercial development. Nevertheless, there are key differences as
well. Chinese journalism operates under an official state ideology and media outlets remain state
controlled. Unlike their Russian counterparts, Chinese journalists apparently feel professional as
they work under a system that seeks more to admonish the government rather than to challenge
it. In addition, because CCTV International operates within the larger domestic media system as
a public diplomacy extension, the pressures that shape Chinese media are much more likely to
influence China’s public diplomacy program as well. These differences, Zhao (2012) argues,
reflect the Communist Party’s revulsion to Russia’s post-communist transition and encouraged
intense, direct state involvement in information management. In these ways, China differs from
Russia, but also in terms of its public diplomacy as their model derives from a system which
values and upholds different normative expectations than other states.
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Table 3.1 Broadcasters by Media System Model
AJE
CCTV
Weak domestic
Late and
Media Market
media market
characterized by
Development
development
post-communist
market opening;
large
commercial
section
High; Qatar
High; all news
Political
considered one
outlets
Parallelism
of worst places
controlled by
to be a peace
state
time journalist
Low; AJ hired
Moderate;
Journalistic
Professionalism people trained in Chinese
British
journalists train
journalism
according to
tradition
developmental
and pro-party
model; CCTV
journalists
receive varied
training from
Western outlets
High; journalists Officially media
State
jailed and
is an arm of the
Intervention
freedom of
state
movement
curtailed

DW
High; several
outlets in open
competition with
each other

High; news
outlets reflect
specific political
positions
High; journalism
considered
autonomous
profession with
constitutional
protections

Low; officially
illegal for
private outlets;
constitutionally
banned for DW

RT
Late and
characterized by
post-communist
market opening;
large
commercial
section
High; Kremlin
ensures high
degree of media
approval for
ruling party
Low; postcommunist
journalists often
do not question
state; RT staff
often from UK
and USA

Direct
application of
state power to
limit media
ownership and
punish dissident
owners

Each state in this study has a specific media system, important because it provides the
framework IBs arise out of, particularly in the cases of Germany and China. Qatar imported their
media system from Britain, but AJE still operates within a highly controlled media system and
remains subject to those mechanisms. I summarize this information for convenience in Table 3.1.
While each state’s media system shares some elements, for example high degrees of political
parallelism – the degree to which media outlets represent various political parties or affiliations.
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However, they also evince differences in the other three categories, even within similar
situations. Both Russia and China, for example, are “transitional” states moving towards
capitalism, but RT hires from the USA and UK more than Russia while CCTV uses more
Chinese journalists whose training reflects both native and Western traditions. Because
journalists actually implement the editorial mission of a broadcaster, their training and
backgrounds represent an important influence on content. This section also illustrated the value
of comparative work, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) attempted in their original theorization of
media systems and some thoughts on this serves as a useful coda for this section. The
comparisons I have made here illustrate the limitations of a normative framework when studying
international broadcasting. Taking Germany, for example, scholars might analyze it in terms of
its potential to illustrate the value of German civil society and thereby build the attractiveness of
German society. Doing so, however, would elide the very real role DW plays as a tool of state
power. In contrast, Russian and Chinese public diplomacy operates according to normative
expectations grounded in communist and post-communist frameworks designed to maintain state
power while transitioning to capitalist relations. In this sense, both have failed to construct public
diplomacy outlets that increase attractiveness, a point Joseph Nye (2013) has made. Scholars and
practitioners of public diplomacy may throw up their hands, wondering why they just do not get
how to appeal to foreign publics. Chinese journalists, however, do not see themselves as pawns
of the state, but as professionals who help their government and their country by presenting it to
the world and calling on the state to live up to its function as a protector of the Chinese people.
Understanding that Chinese journalists work within different normative expectations allows
researchers to see CCTV not simply as state propaganda, but as an amalgamation of Chinese and
Western journalistic practice with the purpose of demystifying Chinese state policies. Moreover,
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it is not just Chinese journalists whose practices require analysis. All of the content analyzed in
this dissertation was produced by journalists operating in specific newsroom cultures (Hanitzsch
2011) and function as intermediaries between the desires of their managers and expectations of
their audiences. Comparison, thereby, allows for nuanced examination of media and public
diplomacy more capable of accounting for our objects of study than studies of singular nations
could (Meng and Rantanen 2015). Nevertheless, international broadcasters are not simply
expressions of media systems, but are also the product of specific government public diplomacy
programs that also exert pressure on their form, purpose, and content.

3.2

Public Diplomacy and State Interests

As seen in Chapter 2, American thinkers developed the concepts of public diplomacy and
soft power (Cull 2009b), and other states have come to adopt them both as necessary and
valuable means to project state power. However, this does not mean that different states
understand these concepts in the same way. Because of this, Hayden (2011) suggests, we should
look to the “rhetoric of public diplomacy,” the ways in which politicians and practitioners
describe and implement public diplomacy policies, to understand state expectations and plans for
the various assets and tools they deploy. While individual journalists working for IBs often shun
the term public diplomacy, IBs are typically considered part of the state’s public diplomacy
apparatus. What this apparatus entails and how it colors IB practices varies widely.
As the phrase “rhetoric of public diplomacy” implies, language is, if not everything, at
least important to how states formulate their public diplomacy. Take, for example, the Chinese
term xuan chuan, which means “propaganda,” called dui wai xuan chuan for “external
propaganda.” Propaganda does not contain the negative connotations it does in English, being
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more like “public relations” in the thinking of Chinese practitioners (Y. Wang 2008, 259).
Rawnsley (2015b) suggests, Chinese PD practice is grounded in an attitude of “to know us to
love us,” predicated on the idea that managing information about China will cause foreigners to
have a more positive evaluation of the country. In contrast, Germans may translate public
diplomacy directly to öffentliche Diplomatie, or some variation like diplomatische
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit meaning “diplomatic public relations,” while the German government uses
auswärtige Kulturpolitik, “cultural policy abroad” (Zöllner 2006b, 162). These terms reflect the
dual role of German PD to support both foreign and development policy goals by managing
Germany’s image as well as addressing cultural and economic development in other states.
Połońska-Kimunguyi (2015) argues that German PD’s Cold War role of fostering dialogue has
increasingly been combined with the state’s desire to see development in African states, and to
counteract increasing Chinese presence in that continent, to the point of not presenting Germany
to Africans, but depicting ways in which Africans could potentially be richer and more
developed, potentially more German.
While these translations may seem similar, they reflect ambivalence about how
governments should conceptualize public diplomacy efforts. In Chinese practice, the goal is to
manage and improve information about China itself, which is what xuan chuan is for, both
domestically and internationally (Shambaugh 2013). The German approach directly references
public relations as a field in some cases, and officially focuses on the “abroad” part of public
diplomacy, indicating that the government sees the domestic and international spheres as
fundamentally different.
Alternatively, Russia uses the terms obshchestvennaya diplomatiya, publichnaya
diplomatiya, or narodnaya diplomatiya, the latter meaning “people’s diplomacy” when targeting
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Western states. When referring to Russian PD in the post-Soviet space terms like gumanitarnoe
sotrudnichestvo, “humanitarian cooperation,” or gumanitarnoe napravlenie “humanitarian trend”
are used. Saari (2014) suggests that these differing terminologies reflect a soft power oriented
“Western” strand of PD and a “manipulative” Soviet style of propaganda in post-Soviet
countries. However, scholars like Borchers (2011) and Pomerantsev (2014) might argue that all
Russian PD is a form of political technology of manipulation and differences between the West
and post-Soviet spaces derive from their audience specific messaging. In any case, Russian PD
has neither the consistency of Chinese PD, nor the ideological content of liberal values seen in
German PD. In contrast, Qatar configures its public diplomacy and broader foreign policy as a
mediator between diverse interests and states (Gray 2013).38 Public diplomacy in the Qatari
model involves removing the Qatari state from most mediated interactions and crafting an open
space for dialogue, going so far as to pursue relations with Israel (Fromherz 2012). Despite
having very little real press freedom, Qatar’s PD efforts have thrived on their openness, in
contrast to Russia’s efforts in its “near-aboard” based on Soviet “political technologies” of
manipulation. In each case, the state has internalized the value, if not necessarily the term in the
case of Qatar, of public diplomacy, but also modified it to reflect its particular history and
interests. In turn, just as I expect their respective media system to shape each IB, the ways states
comprehend PD and soft power shape their larger PD programs.
Table 3.2 shows that each state in the study uses relatively similar methods of outreach. All
have multiple media outreach projects in several languages, finance educational institutions,
promote people diplomacy with schools or think tanks, and have target audiences in mind for
these various efforts.

38

Though, as we have seen in the previous section there are many reasons to doubt that Qatari efforts can
rest on an open mediation model anymore (see also Dickinson 2014).
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Table 3.2 Sponsoring State Public Diplomacy Programs
China
Germany
Wire services
DW Radio
Media Outlets
(Xinhua),
particularly in
Newspapers
Africa,
(China Daily and DWNews
People’s Daily),
Radio (China
Radio
International),
several CCTV
language specific
channels
Confucian
Provides
Educational
Institutes,
German
Institutions,
language
Language, and exchange of
Chinese
education via
Think Tanks
undergraduates,
DW, DWexchange of
Academie for
intellectuals
media training,
Goethe Institutes

Targeted
Audiences

Chinese speakers African subabroad, English
continent,
speaking
Europeans
travelers, African
sub-continent

Qatar
Al-Jazeera
conglomerate,
includes sports
and specialty
language
channels, AJ+
online channel

Russia
Wire services
(Ruptly,
Sputnik, RIA
Novosti), Online
newspaper
(Russia Beyond
the Headlines),

Qatar
Foundation,
partnerships with
Western
universities,
finances
academic
scholarship on
Qatar, finances
Museums
Arabs in
neighboring
states, English
speaking elites
globally

Russkii Mir and
Russian
Cooperation
Agency in postSoviet space,
Institute for
Democracy and
Cooperation

Russian
speakers in
Baltic,
Americans and
Europeans in
English

Within these activities, however, there are key differences where the varied definitions of
PD seen above shape practices. Key among these differences is the relative amount of state
direction of the efforts, depth and breadth of media enterprises, and the value placed on
particular regions and people as targets for outreach. These differences illustrate the variety of
ways in which states understand public diplomacy and soft power and provide a standard to
evaluate the content analyzed in subsequent chapters.
Joseph Nye (2013), has argued that the greatest source of soft power is an active civil
society. The paradox of this view is that PD is state originated by definition. Nye further argued
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that both China and Russia make a “mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument
of soft power. In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends
on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible.” However, evaluating non-Western (or
even Western in the case of Germany) PD by American standards risks placing them in a
normative framework that undermines our ability to understand the internal logic of their
programs. Indeed, both Chinese and Russian efforts are largely state guided. Media systems
interact with powerful central governments to make independent action and thought difficult in
both countries. Meanwhile Germany and Qatar’s public diplomacy, though state funded, operate
with relative freedom. However, state guidance is what we should expect, especially given the
Chinese and Russian models of journalism. In both cases, commercial pressures exist but are
carefully monitored and influenced by the state to achieve broader goals (Meng and Rantanen
2015; Vartanova 2015; Zhao 2012). So, while we might expect greater conformity to state
interests in CCTV and RT than DW, it does not immediately follow that CCTV content is
“brittle propaganda,” to use Nye’s phrase. Likewise, we might expect greater independence from
state narratives in DW and AJE given the relative freedom of their journalists, though we should
still see state interests moderate that freedom, not just for Qatar but for Germany as well. While
Nye suggests that China and Russia misapprehend what fosters soft power, it seems more likely
that they have a different view on how one gains soft power in the first place. In this way, using
Western standards of public diplomacy to evaluate non-Western PD efforts can lead to
misapprehension of the PD policies and methods employed by each state, something I am trying
to avoid by using a comparative framework (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Meng and Rantanen
2015). The various media efforts of each state also suggest differing approaches to PD and soft
power.
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The networks analyzed herein are not the only mass media efforts adopted by these
states, but there are important differences between them as well. The choice each state makes
between traditional broadcast television, wire services, and online platforms illustrate their
differing conceptions of how IB and PD should operate. China’s wire service effort is
particularly robust. Xinhua, like much modern Chinese media, started as a tool of the CPC, but
since the 1979 reforms it has morphed into an international news service working in Mandarin
and English and is now subject to market pressures (Hong 2011).39 Similarly, Russia has started
Ruptly, a news service that provides a “bolder, deeper point-of-view than the established figures
of the news marketplace” (Ruptly 2015). Given international communications long standing
interest in news wire services (see for example O. Boyd-Barrett 1980), Russian and Chinese
entrance into this arena represents the continuation of a long standing dispute over control of
international information flows (Nordenstreng 2012). Alternatively, AJ and DW are invested in
online platforms such as the AJ+ and DWNews (Gummer 2015). This is not to say that Russia
and China do not invest in internet space for their PD efforts. RT remains popular on YouTube
and CCTV has a web presence. Nevertheless, China and Russia opting to create wire services
that supply media content means they provide sources for other news channels, especially those
that do not have on the ground assets in either Russia or China, and can alter the global supply of
information and undermine Western dominance of news services.40 However, information is
plentiful and each state has other methods for reaching audiences. China’s use of multiple outlets
including newspapers such as the People’s Daily, an official arm of the CPC, allows CCTV to

39

In addition to CCTV International, the state funds Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International,
and the People’s Daily Newspaper, all translated into English (Shambaugh 2013).
40
While a complete analysis is not forthcoming here, it is worth mentioning that RT does use content
from Ruptly and Sputnik in its reports and CCTV’s web page content lists Xinhua as their wire source. In
these limited cases, there do appear to be synergies between wire services and some IB content.
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operate less as a propaganda mouthpiece and more as a journalistic institution, even if it is one
based on Chinese journalistic models that encourage deference to the state. Germany continues
to provide FM radio in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa where educational
programming is a popular genre (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015). Finally, Qatar has spun out the AlJazeera brand into a conglomerate structure, providing children and sports programming in
addition to news and changing the name from Qanat “channel” to Shabaka “network,” signaling
it expansion and compartmentalization (Kraidy 2008). Each effort, radio, television, online, or
wire service suggests a different approach and a different audience. Wire services supply news to
other outlets, but as both Ruptly and Xinhua have access to Russia and China that other services
may lack, they have the potential to build market niches and alter the flow of information as
AJE’s images of Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan once did (El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002; Ibish
2016; Wessler and Adolphsen 2008b).
The variety of media outlets also suggests that each state has particular audiences in
mind. Their sponsors intended CCTV America and Al-Jazeera America for the US market, while
wire services are for journalists specifically as opposed to general audiences. Likewise, a state’s
cultural and intellectual advocacy has specific targets, which indicate particular strategies and
understandings of PD and influence how IBs address audiences. For instance, Russia’s Russkii
Mir program exists to promote the Russian language, particularly in the Baltic, while the Russian
Cooperation Agency promotes Russia’s vision of the international system and foreign policy
(Saari 2014). These programs, in Russia’s near-abroad, work to activate Russian speakers and
undermine the states in which they reside by providing specific narratives about Russian history
(Borchers 2011). Further afield, several European states have accused Russia and RT news
content of targeting members of their societies and using them to damage national prestige

104

(Amann 2016; Bidder 2013; Borchers 2011; Nimmo and Eyal 2016). In this way, the Russian
programs and ideas are likely to connect with a narrow segment of “fringe” groups of the left or
right and operate more as traditional one way propaganda designed to undermine foreign publics
(Osipova 2014). In contrast, China wants to reach people in the West and depict China to them
but does so in a way that adjusts to the use of media to conform to the CPC’s goal of maintaining
domestic cohesion (Edney 2012). Put another way, Russia reaches Western audiences but
particularly seeks those disaffected with the status quo and speaks to them in their own liberal
democratic idiom, while China’s PD speaks to Westerners as though they are Chinese. What all
of this suggests, is that each PD program contains within it different normative expectations for
reaching foreign audiences and these expectations may influence the form that particular news
content can take. If RT operates to undermine Western legitimacy, as many have claimed, then it
appears to speak in the language of Western values to its audience; it is not about Russia it is
about the West. If CCTV operates as an extension of domestic propaganda targeted at
international audiences, the channel will seek to convey similar ideas about China’s stability,
development, and the role of the CPC in maintaining both. If this were the case, I would expect
the content of each IB to reflect their broader understanding of public diplomacy and target
audiences in different ways. Because of these factors, I expect IBs to create narratives not only
based on the norms of economic journalism, but also potentially in specific political languages
drawn from the journalists and oriented towards specific audiences.
Broadly speaking two sets of pressures can shape a given international broadcaster, the
media system where they operate and the public diplomacy program of which they are a part.
The first provides formal professional limits on journalistic practice and thus content. The second
reflects state directed norms and the editorial outlook the channel fulfills. While an in-depth
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examination of these pressures would require a newsroom based study, the presumption in the
literature is that international broadcasters are subject to these pressures and thus they should be
detectable in IB content. However, they must also have some concrete policy to narrate or
project. Otherwise, they would not serve the sponsoring state’s interests.

3.3

Economic Policy and Interests: What the Boss Says Goes

This dissertation uses a case study of IB economic news to test scholarly assumptions
about IB’s potential to project state power. Prevailing theories, such as strategic narratives,
suggest that IBs operate as disseminators of state policy, and as such knowing each state’s
economic policies is necessary to evaluate the extent to which IBs project those same policies. In
addition, three of the networks frame their mission as counter-hegemonic with the intent of
diversifying global news and provide perspectives outside the mainstream and some state
sponsors have advocated for changes to the global financial order. Examining those specific
policies, in addition to their general economic policy framework, will indicate the degree to
which a given broadcaster lives up to its counter-hegemonic mission statement or use it to
challenge Western hegemony.
All of the states selected for this study engage in capitalist economic activity, but their
specific policies reflect their unique histories, capacities, and situations. Qatar and Russia, for
example, rely on fossil fuel extraction, while Germany and China rely on manufacturing exports
for growth. Each state has multilateral alliances that limit its scope of action like the EU,
ASEAN, GCC, or Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, we do not need a complete vision of
each state’s respective economy. Instead, I provide a brief outline of state economic policies and
goals to create a standard to measure IB content in subsequent chapters drawing on a
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combination of primary government sources and secondary scholarship. I pay particular attention
to economic events within and around the study period as PD theories expect broadcasters to
serve as a platform for policy advocacy on the part of the state sponsor.

3.3.1

Russia: Remaking the System

Russia remains a country troubled by low economic performance, low oil prices, and
Western sanctions, which shape current Russian economic policies by threatening their oil
exports. During the study period, Russian leaders engaged in “information warfare” with
Germany and continued to participate in the Syrian Civil War, which is to say that Putin’s focus
remains on politics instead of economics. As business magazine Bloomberg put it: “the need to
get the economy back into gear is forcing the Russian president to face a painful choice: bow to
the demands of the markets or protect his Kremlin-centered system” (Pismennaya and Arkhipov
2016). Given these factors, Putin and his United Russia Party view the current international
economic order as unresponsive to their needs, or even openly hostile to their sovereignty and
interests. Additionally, Western sanctions have forced Putin to orient towards his East and the
rising economic influence of Asia, especially China (Karaganov, Cherniavskaia, and Novikov
2016). In pursuit of greater economic opportunities in the East, Putin has also pursued
multilateral trade and economic unions in Central Asia (Eurasian Economic Commission 2014).
All of these policies present promising opportunities for challenging the Western economic order
and promoting a Russian centered system.
The 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation described the official
views of the Russian foreign policy establishment and started from the proposition that
“International relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a
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polycentric system of international relations.” In addition, it stated, “The ability of the West to
dominate world economy and politics continues to diminish” given unsolved structural problems
in Western economies. Economically, Russia demands “adequate accommodation of Russian
interests… including determination of the global agenda in the areas of energy and food security,
[and] improvement of the trade and transport cooperation regime” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2013).
To accomplish these goals Russia seeks the end of Western sanctions and claims to want
deeper economic integration with the European Union and the creation of a Eurasian Economic
Union. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech in Luxembourg encouraged an end to sanctions,
“we talked about the prospects of harmonizing European and Eurasian integration processes in
order to eventually form a common economic and cultural space from the Atlantic to the Pacific
(Lavrov 2015). Despite claims from Lavrov and Putin (Zakaria 2016) that they desire economic
and political cooperation over conflict, Russia continues to engage in tit for tat travel bans of
diplomats (DeYoung and Roth 2016) and uses its PD to delegitimize Western policies and
narratives (Bovt 2013; Groll, McLeary, and O’Toole 2016). Other than lifting sanctions, Russia’s
economic policy appears dominated by its broader foreign policy, and economics appears
inseparable from larger ideological conflicts over the global system and democratic reform.

3.3.2

China: A Responsible Stakeholder

China’s post-1979 economy combined managed change where the CPC ruling party
incorporated capitalist reforms while jealously guarding its own centrality in the Chinese
political, social, and economic systems. During early 2015, the Communist Party continued its
plan to receive greater representation in multilateral institutions while also endeavoring to
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maintain their freedom to run China without outside interference. Specifically, the Party actively
pursued policies to deepen its global economic integration such as the Belt and Road Initiative to
link its coastal cities via rail and ship to Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe
(Simpfendorfer 2009; Winter 2016). In addition, Chinese leaders were busy promoting the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an alternative to Western dominated institutions like
the World Bank. Both initiatives had been viewed with suspicion by Washington (Donnan 2015)
and represent clear opportunities for strategic narrative projection.
The Party’s plan to manage change in the economy has yielded marked result. The
OECD reported in 2005 that “economic performance has been driven by changes in government
economic policy that have progressively given greater rein to market forces,” beginning in
agriculture and moving to steadily more complex forms of manufacturing (OECD 2005). The
CPC currently plans to shift from a manufacturing economy to an innovation and consumption
economy (Xinhua 2015), as the routine economic news analyzed in Chapter 4 shows. Despite
recent stock market turmoil, experts believe the fundamentals of China’s economy are strong
(Prasad 2016).41 These policies have made China the second largest economy in the world and as
Chinese economic standing increased so has the CPC’s demands for a greater share of power in
global governance. In a 2015 speech, Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong said that the G20, which
China leads this year, “is unmatched in its representativeness, thus legitimacy, and the capacity
to take and implement major, and sometimes tough decisions.” In addition, “There is an intrinsic
need for a vehicle like the process to advance cooperation in global economic governance in an
increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Arguably, if [the] G20 did not exist today, it
will have to be invented” (Baodong 2015). Likewise, China’s AIIB, represents a “great deal to

41

The author of this source, Edwar Prasad, was a China expert at the World Bank and frequently appears
on CCTV programming.
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the reform of the global economic governance system. It is consistent with the evolving trend of
the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic governance system more
just, equitable and effective” (Jinping 2016). China, therefore, desires greater representation in
global economic governance, but economics also highlights ideological tensions.
The Central Committee of the CPC’s Communiqué on the Current State of the
Ideological Sphere described a series of threats to the Party’s leadership including the promotion
of universal values, Western constitutionalism, Western journalism, civil society, and,
interestingly, neoliberalism. The communique says neoliberalism’s weak state and strong market
model aims “to change our country’s basic economic infrastructure and weaken the
government’s control of the national economy” (quoted in ChinaFile 2013).42 China’s increased
prosperity, and the fears it has stoked in the USA and China’s neighbors, has arguably sharpened
focus on ideology and nationalism (T. Zhang 2016). In the process, President Xi plans to ensure
ideological stability by strengthening control over media. Xinhua reported him as saying “All
news media run by the Party must work to speak for the Party’s will and its propositions and
protect the Party’s authority and unity,” and he encouraged “Marxist journalistic education” to
counteract fundamentally different and incompatible Western journalism (Tiezzi 2015). This
directive includes central broadcaster CCTV. In this way, China’s economic development led to
what the CPC sees as ideological instability and this shows a kind of schizophrenia in Chinese
thinking. CCTV, as we have seen above, is likely to convey state messages and avoid overt
criticism, but it must also engage with new ideological confusion brought about by China’s
economic success.

While Harvey (2010) would suggest that the growth of China’s economy represent the global capitalist
class moving money to where it can exploit development for its own ends, and pundit might say China is
gradually becoming more capitalist, the Chinese state clearly rejects this.
42
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3.3.3

Qatar: Oil and Royals

Qatar had long been a lonely outpost of the British Empire, reliant on pearl fishing and
was only granted independence in 1971 (Gray 2013). This all changed with the exploitation of
oil and natural gas reserves that enriched the ruling Al-Thani family (Fromherz 2012). It was this
hydrocarbon wealth that allowed Hamad bin Khalifa, who deposed his father, to found AlJazeera in 1995 and engage in higher-level diplomacy than their microstate status would
normally allow (Kaussler 2014; Khatib 2013). This wealth has also allowed Qatar to finance a
variety of infrastructure and political projects. Currently Qatar’s regime wants to diversify its
economy but remains embroiled in the oil politics of the region as well as the larger political
transformations in its neighbors; specifically Qatar want to sideline Iran, Syria, and Russia to
supply oil and gas to Europe and at the time of study this dynamic has been playing out for
several years. During the study period, low oil prices are probably the most relevant economic
issue in Qatari decision-making as oil and gas account for 80% or revenues and 50% of GDP
(Heritage Foundation 2016). Politically, Qatar finances a number of armed groups, some
accused of terrorist connections, in Libya, Syria, and other Middle Eastern states after the Arab
Spring (Dickinson 2014). Qatari economic interests are, therefore, pressured on two fronts. First,
the basic source of their wealth has dropped in price and weakened their relative economic
power. Second, geopolitical conflict and proxy wars that limit Qatar’s ability to maintain access
to the infrastructure necessary to gain access to oil markets.
While Qatar remains reliant on oil and gas, the government has instated reforms to move
away from reliance on resource extraction and expand their financial and knowledge industries
(Ibrahim and Harrigan 2012). The Qataris call this and other policies designed to transform the
economy “Qatarization.” In particular, the Qatari state seeks partnerships with Western
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universities via the Qatar Foundation to provide high level Western education for its citizens,
many of whom do not work (Salama et al. 2016). However, the free inquiry model of Western
education clashes with state control of information and the media, as seen above, limiting the
effectiveness of these ventures (Vora 2014). Oil price decline led to cuts in state fuel subsidies
and a general curtailment of PD efforts like AJ, museum financing, and World Cup 2022
expenditures (Galal 2016). Qatar, like Russia, finds itself in a precarious position economically,
racing against time to displace petroleum as the centerpiece of its economy and move into
knowledge, finance, and service sectors. It is unlikely that AJE will openly discuss Qatar’s recent
weakness, but we may find that their economic coverage receives impetus from the need for
innovation in the Qatari economy and may well focus on those kinds of stories.

3.3.4

Germany: A Steady Hand

German economic policy promotes strengthening European Union governance, political,
and economic structures, and integration while promoting what they call the “social market
economy” (Schauble 2016). Within this framework, German political leaders have spent much of
the past few years addressing the European financial crisis, the Greek Crisis, migration, and
Russian provocations in Ukraine all while attempting to expand Germany’s overseas profile as a
valuable trading partner. In particular, the election of the Syriza Party in Greece represented a
fundamental challenge to German led austerity efforts in the European Union and a prime
opportunity to use DW to frame Syriza’s policies and project German interests.
According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, the social market
economy is a system that protects “the freedom of all market participants on both the supply and
demand side, whilst also providing for a strong safety net” (’Öffentlichkeitsarbeit’ 2016b). In
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this way, Germany can serve as a model for other nations and as a bulwark against Russian
influence. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble recently said that as former Soviet
states entered the EU Russia saw “European soft power… moving closer, coming face to face,
with the Russian system…. Putin appears to be afraid to let this competition play out openly”
and this is “why he’s trying to weaken Europe by dividing us and tempting us to think only in
narrow national terms” (Schauble 2016). Germany sees its national interest as tightly intertwined
with the fortunes of the broader European Union, and seeks to strengthen that Union providing
its own economic system as a model.
What this has meant in practice, however, are rising tensions within the Union that Russia
seeks to exploit.43 Germany’s government advocated for tightening fiscal discipline in those
countries effected by the Euro Crisis, most famously in Greece where many see German policies
as punishing austerity (S. Brown 2012). Chancellor Merkel placed blame for the crisis squarely
on member states who did not maintain target deficit spending levels and argued that had they
“engaged in reform to increase their competitiveness, economic and monetary union would never
have been embroiled in such a crisis even with a relatively weak economic union” (Merkel
2012). As such, as anti-EU parties gain toeholds in parliaments across the Union, her
government advocates for deeper policy coordination and economic integration. When we
consider that Putin’s Russia openly finances parties like the Front Nationale in France and the
Alternative for Germany, it becomes clear that German and European economic strength are
crucial to challenging Russian aggression (Amann and Lokshin 2016).
Beyond strengthening European governance and integration, Germany sees international
trade as a valuable source of economic growth and potential soft power. German trade officials
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Russia exploits rising righting wing nationalism in Europe in other ways as well. As these parties gain
seats and visibility, RT reports on these events as signs that the West is fundamentally corrupt.
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say that, “Free trade is generating a great deal of employment and economic growth in our
country. This is why Germany has long been an advocate of open markets and trade
liberalization based on a clear set of predictable, multilateral rules” (’Öffentlichkeitsarbeit’
2016a). Asian countries are particularly important for expanding German trade; and Germany
advocates a policy in the region that stresses the interest of German companies as well as the rule
of law and competition policy (“Asia in German Foreign Policy” 2015). Merkel’s recent visit to
China, her ninth, focused mostly on economics and development issues, specifically Chinese
rules that limit the competitiveness of German companies. In order not to anger her hosts, she
omitted any mention of human rights issues, illustrating the importance Germany places on
economic relations with China (Stanzel 2016).
Each of these states pursues active economic policy, pushing for more trade and
development, or reform of the economic governance system. Nevertheless, they are not
unanimous in their approaches to achieving these goals. History and geography constrain and
enable each to pursue their preferred policies. Theories of international broadcasting and public
diplomacy suggest that the channels analyzed here will project these policies as legitimate and
desirable to foreign publics. However, this assertion has yet to be tested.

3.4

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter showed that each network arose out of contingent conditions
and that no two networks operate under the same set of pressures. First, states develop
international broadcasters out of specific exigencies that may influence their editorial positions
and thereby their content. RT and CCTV, for example, were direct responses on the part of their
state sponsors to counter what they saw as Western media’s bias against their political systems
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and interests. Second, IBs also reflected multiple pressures during their operations. Media
systems define journalistic norms and thus the ways in which IB journalists create content. At the
same time, a state’s public diplomacy program influenced the place of an IB in a broader policy
platform for reaching foreign publics. Specific definitions of PD employed by sponsor states
suggest that each network operates as different manifestations of state understandings of PD and
information outreach and management. Finally, financial journalism norms provide generic
conventions while newsroom cultures provide normative expectations that each journalist
working in an IB must consider when crafting their product. These pressures all potentially exert
influence on IB content.
I have also shown that each state has specific economic views, interests, and policies.
Examining these provides a baseline for analyzing the extent to which IBs directly promote
strategic narratives and state interests. In addition, my analysis showed that each of these states
remains connected to larger networks of global commerce and none of them exist in isolation. In
turn, each shows different levels of acquiescence to the global economic system with two states –
Russia and China – exemplifying counter-hegemonic views of global commerce. While all of
these states need global capitalism they are not all happy with its operation. Indeed, some of
these states are in direct conflict with each, as with Germany and Russia over Ukraine, and Qatar
and Russia over Syria. In short, while all of these states are nominally engaged in capitalist
activity, sites of conflict, and thus opportunities for state power projection, are readily available
to each broadcaster.
Literature on international broadcasting suggests that these channels exist to promote and
project state narratives. However, we have also seen that each state possesses a unique
understanding of how public diplomacy should function, how international broadcasters should
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treat information, and how journalists see their particular roles. As such, the comparative
analysis in the Chapter also highlights the significant differences in PD practice. In turn, the data
will help account for the content analyzed in subsequent Chapters.
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4

VISIONS OF NATIONAL OF ECONOMY

Under a grey sky, tugboat captain Dirk Woltersdorf guides a container ship down the last
stretch of the Elbe to the German port city of Hamburg. A deep, masculine voice narrates
Woltersdorf’s actions as the young man checks sonar and communicates with his home base in
one of Europe’s biggest ports. The narrator claims that the ship, like one in three that enter and
exit the port, comes from China and that these ships stitch together the pathways of global
commerce. We learn that the tugboat captain and his crewmates will spend two weeks on the
water and two weeks on land. As the story ends, Dirk expresses his concern that without
deepening the Elbe, global commerce may pass by the now prosperous city in favor of more
amenable facilities. Deutsche Welle’s Made in Germany reported this story as part of an episode
devoted entirely to the economic history and life of Hamburg. The episode also included reports
about an American immigrant working in an ad agency, women workers at an Airbus plant, and
wealth inequality and affordable housing. Overall, the episode handily illustrates how
international broadcasting projects a national brand and serves as a tool of state power. The
program paints a picture of German history and culture for global audiences, while also serving
as a sort of documentary highlighting the positive aspects of modern Germany. Drawing upon
what Silcock (2002) calls the German mythic past, DW uses history to contextualize news
events; each story begins with an individual engaged in their daily routine, as opposed to a larger
news event or issue to be reported. In contrast, RT, AJE, and CCTV news programs typically
begin with the issue itself. In this sense, the program illustrates the hybrid function of statesponsored IB: part news, part public diplomacy aimed at addressing foreign publics to shift their
attitudes towards the sponsoring state.
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This example also illustrates that international broadcasters, as tools of state power
projection and public diplomacy, are not homogenous, but rely upon a variety of narratives and
visual techniques. Instead, a complex set of features--including sponsor-state interests, the
respective media system, journalistic culture and routines, and genre conventions--all contribute
to shaping the actual IB content. Analysis of these features, thus, informs our understanding of
media flows, complicates our understanding of counter-hegemony, and invites further analysis of
the global newsroom.
In this chapter, I examine the domestic news narratives projected by AJE, CCTV, DW,
and RT. Using the coding scheme and methodology described in Chapter 2, I analyze each
networks’ common story topics, geographic focus, type of speaking actors featured, style of
news reporting, narratives of the sponsoring state, narratives of their geostrategic rivals, and the
presence of neoliberal ideology in the narrative. An analysis of these variables provides a test of
the extent to which IBs conform to the assumptions present in the existing literature about their
role in projecting state power narratives. As this chapter will demonstrate, my findings suggest
that generalizations about the relationship between IBs and the sponsoring state that dominate
the literature are misguided. Even in countries where IBs have constitutional protections, such as
Germany, Połońska-Kimunguyi argues that DW operates “in line with one of the key areas of
German development policy” (2015, 388). This quotation illustrates the generalized, and logical,
belief that IBs work directly to promote state interests. Likewise, leaked State Department cables
indicate that foreign service officers believe Al-Jazeera’s “ability to influence public opinion
throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar,” and, “can also be used as a
chip to improve relations” with other states (Booth 2010). However, with closer analysis we can
identify how domestic journalistic norms, the global news agenda, and the political interests of
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the sponsoring state interact to facilitate a range of relationships between the state and the IB.
Financial journalism, in particular, with its deference to market ideology and economic actors
shapes IB content in ways arguably not seen in other forms of journalism.

4.1

State Sponsored Though not of a Kind

Public diplomacy (Cull 2009b; P. M. Seib 2005) and strategic narrative (Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014) literature assume that IBs serve a central purpose: to
present the state and its policies. They provide little if any detail of how and to what extent the
actual content of IB coverage conforms to such a purpose. Seib, for example, claims, “Russia
Today provides news with a spin that favors the interests of its proprietors. Many news
consumers presumably recognize how the game is played and judge the information they receive
accordingly” (2010, 737). Similarly, Miskimmon et al. claim, “The recent proliferation of
transnational television channels such as Al Jazeera, Telesur, Press TV, Russia Today, and
CCTV9, alongside BBC World and CNN International, may suggest state control. However,
each features platforms and interactive features” (2012, 10).44 However, in neither case do these
scholars examine the content of these channels, and while their presumptions about state control
and spin are logical, they have yet to be directly tested. Furthermore, scholars that examine the
potential of IBs to be a contra-flow or counter-hegemonic (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Painter 2008;
Sakr 2007; Thussu 2007a) have studied news content for reliance on establishment elites like
politicians, on ethnocentric focus in covered regions, how distant places are reported, and weak
coverage of developing world that focuses on violent conflict. Avoiding such patterns would
indicate the possibility of contra-flow and counter hegemony (Figenschou 2010). However, few
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He does not substantiate his claims about reception.
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of these studies relate the content to the sponsor state’s political interests. Literature on financial
journalism (Chakravartty and Downing 2010; Corcoran and Fahy 2009; Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti
2010; Lee 2014) suggests that this genre of news is overly reliant on official sources and
generally lacks academic, worker, and union voices. It also suggests the genre is not critical of
the economy and its structure, and are fascinated with new things or products. However, since
the literature focuses primarily on privately owned networks, it must be determined if IBs follow
the pattern seen in private business news because government funding partially shields
broadcasters from market forces. It is possible that IBs will actively use different kinds of
sources in the process of articulating state policy or counter-hegemony compared to private
networks, as scholars’ research on AJE illustrates.
I have organized the findings into six topical categories based on the theoretical issues
outlined above. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the “issue” variable (see Appendix A and B) shows that
there were particular stories that each network covered such as: the Greek debt crisis, ECB
policy of quantitative easing, and US Federal Reserve plans to raise interest rates, suggesting that
there is something like a global financial news agenda. Recall that “issue” refers to the lede of
the story, how the anchor or journalist introduces a given news item, as opposed to the framing
or narratives within a news item. As such this table indicate the total number of discrete news
items, across networks, where these terms were used in the lede.
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Table 4.1 Most Common Stories
AJE
0
Interest Rates
2
Greek Debt
Crisis
1
ECB
Quantitative
Easing
3
Chinese
Economy
3
Russian
Economy

CCTV
23
34

DW
0
7

RT
14
19

11

1

10

5645

0

1

046

1

0

Japanese
Economy

2

2

0

0

Oil Prices
Commodity
Prices
Currency
Asian
Infrastructure
Investment
Bank
Trade

3
1

18
10

2
0

9
4

0
1

22
11

0
0

9
1

0

18

Nevertheless, each network also covered issues of particular interest to the sponsoring
state. CCTV, for example, devoted coverage to Chinese economic reform, while AJE negatively
framed Russia, a country on the opposite side of the Syrian civil war. RT featured several items
on technology and currency that did not feature any state directly, and DW’s reporting paid
particular attention to German industries rather than event driven news. Story selection suggests
that IBs need to be responsive to the news cycle while also projecting state power, a tension
apparent in several of the coding scheme’s variables.

45

This number reflects stories about the Chinese economy at a macro-level, several hundred other items
covered specific sectors
46
There were no stories about the Russian economy on a macro-level, however, there were six stories
devoted only to Russia and several stories discussed Russia in terms of oil and their credit rating.
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4.1.1

Geographic Focus – Where is my Country?

Scholars who examine international broadcasting suggest that sponsoring states finance
networks to influence foreign publics by increasing the state’s soft power or providing strategic
narratives and, thus, we should expect them to cover the sponsoring state (for example Price
2014; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012; Pamment 2012). Analyzing the geography
variable, therefore, illustrates each channel’s geographic attention, and thus gives insight into
potential areas of state interest. As such, we should see that each network covers their sponsoring
state to a degree, and thus project the state sponsor, though how much is not known. The
prevalence of the state sponsor as the topic of a given news item also serves as an indication of
the potential presence of state strategic narratives. In order to test this, I coded for a set of
features in each news item including focus on domestic or foreign news, the name of the states
discussed in the item, and if those states came from the Global North or South. In other words,
these variables tell us where each programs’ editorial attention lay and give us the relative
number of items that focused on domestic versus international news as well as more specific
information about those states. Because CCTV, AJE, and RT claim to depict underrepresented
issues and regions of the world, we may therefore expect some coverage of states in Asia, Africa,
and South America. CCTV specifically claims to be a “link to Asia” and DW claims to cover
Europe, so we may also expect a degree of regionalization based on editorial pressures.
Examining the geographic focus of news coverage is also a way of testing the degree of news
homogenization, a feature Thussu (2007c, 2007b) predicts will increase with media deregulation
and which some networks claim to resist.
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Table 4.2 shows the percentage of total news items that cover domestic, intersectional, or
foreign news items aired by each broadcaster. Domestic items are about the state sponsor,
intersectional items are about sponsor and at least one other state, and foreign items about nonsponsor states only where news items are discrete units of news characterized by individual ledes
(see Appendices A and B). Given the claim that IBs can project state narratives and can serve as
platforms for advocacy and cultural diplomacy (Cull 2009b), its surprising that only DW and
CCTV spend any substantive amount of time discussing their state sponsor. While it is at this
point well known that AJE does not cover Qatari affairs (Sakr 2007; Figenschou 2010), more
surprising is that RT’s Boom Bust devotes little attention to Russian economic news. Russia
Today content covered the foreign news in 96.1% of items with few explicit references to
Russia.
Table 4.2 Geographic Frequency
AJE

CCTV

DW

RT

0.0%

31.1%

51.7%

1.1%

Intersectional 1.8%

32.0%

31.7%

2.8%

Domestic

Foreign

98.2%

36.9%

16.7%

96.1%

N=

57

192

61

57

Only 1.1% of items were domestic and 2.8% were intersectional i.e. about the sponsoring
state in relation to another state. The USA received the most attention accounting for 31.9% of
RT news items. Greece accounts for the next most being the subject or related to the main
subject in 16.0% of stories and the EU appears in 13.2% of items. RT’s editorial attention,
therefore, is focused on the developed world, particularly the USA and EU in general, and states
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in the midst of financial crisis specifically. Western states featured in RT coverage are also the
countries of origin for many of their reporters, including host Erin Ade and producer Edward
Harrison (both Americans). These facts suggest that Boom Bust does not project narratives about
Russia itself. In turn, RT’s public diplomacy strategy does not directly seek to improve Russia’s
image but gives space to viewpoints that undermine its geopolitical rivals using reporters from
those rivals, which I examine in the “opposing power narratives” sub-section below.
Nevertheless, the RT content analyzed here shows that the network remains focused on the
Global North, covered in 69.3% of news items, and does not diversify global news output in the
same ways as CCTV and AJE, with 44% and 56.1% of their items covering the South
respectively. As such, if we are to conclude that RT projects state narratives we must look to the
specific discourses about its rivals present in its programming. Likewise, RT’s claim to provide
an “alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints international audience with a
Russian viewpoint” and operate counter-hegemonically as operationalized by Figenschou (2010),
Painter (2008), and Robertson (2015) must be found in content.
In contrast, CCTV and DW are on the other end of the spectrum, suggesting a bifurcation
in the networks’ geographical focus. In turn, this suggests each networks applies different
approaches to PD and economic news. CCTV stories focused on Chinese domestic economic
news (31.1%) and many others focused on Chinese relations with other states (32.0%). CCTV
intersectional stories exemplified the Chinese PD policy of “to know us is to love us” (Rawnsley
2015b) and often covered Chinese economic relationships (e.g. when China and Argentina
signed a series of trade deals). CCTV also depicted multilateral relationships and diplomacy such
as when the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) met in Beijing in
January 2015 and the Boao Forum of Asian States or China cosponsored the German CeBit
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Technology show in March. In these stories China goes out into the world, the world goes to
China, and these relationships support the view of China as a safe multilateral actor that the CPC
wishes to project (Shambaugh 2013).
DW news items focused on solely domestic stories 50.8% of the time and the relationship
between Germany and some other nation 31.1% of the time. As seen in Chapter 3, Germany’s
foreign policy involves promoting European integration and cooperation and promotes economic
development and increased trade with Africa and China, while promoting Germany as a model
of capitalism and the welfare state. However, Made in Germany rarely goes to these places to
explore those relationships; instead we see foreign citizens come to Germany (such as in a
feature on a Mexican family immigrating to Germany). In this sense, DW projects Germany as a
model for other countries to follow. DW like CCTV exhibits a higher degree of parochialism in
its broadcasts when compared with AJE or RT.
The parochialism of a given network suggests the degree to which it is ethnocentric in its
coverage, a scrutinized feature of international news reporting (Sreberny and Paterson 2005).
Ethnocentrism in news and the general pattern of North to South and West to East flows of
media content (Thussu 2007a) means that journalists from the Global North report on the
developing world more often than the reverse.47 Covering states in the Global South may serve
state interests, as in the case of Chinese coverage of domestic news, or editorials interests, as in
CCTV coverage of their Asian neighbors. CCTV’s coverage may also reflect the interests of its
Chinese journalistic staff who, while working for an arm of the Chinese government, are also
seasoned financial journalists who may take this opportunity to explain their nation and region to
Western audiences. As such, the degree to which an IB covers the developed versus the

47

It was this situation that made Al-Jazeera Arabic so interesting when it premiered as an Arab owned
and operated channel speaking to and for Arabs.
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developing world has potential to both distribute state narratives and diversify global news in
accordance with specific editorial missions.
A central part of the mission statement of RT and AJE and CCTV are to privilege voices
from the Global South and to diversify global news flows. In one sense, this goal is a clear
response to the weaknesses of traditional global news outlets. In another sense, however, states
can use speakers from the Global South, and counter-hegemonic coverage more generally, as a
means to project their narratives or undermine rivals’. Ultimately, speakers from the Global
South can diversify news, but also serve a state sponsor depending on their specific needs.
Accordingly, networks’ distribution of coverage of the Global North or South varies widely. AJE
conforms to previous research (Figenschou 2010) that shows the network focuses on the Global
South, in this sample accounting for 56.1% of all news items. DW focuses on the Global North
in 85.0% of its items, largely because of its focus on German affairs. As such, DW functions as a
tool of PD by broadcasting news about its sponsor state. This is also consistent with research that
suggests most news providers focus on the Global North (Sreberny and Paterson 2005).
CCTV diversifies global news by virtue of fulfilling its function as a tool of state power
projection and providing a “link to Asia,” where many states are classified as developing nations.
Journalist’s focus on the Global South in 53.4% of the items in the sample, which can partially
be accounted for by the relatively high number of domestic items (45.3%) coded. As noted
above, topics cover a wide range including major holidays, government economic policy, and the
lives of China’s nouveau riche, projecting an image of Chinese prosperity to global audiences.
China’s relationships with South American, Asian, and Western states account for 32% of all
CCTV items. This does not mean that CCTV’s content is necessarily “objective” or challenges
the state. It must still fulfill its function as external propaganda in the CPC’s sense of the term,
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but the data does show Global Business news items project Chinese state narratives about a wide
swathe of the world, and that the network provides coverage of the developing world at a higher
rate than other networks studied here.
Scholarship has, up to now, suggested that IBs are critical tools of state narrative
projection and they might be expected to discuss the sponsoring state in some detail.
Nevertheless, the data here suggests varying strategies in terms of geographic focus. Omitting
the sponsoring state, as AJE and RT do, means that we cannot necessarily expect either to
directly project Qatar or Russia respectively. Meanwhile, DW and CCTV’s relatively high
amount of domestic and intersectional coverage indicates that state sponsor narratives might be
present in their content. Likewise, RT’s claim to cover news outside the mainstream does not
extend to covering the Global South, while both AJE and CCTV appear to live up to their
editorial mission to cover the Global South and Asia. Geographic data does not reveal anything
about specific narratives, it does show DW and CCTV do present the sponsoring state. However,
AJE and RT do not which suggests different potential approaches to serving state interests and
projecting state narratives.

4.1.2

Voices – And Now, Live from…

Geographic focus tells us where editors want our attention, but the people empowered to
speak actually tell the story. Zelizer (2007) argues that journalists, and those they interview
including ordinary people, bear with them the duty to “eyewitness” the news and thereby provide
credibility to the news source itself. By privileging certain voices, international broadcasters can
directly address sponsoring state’s specific interests when media like CNN and BBC do not
devote sufficient coverage to their views (Kuhn 2010; Pomerantsev 2014; Rawnsley 2015b).
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While the presence of overt political propaganda is unlikely because it would undermine network
credibility, Cull (2009b) suggests that IBs provide platforms for diffusion of policy positions by
the sponsoring state or as direct communication channels between members of the sponsoring
government and foreign publics. Consequently, one would expect networks to feature members
of the sponsoring government to project and promote state interests. In addition, AJE and RT
might pursue their stated goals of diversifying news by including underrepresented groups in
terms of political party, nationality, gender, or ideology. Nevertheless, scholarship shows that
financial journalism caters to elite audiences and IB’s economic news content could follow these
journalistic conventions illustrating the importance of journalism cultures in the production of
content (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010; Hanitzsch 2011; Schiffrin and Fagan 2013).
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the different populations featured in the four programs
under review: political (those connected to governments), economic (people in charge of
buisnesses), expert (speakers who provide context and analysis), workers (those engaged in work
but not in a position of power), and ordinary people (person on the street interviews).48 Activists
and members of international organizations such as the IMF are included in the political
category. As the table demonstrates, just as stations vary significantly in their geographic focus,
so too do they vary in whose voices they choose to privilege in economic news and thus who
witnesses economic activity and policy. These figures represent total number of appearances
across all news items for the speaker categories. No matter how short the speaker’s total amount

For the reader’s convenience, the speaking actor categories include: political (works for a government
or supra-national governance organization like the IMF; also includes activists), economic (those engaged
in economic decision making for private profit), expert (people invited to provide analysis of the news),
worker (people engaged in economic activity who do not have decision making power, and ordinary
(someone used to provide opinion but not specifically and expert).
48
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of time in a given item, I coded them as having appeared; each speaker was limited to once per
item (see Appendices C and D).
Table 4.3 Speaking Actor Frequencies
AJE
21.4%
Political
29.0%
Economic
29.8%
Experts
14.5%
Ordinary
5.3%
Worker
131
N=

CCTV
21.6%
20.5%
47.8%
8.7%
1.4%
1362

DW
9.4%
36.8%
21.7%
18.9%
13.2%
212

RT
5.2%
4.6%
89.0%
1.2%
0.0%
173

Despite claims that IBs can be platforms for state officials, political figures from the
sponsoring state or from other states comprise a relatively small percentage of the speakers
across networks.49 CCTV features the most political actors (21.6%) of all the networks, with 118
speakers connected to national, regional, or local Chinese governments. Interviewees ranged
from local government officials such as Guangdong Deputy Mayor Yang Xiaotang; to national
figures like Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei. Such speakers fulfill a variety of roles from
explaining national policy during press conferences to commenting on economic issues in his/her
particular locality during onsite interviews. The numbers of political speakers, however,
represents a small fraction of the total number of CCTV speakers, which totaled 1362 as seen in
Table 4.3.50 RT featured no members of the Russian government and AJE only presented one
member of the Qatari government, a Qatar Airways representative. These numbers show that in
economic programming, government members are rare and policy advocacy needs to be
accomplished by either the journalists themselves or other guests. State economic narratives are,

49

China and Russia have used direct state sponsored advocacy via advertorials in Western newspapers to
directly communicate their governments positions with foreign publics (T.-K. Chang and Lin 2014; Golan
and Viatchaninova 2013), suggesting their willingness to use direct government appeals.
50
The annual Two Sessions and the multiple multilateral forums held in China during the study period
accounts for these relatively high numbers.
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thus, presented through surrogates and economic policy and opinion remain the preserve of
experts and economics actors, which provides credibility via economics’ professional norms
(McCloskey 1998). This appears to be true even for RT, often accused of towing the Kremlin
line (Bidder 2013), or CCTV where the principles of journalism subordinate criticism of the
government to improving national image and development (Zhao 2012). How programs
distributed the rest of the speaker types suggests that each network engages with economic news,
and projects state narratives, in different ways.
Although IBs do not necessarily feature government speakers, their reliance on elite
speakers from the private economic sector belies particular positions and interests. As Table 4.3
shows, economic actors (those who are presented as engaging in economic activity as opposed to
analysis) account for between 36.8% (DW) and 4.6% (RT) of speaking actors, mirroring trends
identified in commercial economic news (Schiffrin and Fagan 2013). With the exception of RT,
to which I return below, all the IBs rely on economic elites as speakers. However, they also use
entrepreneurs and small shop owners. Economic actors, therefore, operate at different levels of
the economic system. This arguably builds eyewitnessing credibility in terms of the speaker’s
status.
DW’s use of high-level economic actors, such as the CEO of Lufthansa, emphasizes its
access to German business elites and highlights the economic power of Germany. However, DW
items often focus on economic actors in charge of small or medium sized enterprises or
“entrepreneurs” who are starting new companies and, in the process, transform traditional
German business practices. For example, a DW story from early March 2015 follows a young
woman who left the relative conformity of German business to start her own “management
training” company. Another story from March focused on Berlin based French restaurateur
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Sebastien Gorius who the reporter claims, “loves his country but says fundamental changes are
needed,” to be competitive. Comments like these echo Angela Merkel’s position that “All [EU]
member states need to implement reforms, structural changes and tough consolidation steps to
increase competitiveness” to counter the European financial crisis (Merkel 2012). In this
example, a French economic actor praises both the dynamism and Germany to be worthy of
emulation on the part of European neighbors, thereby indirectly supporting German economic
policy.
Similarly, CCTV interviewed powerful Chinese business people, even producing a series
of stories entitled “high-flyers” featuring Hanergy CEO and the richest man in China, Li Hejun,
or head of the Alibaba group, Jack Ma, among others. CCTV journalists also devoted stories to
small businesspersons, particularly from new ecommerce ventures, which the state had just
authorized. As China’s “Economic and Social Development Plan” from 2015 makes clear,
foreign direct investment and opening China to greater capital flows is a key part of the CPC’s
overall economic strategy. Additionally, Chinese Foreign Minister Hua Chinying responded to
German criticisms of Chinese investment policy saying “‘China is willing to cultivate a fair and
transparent investment environment for investors both at home and abroad’” (People’s Daily
2016).51 Using business actors allows DW and CCTV to promote their countries as desirable
sites for economic activity and thus promote the broader interests of the state and in the process
conform to financial journalism’s generic conventions. In this way, DW and CCTV appear to use
economic actors to project desirable narratives of their economic vitality and fitness.
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While outside the study period, the comments indicate a long-term trend in Chinese economic policy of
attracting investment, people, and capital to foster Chinese economic growth and innovation in line with
previous policy efforts.
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The presence of economic actors is largely consistent with studies of financial journalism
which show the business press rely on economic elites as sources for information and as
commentators (Lee 2014) and suggests the IBs operate under similar pressures to commercial
financial journalism. However, some networks use speakers in ways that deviate from their
editorial line or rely on particular groups more than others to project state economic narratives.
Figenschou’s (2010, 2012) work on AJE suggests that despite the network’s mission to be a
“voice for the voiceless,” it relies on elites, establishment or otherwise, as well as their own
editorial staff for most of its regular newscasts. According to my analysis, AJE uses expert actors
roughly equally to political or economic actors. However, workers, those who are actors in the
economy but without the power of a manager or CEO, only account for 5.3% of speakers while
ordinary people account for 14.5% of the sample. In contrast, nearly one out of three speaking
actors on DW, a network with no stated counter-hegemonic mission, were ordinary people or
workers. For example, a story from January 13 featured Sudanese refugee and baker Adam
Ismail Hussein and his boss to contextualize a larger story about German refugee laws that allow
newcomers to work for four years. We have already seen a similar story construction with the
French restaurateur but there are several other examples including stories involving a Mexican
family who immigrated to Germany. I will return to these possibilities below when I engage with
the presentation of the state, but these examples illustrate the need to test broadcaster claims
about their editorial mission against their actual content output.
In each of the programs analyzed, each IBs’ projection of state narratives depends largely
on non-governmental speakers. In turn, experts occupy a key role in legitimating strategic
narratives for the state sponsor by providing independent expertise on economic matters. CCTV
provided particularly instructive examples given that their programming combines both Chinese
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and foreign experts. For example, Yang Zhimin of the Institute for Latin American Studies at
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Madhav Das Nalapat of India’s Manipal University.52
Particularly when those speakers are labeled “economists” they draw on the rhetorical authority
of that profession to portray state policies or interests as natural and backed by scientific
consensus (McCloskey 1998). AJE, DW, and CCTV also featured experts, which include:
business people, consultants, university professors, and analysts for supra-national organizations
such as the IMF and World Bank. In this way, these three networks conform to the financial
journalism norms (Corcoran and Fahy 2009; Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010), and they illustrate
an apparent limitation of IBs in projecting state power. However, there are important differences,
and RT is a clear outlier, in these networks’ selection practices. While AJE and DW do not use
independent experts significantly more than any other category of speaker, experts on CCTV and
RT account for 47.8% and 89.0% of speakers respectively. These numbers reflect both networks’
frequent use of their own journalistic staff as interview subjects, with CCTV journalists
accounting for 14.3% and RT journalists accounting for 31.8% of their respective speaking
actors. Removing all CCTV affiliated speakers, the number of experts in its coverage drops to
33.5%, still high compared to AJE and DW but not as drastic. In CCTV’s case, foreign and
Chinese experts provided knowledge and interpretations that substantively supported Chinese
policy, thereby lending their own credibility to Chinese policies and interests while avoiding the
appearance of pure government propaganda, an important goal for CCTV’s managers as seen in
Chapter 3. RT’s Boom Bust, on the other hand, relies heavily on one kind of expert not
necessarily seen in other IBs: American university professors account for nearly 22.1% of expert
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Here again, we see that CCTV devotes sustained attention to the Asian region as its editorial mission
would suggest. In addition, independent expertise may well signal to viewers that CCTV can operate as a
trusted source for information on Chinese economic news and policy.
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speakers and 19.7% of all speaking actors. They are the best-represented group, other than RT
staff, on Boom Bust. Instead of putting Russian officials or economic actors forward, as one
might expect (Cull 2009b), RT empowers Americans who occupy an independent elite position
to disseminate information and project economic narratives. Indeed, RT’s reliance on American
speaking actors is pronounced when compared to the other IBs. PD literature often assumes that
IBs privilege the voices of sponsoring state officials as projectors of state narratives. However,
AJE features only one Qatari in the programs under review and RT includes no Russian
speakers. This may be a function of topic choice, because neither IB directly covers national
economic stories. However, both networks claim to diversify news by providing both agents of
underreported states as well as showing regions of the world traditional journalism leaves under
covered. AJE’s use of non-Qatari speakers suggests that if the network promotes state narratives
and policies it does so by using foreign speakers. In this case, AJE does follow its editorial line
of “giving voice to the voiceless” as speakers from the global south accounted for 67.1% of
speakers.53 Unlike CCTV and DW, state policy and narrative projection must be done through
the voices of non-Qatari’s indicating a potentially different public diplomacy strategy may be at
play.
On RT, the results show that 76.9% of speaking actors were American and 5.2% British
while the remainder’s nationalities could not be determined. This is by far the most limited
number of nationalities of any network. In part, this can be accounted for by the nationalities of
the Boom Bust staff, all of whom are American and often serve in a double capacity as journalist
and interviewees. However, when we take into account that (1) many speakers are university

That said, analysis of AJE’s speaking actors demonstrates that the greatest frequency of speakers came
from the USA (11), the UK (11), China (8), and Nigeria (7). India by way of contrast had four total
speakers. So when viewed in total the South is widely represented, American and British appear at a
higher frequency.
53

134

professors, (2) the show is based in the USA’s Eastern Time zone, and (3) its story focus is often
on the USA, it appears that the PD strategy of Boom Bust is not to diversify news with wider
coverage like AJE or to put forward under covered issues like CCTV. Instead, the strategy
appears to directly address very particular audiences like Americans, British, and Europeans to
provide them with alternative interpretations of economic news. While similar to AJE’s strategy
of omitting Qataris, the limited variety of speakers indicate that RT’s narrative projection
operates not by using a variety but with a deep focus on specific target states.
Chinese people were the dominant nationality on CCTV coming in at 36.3% of speaking
actors, followed by Americans (14.4%). Much like CCTV, Germans accounted for the highest
percentage of DW speakers’ nationality (54.7%), followed by Greeks (12.3%). This tracks with
DW’s editorial focus on the Greek debt crisis, which accounted for 7 individual news items or
11.4% of the total, more than any other individual story. These two broadcasters, therefore,
conform more readily to PD theories. Likewise, each broadcaster illustrate counter-hegemonic
qualities in different ways that suggest states may utilize diversification of news in ways that
serve state interests.
The analysis thus far leads to some preliminary conclusions about the use of counterhegemony to project state interests. Figenschou (2010) operationalized counter-hegemony in
terms of geography and speaking actors. In the first category, a channel that covers the Global
South more was more counter-hegemonic. Likewise, non-governmental figures and non-elites as
speakers suggested that channel was counter-hegemonic. DW and CCTV, despite divergence in
their journalistic traditions and legal frameworks for their broadcasters hew closely to
expectations of IB content in terms of promoting and projecting the state as well as expectations
for financial journalism in relying on elites. However, RT’s divergence suggests a few
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conclusions that challenge expectations. First, in the strictest sense, Boom Bust empowers a
group not often present in newscasts or economic news, even though most of those speakers are
American or British. Second, RT’s lack of Russia coverage could be interpreted in the same way
as AJE’s, as proof of a truly global and altruistic editorial line or a strategy to avoid criticizing
the sponsoring state. However, Pomerantsev (2014) suggests that RT’s original strategy of
broadcasting programs about Russian culture in a positive light yielded low ratings.54 Their new
strategy is to “climb inside existing Western ideological narratives,” and promote narratives
hostile to Western hegemony in general and US hegemony specifically (2014, 19). The
programming analyzed here supports this assertion given its overwhelming focus on the USA
and Europe and the specific topics of many stories. Boom Bust covered topics such as, oil,
currency, the Greek Crisis, and US Federal Reserve policy that all other networks covered.
However, they also covered stories no other program covered such as sport economics, bitcoin
(repeatedly), drug legalization, Bernie Sanders’ candidacy, data encryption, and even reader
mail. Using experts with institutional authority such as academics means Boom Bust’s narratives
“climb” inside the legitimation narratives of the West by accessing traditional intellectual elites
from one of its main geostrategic rivals, the USA. This is a strategy very unlike that of CCTV,55
which empowers Chinese people to speak for China and about other countries in a way that,
presumably, normalizes Chinese economic policy.
Before moving to the next sub-section, I need to analyze the place of activists in
economic news, especially given AJE and RT’s editorial promise to cover news outside the

54

Both CCTV and DW employ this strategy in addition to covering hard news, going so far as to connect
people to language instruction. Activities such as these fall under Cull’s (2009b) categories of “cultural
diplomacy” and “exchange”, which promote the sponsoring nation’s cultural achievements and encourage
interaction across borders between citizens.
55
Sponsored by a state that also has geostrategic conflicts with the United States.
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mainstream and counter-hegemony’s potential to undermine Western rivals. In terms of featuring
grassroots political activists, no network can truly claim to be counter-hegemonic in featuring
independent political voices; however, the networks also did not serve as a platform for
government officers of the sponsoring state, indicating they do not merely serve as platforms for
unfiltered government speech.56 CCTV featured activists such as John Christensen of the UK
based Tax Justice Network57 and AJE showed activists from Frack Free Somerset and Global
Justice Now, but grassroots political activists remain almost invisible in IB content with few
being shown by the other two networks.
Conforming to patterns identified in financial journalism more broadly, IBs typically
feature elites in their economic news. (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010) (A. Robertson 2010).
However, speaking actors rarely worked directly for the sponsoring government. In the case of
CCTV, we can account for the prevalence of political actors as part of the station’s editorial
mission to cover Chinese news and timing of the Two Sessions. The prevalence of other
speaking actors showed more variation, with RT relying almost exclusively on experts and
specifically Americans and British and DW and CCTV relying on their own nationals and a
more even distribution of speaker types. RT’s deviation from this norm is particular noteworthy
as it supports scholarly and journalistic charges that their programing empowers “fringe” figures
in the West while cloaking itself in the language of subversive and hard hitting journalism
(Nimmo and Eyal 2016). As a tool of PD, RT shows that IBs can project state interests and
narratives while eliding criticisms of the sponsoring state.
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Chapter 6 takes these findings and applies media studies literature on news protest reporting.
That CCTV featured protestors and activists at all may surprise those who feel that the network is
merely a mouthpiece of the CPC (Nye Jr. 2013; Rawnsley 2015b). Chapter 5 shows that CCTV, like RT,
is more than capable of covering activism, but only in as much as it accords with their state interests or
undermines geopolitical rivals.
57
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4.1.3

News Norms – How we do Things Here

Speaking actors on the news are eyewitnesses to events, or experts with the credibility to
comment on them, and provide the viewer with the sense of being there (Zelizer 2007). As news
organizations, international broadcasters need this credibility to avoid being perceived as
propaganda. Cull argues that the “most potent element of IB has been its use of news, especially
when that news is objective” and the “entire practice of IB with the ethical culture of domestic
broadcast journalism, and turned IB into a mechanism for diffusing this culture” (2009b, 21).
However, Chapter 3 showed that the media systems of each state shape the journalism culture of
their international broadcasters. Put another way, the news norms of each state influence the
ultimate form of news content on a broadcaster.58 To examine the different news norms of each
network, I coded the reporting style of each news item: did the item use in studio or onsite
reporting, interviews in studio or on site, or some mixture of these categories. Onsite items are
physically close to the location of the news issues, while in studio reporting stays in the main
studio. Interviews are similarly divided but focus exclusively on interviews with individuals (see
Appendices A and B)). As with speaking actors and geographic focus, the networks’ show clear
differences in their news norms. RT and AJE are almost polar opposites in their news norms. In
contrast, DW and CCTV focus more on their domestic economies and utilize a wider variety of
reporting styles.

The presumption here, based on Chouliaraki’s (2006b, 2010b) studies of mediated suffering, is that on
site reporting and interviews with average people living through the news event invite greater viewer
identification with those depicted. However, as Robertson (2010) notes, there are different levels of
engagement that news reports can provide. Verifying that an onsite report, as opposed to a studio item
with archival footage, increases the “moral imagination” of a viewer requires audience centered research
methods and is thus beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Table 4.4 Newstype Frequencies
Studio
Site
AJE
CCTV
DW
RT

0.0%
33.9%
5.0%
20.8%

47.4%
23.7%
55.0%
1.0%

Studio
Interview
24.6%
2.0%
1.7%
60.4%

Site
Interview
0.0%
2.0%
5.0%
3.9%

Roundtable Mixture N =
15.8%
.1%
0.0%
2.4%

12.3%
32.0%
33.3%
11.6%

57
738
61
207

As seen in Table 4.4, AJE and RT reflect notably different news reporting styles. More
than any other network, RT relied on studio-based interviews, in studio one on one interviews,
(60.4%) followed by in studio news items, items which to not leave the television studio
(20.8%). In contrast, AJE reported on site 47.4% of the time. Because onsite reporting typically
includes interviews, AJE’s reportage connects viewers with local political speakers, economic
speakers, ordinary people, and workers. A report from Nigeria on energy, for example, featured a
mother and son watching television and enduring a blackout bringing home the personal
struggles of individuals dealing with poor governance. In this case, credibility relies on literally
being there. RT’s reliance on expert opinion and studio interviews means they derive their
credibility via the studio and questioning of RT staff. In the process, Boom Bust offers a
constrained source of news, which limits the possibly of contention in their content, meaning that
the program can project consistent strategic narratives of their geopolitical rivals.59 Though state
control is still a factor in editorial decisions, AJE, by contrast, adheres to British journalistic
traditions, brought to the network by the many transplants from the BBC. It therefore depicts
multiple sides of issues via onsite reporting, increasing the likelihood of contention in its content.
Neither AJE nor RT features citizens of its sponsoring state, suggesting that the PD role of each
network does not build their credibility depicting the sponsor or its representatives directly. This

Contrast this with CCTV’s addition of live studio interviews and on site coverage as a means of gaining
credibility with Western audiences as seen in Chapter 2.
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necessarily complicated our understanding of IBs as projectors of state narratives by calling into
question their chosen credibility building techniques.
DW and CCTV both use onsite (stories from the location of the events depicted) and in
studio reporting, frequently mixing them to cover domestic issues. Made in Germany features
onsite reporting in 60% of its domestic news items. Since site reporting typically includes onsite
interviews, often with economic experts, DW’s reporting style seems to invite viewers to engage
directly with people, and particularly economic actors based on the numbers of business people
interviewed. Reflecting Germany’s free press tradition, speakers also represent different
opinions. DW stories typically begin with individuals, visually focusing on them at work or
home, the narrator mentioning them by name in the first sentence of the report and then
discursively linking them to the larger topic of the story. The tugboat captain in the introduction
is one such example, as are a young Greek and an Italian woman starting new jobs at the ECB in
Frankfurt. DW’s credibility building relies on a tightly focused onsite depiction of speakers,
often Germans themselves. Stories then return to the studio for expert analysis. Often the
speakers are members of elite think tanks such as the German Institute for Economic Research or
academics from Cologne or Hamburg University.
CCTV follows a similar pattern, combining mixed style and onsite reporting in the
majority of new items in domestic and intersectional items. The key difference is that CCTV
items typically begin with a focus on governmental policy or larger economic trends, like the
CPC’s authorization of three free trade areas (FTA) or the growth of ecommerce and online
payment methods in China. A typical story, for example, examined economic slowdown in
Northeastern China, which was introduced in studio, and found Chinese economic actors, in this
case a car wash owner and the co-founders of a magnesium foundry, to describe their recent
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difficulties. The foundry owners blamed a lack of government oversight and regulation of State
Owned Enterprises in the area (SOE) as well as a lack of market mechanisms to signal when
decisions and plans should be changed to reflect new conditions. This kind of report exemplifies
the Chinese model of journalistic criticism by censuring local or regional governments and
subtly suggesting to the central government that it has a responsibility to correct the problem
(Zhao 2012). While this story did not continue in studio, CCTV favors expert speakers to all
other types and uses them both on site and in studio to provide context and analysis. In this way,
CCTV combines elements of Chinese journalism, eschewing direct criticism of the CPC and
state, with Western onsite reporting and interviews, sometimes with foreign experts. This
suggests that CCTV melds Western and Chinese news norms to build credibility via independent
experts to project narratives and explain Chinese economic news.
The ways in which international broadcasters present the news, onsite or in studio, expert
interviews or onsite interviews, shapes the ways that a network builds credibility as well as the
way it projects state narratives. While DW and CCTV used mixtures of reporting styles to
project their sponsors, AJE and RT occupy opposing ends of a spectrum of onsite reporting.
Robertson (2010) and Zelizer (2007) demonstrate that onsite reporting is a key means of
depicting news events and people who live through them, and thus building credibility with
audiences. Boom Bust’s almost exclusive use of studio items and elite experts means their
projection of state narratives occurs in a narrower range of possible journalism norms. News
norms, geographical focus, and speaker selection form the basic contours of IB content and each
IB demonstrated divergences from PD theory and from previous scholarship on counterhegemony. DW and CCTV projected their sponsors routinely, while AJE and RT did so
indirectly. Some, like AJE and CCTV drew from a wide range of speakers and nationalities,
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while RT demonstrates a myopic focus on Americans. It is within these contours that specific
strategic narratives work and attempt to influence foreign publics.

4.1.4

Self-Presentation – I think what the Government Meant to Say Was…

Scholars of strategic narratives, soft power, and public diplomacy suggest that IBs are a
key tool through which states may project particular narratives about the world system that bind
the actions of other actors. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, for example, argue that
“strategic narratives are a tool through which states can articulate their interests, values and
aspirations for the international order,” and “attempt to overcome… domestic and international
institutional constraints” (2012, 3). I examine narratives of the international system in Chapter 5.
Here I examine national identity narratives understood as tools that “set out who… actors are,
what characterizes them, what attributes they possess, what actions they take, and what motivates
them” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 32). Miskimmon, et al. (2013) suggest that
the international system is composed of actors who inhabit particular identities as states, such as
great powers, normal powers, and rising powers.60 When a state accepts a particular
characterization of its international status that identity limits its scope of action. In Chapters 2
and 3 we saw how the proliferation of IBs often derived from a sense of grievance on the part of
states who felt their views of the international system were elided in traditional global news
channels. We should therefore expect to find that the news agenda of each IB, to a certain extent,
conforms to the economic policy agenda of the sponsoring state as a corrective to perceived
Western biases. While journalism norms, public diplomacy definitions, and the global news
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Its complete listing includes those three as well as the unipole/hegemon, great power, and weak/rogue
states. There are other non-state actors in the system of course but those do not concern us here.
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cycle likely constrain the freedom of action of an IB, the editorial remits of each channel suggest
their management have a keen understanding of their role in PD practice. I use this framework to
ground my analysis of each network’s presentation of its sponsoring state. Because RT and AJE
devoted no or little attention to their sponsoring state, I examine the narratives applied to their
rivals and explore possible reasons, benefits, and costs in the next subsection. CCTV and DW
economic news content, however, indicates that both networks project narratives that arguably
conform to the image their foreign and economic ministries promulgate independently. In
addition, I also examine specific issue narratives as a sign of editorial concern with that specific
policy.
Miskimmon et al. suggest that rising power narratives entail either an aggressive or a
peaceful attitude on the part of the rising state,61 and CCTV’s presentation of China conforms to
their view. As a peaceful rising power, CCTV’s key domestic economic issue is China’s ongoing
efforts to improve and expand its economy through state-guided reform. The study period
coincided with China’s “Two Sessions,” a time when the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) and the National People's Congress (NPC) meet to propose new national
legislation (BBC 2015a). Not surprisingly then, CCTV coverage paid a high degree of attention
to the Chinese economy, and more specifically the role of the Chinese state in shaping it. Several
leading stories examined CPC policies designed to reform economic sectors including: taxation,
stock markets, free trade zones, steel production, tax evasion, and fostering the “innovation
economy” among several others. Reporters were never critical or skeptical of these reforms, as
literature on the Chinese media system suggests (Zhao 2012). Furthermore, the coverage

They also explore scholarship that defines China as a “normal great power,” and this is one narrative
that China watchers and the Chinese state put forward. But as we shall see below most Global Business
coverage of China does not deploy this narrative.
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conformed to stated Chinese policy. The Communique on the Ideological Sphere, for example,
states, “the people’s faith in China’s economic prospects has risen. In an effort to improve the
people’s livelihood, we are putting forth new measures to benefit the people so they may look
forward to a better future” (ChinaFile 2013). In this way, CCTV coverage conformed both to the
CPC’s vision of a benevolent state guiding economic progress and functioned within the
parameters of the Chinese media system.
This focus on the Chinese economy and the Chinese state during the Two Sessions period
was not an anomaly; it was also a topic in CCTV’s World Economic Forum coverage and
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) coverage in January, Boao
Forum and AIIB coverage in March, and G20 coverage in February. While Chinese economic
clout may scare some, the CPC continually propagates slogans such as “peaceful rise” or
“China’s Peaceful Development Road" to emphasize their benign intentions (Shambaugh 2013,
218). While I discuss China’s views of the international system in Chapter 5, it is important to
underscore the ways reporters presented China as an international actor as they reflect the state’s
peaceful rising identity narrative. Chinese sponsored events like the Boao Forum, presented as an
“Asian version of the Davos World Forum” (Sutter 2010), highlighted China’s multilateralism.
In all, reporters covered the Boao Forum in five items at the end of March 2015, often as the
leading story. Speakers included several foreign and Chinese experts, many working for large
Western investment firms, thereby providing a non-governmental source to bolster the credibility
of the item. Likewise, five stories examined the CELAC forum with Latin American nations,
featured foreign experts, and emphasized the benefits of Chinese economic multilateralism.
Finally, the benefits of trade with China was a clearly salient topic for the program, as when a
series of items showcased China-UK trade deals, one featuring a short interview with then
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British Prime Minister David Cameron.62 Other stories emphasized the value of China’s rise to
other economies. The clearest example of this pattern comes from several items in mid to late
February during the annual Spring Festival, also known as the Chinese New Year. Global
Business confronted viewers with the holiday’s vast scale,63 but also its multinationalism and
depicted celebrations of the holiday in the USA, UK, South Korea, and Japan. Items further
show the increasing numbers of Chinese traveling abroad to places like Belgium, the USA, Hong
Kong, and Australia. Global Business news items, therefore, showcased the CPC as a benevolent
guiding hand in economic reform, conforming to expectations seen in Chapter 3, as well as a
responsible stakeholder in the international system whose rise was mutually beneficial to China’s
partners.
In contrast to the Chinese approach, DW journalists adopted a narrative that
simultaneously holds up German ingenuity and artisanship as a defining feature of their economy
historically and contemporarily while also suggesting that its economic and cultural traits are
worth emulating, particularly for other Europeans. In addition, Silcock (2002) suggests that DW
producers filter story selection through a mythic past,64 which means current news stories are
read in historical terms that Germans use to negotiate their national identity. At the same time,
Miskimmon et al. (2013) suggest that Germany increasingly sees itself as a normal power,
grounding its policy in self-interest within the overall process of European integration. All of
these features were present in DW coverage. We have already seen the prevalence of ordinary
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It should be noted that many of these items actually feature David Cameron being directly interviewed
by a CCTV correspondent and do not use press conference footage that would be available elsewhere.
While not the relevant topic here, there is an intriguing possibility that political figures who are not from
the sponsoring state can use IBs to reach the sponsoring state in some way.
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Indeed it is the largest annual human migration in the world.
64
This mythic “Past” contextualizes and frames Germany’s relative youth with its heritage of cultural
achievement. The term in German is “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung” which means, “managing the past.” In
its current form, it also includes German war guilt and helps Germans to negotiate that guilt.
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people and workers as speaking actors on Made in Germany and that these speakers extol the
virtues of German modeled capitalism. Another example followed Wolfgang Durheimer, the
new German CEO of Bentley. In an item from late March, DW journalists examined changes at a
Bentley factory in the UK and featured workers pleased with the infusion of cash from German
firm Volkswagen. A similar item framed the sale of a German motorcycle manufacturer to
American Warren Buffett in terms of German economic growth, and thus German strength. The
combination of the social market economy with economic liberalism is a constitutive part of
German economic policy (see Chapter 3). DW items on the minimum wage, quotas for women
in business, and labor union rights, for example, gave journalists and speakers an opportunity to
engage in debate about the social dimensions of the German economy and tended to emphasize
conflict. Taken together, DW journalists framed Germany, or rather Germans specifically given
the relative absence of the state, as a desirable destination for immigration, economically
dynamic, and responsible in their business practices. CCTV and DW’s coverage projected state
interests to a degree, but reflect differing approaches to journalism with differing degrees of
press freedom. Similarly, coverage of specific Chinese and German issue narratives also reflect
state interests and narratives.
CCTV’s journalists routinely emphasized the market reforms undertaken by the CPC
including the internationalization of the currency, reform of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and
the fostering what they call “mass innovation society.”65 The Chinese state is guided these
reforms to shift its economy from manufacturing and exports to service and consumption. In

An interesting facet of CCTV coverage is their use of terms like “mass innovation society” or
“entrepreneurship culture” or “belt and road initiative.” They have occasionally used a graphic called
“Hot Words in New China” that explains these terms to viewers. The use of these graphics, and the many
verbal asides by hosts to explain what Chinese politics entail, gives their reporting an educational quality
not seen in other networks.
65
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turn, Chinese deregulation of stock markets, foreign ownership, and ecommerce signal the
CPC’s insistence on economic reform (Xinhua 2015). Fourteen news items directly addressed
economic reform as their main topic, and several more addressed CPC reforms indirectly,
showing that program producers devoted sustained attention to the reform program. Frequently,
particularly during the World Economic Forum summit in January where the Chinese premier
made a major policy speech, CCTV journalists questioned foreign experts about their views on
Chinese economic policy. For example, CCTV interviewed Nariman Behravesh,66 chief
economist of IHS Inc., who says that Chinese plans will improve their quality of growth and that
the reforms introduced by the state are a positive sign. Taken together, the news items analyzed
here suggest that CCTV does project state narratives, notably those of China’s peaceful rise and
economic reform. The use of foreign experts, especially those working in high finance, allowed
CCTV journalists to operate in a Western framework of journalism by seeking outside and, thus,
potentially more credible, analysts. At the same time, journalists do not seriously question the
CPC’s program, and conform to the Chinese model of journalism. Effectiveness aside, CCTV
programing seen here may “shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place”
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 7). Programming does so by aligning with the
preferred narratives of the Chinese state, supported by the norms of Chinese journalism, and
presenting both Chinese and foreign experts as means of credibility building.
CCTV programming examined a series of current events in the news cycle to project
preferred CPC narratives of China as a state and the legitimacy of their policy programs. In
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Other interview subjects in this item included: Abadul Aziz Al Ghurair CEO of Mashreq Bank who
said that he thinks China has a plan to continue growth even if its not as fast and that the impact on the
rest of the world is very important, Edmund Phelps 2006 economic Nobel winner who liked the
reemphasis on turning China into an innovative nation, and Philipp Gerbert Snr. Partner Boston
Consulting Group who also approved of the focus on structural reforms.
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contrast, DW wrapped current events in the mythic “Past,” and used German history to explain
Germany in the present, highlighting the ways in which journalistic norms help to shape IB
coverage. One episode, for example, on the city of Hamburg began by emphasizing the city’s
historic mercantile status before moving on to its major economic sectors. On another episode
economic historian, Werner Abelshauser, spoke of Germans’ historical penchant for saving in
terms of deeply rooted cultural biases against speculation and the “British speculative stock
market model,” which in turn explains current German policy towards Greece and undermines
Syriza’s challenges to austerity policy. Made in Germany maintained the pattern of historicizing
and then explaining issues across news items. Similar patterns were present in several stories
including one on the origins of “German frugality” and in a series of news items that focused on
small German companies that produced luxury items.
At the same time, intersectional DW news items tended to promote German economic
policy as desirable for Europe, the region that received the most attention by far. The Greek
Crisis, Greek Elections, or the possibility of Grexit accounted for sixteen percent of news stories,
indicating the importance attached to Germany’s neighbor. While the standard news cycle might
account for this, and surely plays a role given the overall amount of coverage these events
received in the sample, Greek outcomes directly affect German interests and we should interpret
DW content through that lens. Recall that the German policy is to pursue “structural reform” of
the Greek economy through austerity. In addition, German leaders claim these policies are
simply what had been agreed to by member states and that Germany itself had previously
pursued similar reforms (Merkel 2012). Journalists reporting on the ongoing Greek debt crisis
highlighted the tensions between the Greek and German governments. While DW reporters
interviewed Syriza supporters and protestors, they would balance these with interviews featuring
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Greek business people who expressed a desire to stay in the Eurozone and German experts who
urged Greece to adopt “reform” measures while characterizing the Greek government’s position
as “far-left” or “brash.” Expert guests, typically Germans, routinely called for structural reforms
of the Greek economy as the only solution to the crisis. As if to highlight the prosperity the
German model provides, at least four items demonstrated the desirability of German economic
attitudes by showing immigrants, a Frenchman, a Greek, a Sudanese, and a Mexican, who had
adapted to their new home. The data support both Silcock’s and Miskimmon et al.’s views on
DW as a projector of national myth and Germany’s move to a self-interested normal power.
However, the guilt Silcock identified as a key component of the myth is not present. Instead,
news items historicize German economic success while also implying that it is a model other
states should emulate. In these ways DW both follows the German model of journalism by
providing alternative views, but also supports German national interests by probing the German
mythic past as a model worthy of emulation that also closely aligns with German policy towards
Greece.
Both DW and CCTV project preferred state identity and issue narratives. In this sense,
both conform to strategic narratives expectations that states use IBs to project preferred
narratives in an effort to manage the global information environment (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin,
and Roselle 2013). DW’s journalists framed the Greek crisis, for example, in terms similarly
seen in German government speeches and documents. Likewise, speaking actors, including many
Greek small business owners, undermined Syriza policy proposals. While the program covered
opposing views, as an understanding of the German media system suggests they would, Made in
Germany’s journalists projected a narrative in line with German policies. CCTV reporters,
operating under a media system where journalists defer to the state, also aligned their coverage
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with Chinese policies and narratives. Both DW and CCTV roughly conform to our expectations
of financial journalism as well, given that this particular journalism relies on elite voices and
typically undermines rhetoric that questions the legitimacy of capitalism (Lee 2014).
Nevertheless, these two channels present and project the sponsoring state, as can be expected
given their respective editorial missions and the role of international broadcasters in strategic
narrative projection and public diplomacy more broadly. The other two networks’ economic
coverage eschews examination of the sponsoring state, and therefore suggests different models
of strategic narrative projection.

4.1.5

Opposing Power Narratives – Or watch out for the Other Guy

It is clearly more difficult to state definitively that RT or AJE economic news presents a
national identity narrative. Unlike DW and CCTV, whose selection of geographical focus,
speaking actors, and news norms suggest that the channels conform to existing understandings of
international broadcasting; AJE and RT operate differently. Counting the Cost is invariably
present at the site of stories, even when they combine the item with a studio interview. Boom
Bust goes in the other direction, essentially never reporting onsite and operating in the studio
with expert figures providing an air of authority for the projected narratives. Because RT and
AJE do not focus attention on Russian or Qatari economic news,67 the programming analyzed
here focuses on geostrategic rivals and attempts to undermine their policies. Using the issue and
geography variables indicates what nations are of most interest to a program’s editorial staff. If a
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There is one exception, a story on low oil prices and their effect on the Russian economy. That item
was an in studio interview where the guest was economic strategist Marin Katusa. The item grappled with
the larger question of dropping oil prices and Katusa claimed that falling prices were the result of a Saudi
plan to weaken ISIL, Iran, and the USA. Russia, the guest assures us, will weather the storm because of
its cash reserves and Chinese energy imports.
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Qatari rival, for example, pursues policies the Emir opposes, Al-Jazeera’s content should reflect
negatively on that specific state.68 In addition, just as IB content projects the identity narrative of
the state on CCTV then the identities of rival states are arguably not ones Qatar would assign to
itself. I examine how each network frames the international economic system in Chapter5, but in
this section I use the sources on the economic policies of Russia and Qatar seen in Chapter 3 to
examine the extent to which their respective broadcasters project those policies. As the following
section will demonstrate, the dominant news narratives embedded RT and AJE coverage target
rival states and policies by suggesting ulterior motives or incompetence on the part of those
states.
Russia grounds its broader foreign policy in terms of “sovereign democracy;” Russia, and
only Russia, can define its governance norms (Ziegler 2012). The Kremlin thus routinely
questions prevailing international norms, including the economic system, and particularly
Western dominance of it, as we have seen in Chapter 3 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).
Practically, the Russian Federation wants Western sanctions lifted (Lavrov 2015) as well as
greater economic integration with Eurasian states (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2014). Energy policies
are particularly significant as gas exports account for 68% of Russian GDP (US Energy
Information Administration 2014). While Boom Bust rarely addresses Russian economic news,
the program tacitly mirrors Russian foreign policy goals by adopting different narratives that
emphasize the perfidy, incompetence, or maliciousness of the West, particularly the USA, EU,
and UK. During the period under review, several news items, for example, focused on how
central bank policies will lead to “currency wars.”69 The currency wars narrative reflects a sort of
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See Chapter 3 for a thorough examination.
The concept of currency wars comes from Jim Rickards, a strategist for West Shor Funds, and a
frequent guest on the program.
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inverse great power narrative, which Miskimmon et al. (2013) suggest frames powers as both
independent to pursue action but also responsible to other, weaker powers. In a typical example
from a January episode, Boom Bust host and producer Edward Harrison explained that as the EU
engages in quantitative easing to try and solve the financial crisis there, the USA wants to raise
interest rates leaving it “alone” and potentially leading to “currency wars.” These arise from the
“policy divergence” between the USA, EU, Canada, and other developed nations and will “roil
markets” until the USA shifts its policy and, Edward promises, RT will continue to watch the
“policy war.”70 When these international actors pursue policies designed to improve domestic
economic health, they weaken other economies by “stealing growth” from their neighbors.
Another example comes from an interview with Axel Merk of Merk Investments who suggests
that the EU would be better off lifting sanctions against Russia to increase economic growth than
engaging in monetary policy. At the very least, this narrative frames the USA and EU, as well as
other advanced economies, as self-interested and shirking their responsibilities as great powers
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013). At worst they are predatory, where great powers
are meant to be responsible leaders of the international system, the USA and EU pursue policies
that benefit only them and will bring about international conflict. Ultimately, these findings
support scholars such as Pomerantsev (2014) and Price (2014) who argue that RT’s strategy is
less about making Russia look good than about making its rivals appear hypocritical and selfinterested. It is also worth noting that RT overwhelmingly airs independent elites from the USA
and UK, who would potentially have more credibility with Western publics. In this way, RT
appears to be giving a platform to experts expressing a learned opinion instead of a platform for
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The use of inclusive language, like the host promising that they will continue to monitor a situation for
“you” as in the audience is a common linguistic trope in the RT programming analyzed here. It invites the
audience into a personal relationship with the hosts and guests and precludes the possibility of seeing
economic news and policy on the ground as we do in the other networks.
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the interests of the Russian state and its leaders. That the key hosts are also Americans means the
Boom Bust’s presents Americans speaking to American about American issues in several items.
RT’s economic news content, therefore, does not project Russia so much as it projects the
“Russian view” (“About RT” 2016) that the Western dominated economic system is a threat to
Russia specifically and to the sovereignty of states broadly.
AJE follows a somewhat similar strategy, eschewing coverage of Qatari affairs in favor
of covering underreported regions and giving “voice to the voiceless.” This editorial line also
supports Qatar’s broader foreign policy goals based on shared interests between states (Powers
2012). As outlined in Chapter 3, Qatar’s new Emir wants to shift Qatari foreign policy away
from its previous openness; and Qatar currently has several rivals on opposite sides of the Syrian
Civil War. Journalistic accounts suggest energy politics drive Qatar’s involvement in the
conflict. Syria rejected plans to build a gas pipeline through its territory via Turkey and on to
Europe, which would have bypassed Iran and Russia, undercutting their stakes in the European
gas market (Orenstein and Romer 2015).71 Scholarly (Samuel-Azran 2013) and journalistic
(Booth 2010; NDTV 2010; Fahmy 2015) evidence suggests that the Qatari government uses AlJazeera channels contingently to undermine the legitimacy of their geopolitical rivals and the
data point to one particular state as a target in economic coverage.
During the study period, AJE covered Russia in 5.3% of its news items. The overall
narrative AJE provides both undercuts Russia and Vladimir Putin, while also showing European
states alternative energy projects, which would free them from Russian supplies of gas.
Examples of the former come from items that examined the overall health of the Russian
economy and Russia’s gold buying. In contrast to the RT narrative where the Global North were
A trend which Europeans may welcome given the continent’s reliance on Russian energy (Ahmed
2013).
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the villains, AJE’s narrative of Russia paints Putin as a feckless and deluded leader who “won’t
get away with” annexing Crimea and whose presence in Ukraine led to an IMF bailout and
Western sanctions. In the February 26 episode, for example, three stories appeared to directly
challenge the Russian “currency wars” narratives and frame Danish plans for energy
independence as a viable path forward. In the first item, during an interview with David Marsh
Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) on central banking, the host,
Kamal Santamaria, directly queries whether we will see a currency war. Marsh responds that it is
unlikely and argues that interest rate policies can have a positive effect on economies, a point
that RT guests continually deny. In the next item, Danish Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard
suggests that Danish energy policy gives Denmark more freedom of movement should Russia
cut off energy supplies. In another news item the host interviews Bill Browder, a hedge fund
manager who has accused Putin of attempts on his and his lawyer’s lives (Harding 2015).
Finally, AJE reported on site in Moscow to show Russian shoppers buying goods before their
currency loses value against the Euro because of sanctions. To the extent that these items created
a narrative, they paint Russia as a rogue state that bucks the norms of the international system
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013), suggesting that AJE allows Qatar to “leverage the
network’s credibility for public diplomacy purposes in times of crisis” (Samuel-Azran 2013,
1307).
While AJE’s reporting parallels RT’s economic news by avoiding domestic coverage, it
also differs in specific ways. Unlike RT, which uses citizens from rival nations to criticize
economic policies, AJE did not interview a single Russian, interviewing Ukrainians, Danes, and
British instead. Likewise, the host Kamal Santamaria, of New Zealand, likely reflects the larger
negative views of Russia RT was initially meant to address. Second, AJE did not focus
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exclusively on Russia or Iran, but covered a wide variety of states particularly those of the
Global South suggesting that factors other than geopolitics inform editorial decisions, potentially
the interests and training of their locally hired journalists. These considerations on the part of
editorial staff may have long-term effects on network credibility, though further study is required
to determine this. Counting the Costs news items, therefore, support Qatari interests not by
depicting Qatari policy as legitimate, but by depicting Russia and its leaders as incompetent and
malicious.
RT and AJE’s omission of domestic news items represents a departure from what the
academic literature would lead us to expect. The USA founded Voice of America, for example, to
project American journalistic values and promote American interests and policies while
undermining rival states (Heil 2003). In addition, states founded the post 9/11 broadcasters such
as France 24, Press TV, Telesur, and Russia Today with the understanding that traditional global
news channels omitted their national perspectives. As such, IBs exist, within the limits of their
respective media systems and their legal and editorial mandate, to project the sponsoring state.
We should see Russia in RT and Qatar in AJE, but do not. The absence of sponsors is, thus,
unexpected. However, there are several possible reasons for state absence as well as purposes it
might serve for the state.
Avoiding domestic stories may serve these broadcasters by diverting attention from their
sponsors’ lack of press freedom. Indeed, Russia Today rebranded itself into RT in 2009, when
editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan said “‘Who is interested in watching news from Russia all
day long’” (quoted in von Twickel 2010). Similarly, AJE’s founder initially sought to segregate
the English and Arabic branches of the channel, though this ultimately did not come to pass
(Powers 2012). State sponsor absence in this case would be a means of eliding any potential
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charges of propagandistic intent or credibility damaging associations with the sponsor. Absence,
then, would not be a failure of the broadcaster’s PD potential, but a possible strength derived
from disguising the channel’s origins and relationships.
State sponsor absence may also bolster the activation role of a given broadcaster. As
Samuel-Aran (2013) and Price (2014) have suggested, IBs may serve a state’s interest by
operating as a BBC style news channel, then being activated by the state to aggressively shape
issue or system narratives to the sponsor’s advantage. Certainly, the data suggests that both AJE
and RT project state narratives, but subsequent analysis of RT will show that the channel’s
editors obsessively focus on the USA and UK in economic news content.72 Meanwhile, Counting
the Cost and AJE do cover a wide array of issues and states. While they may not be the “voice
for the voiceless,” coverage does follow the economic news cycle. This being the case, future
studies should question which model builds credibility and with which audiences.
Finally, state sponsor absence does not appear to undermine the ability of a broadcaster to
project state narratives or interests. RT content shows remarkable consistency in its anti-Western
message, even if the speakers’ draw their ideological critique from different ends of the political
spectrum. That message apparently resonates with many in the West given its 2 million
subscribers on YouTube and on regular cable services in place likes the UK (Bullough 2013) and
German politicians’ criticisms of the channel (Amann 2016). AJE may follow the regular news
cycle, and does provide a fair amount of coverage of the Global South, but as this section has
demonstrated it also acts to directly undermine Qatari rivals, as in the case of Russia. Each
channel thus supports state narratives and policies, just not in the uniform way that the majority
of academic literature suggests. Media systems norms inculcated in journalists help to explain
Chapter 5 shows that RT’s regular newscasts cover a similarly constrained set of states. However, items
do cover Russian affairs.
72
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these differences, but financial journalism, specifically its deference to market based values also
shapes IB economic news content.

4.1.6

Neoliberalism in the Narrative – Markets and the State

As suggested in Chapter 1, international broadcasters’ economic news coverage is torn
between two poles. One is the basic requirement to serve its sponsoring states interests, either by
bringing new and different information to global audiences like AJE or undermining rivals’
policy narratives like RT. The other is the generic conventions of economic news, which tend to
reflect the worldview of business and political elites. While many of the networks here claim to
diversify global information flows, more voices does not mean more perspectives: “An interview
with an Indian businessman may not offer a significantly different vision on the importance of
free market policies to that of a Wall Street banker” (Painter 2008, 24). Processes of media
globalization and the increase in 24-hours news as well as dedicated financial media are in part
the result of a neoliberal policy framework adopted by many nations and supra-national
organizations alike (McChesney 2004). As such, the issue I address here is the degree to which
network content either supports or undermines neoliberal ideology, understanding that neoliberal
ideology works as a constraint on possible strategic narratives on the economy. I adopt Harvey’s
argument that neoliberalism is a “political project” and a political economic theory that holds
economic prosperity can be secured through liberating “individual entrepreneurial freedoms…
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets,
and free trade” (2007, 2). The hallmarks of neoliberal policies, such as austerity, private
property, the valorization of business and capital, lack of government intervention in the
economy, and greater importance for finance as an area of economic activity are signs of a
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neoliberal tone to coverage. Those hallmarks need to be contextualized in terms of each state’s
stated economic vision and policy goals in order to make sense of the content I have already
analyzed.
Recall that each state analyzed here has enmeshed itself, to varying degrees, in global
capitalist activity. Ong (2006), however, argues that each state engages and incorporates
neoliberal policies in unique ways that reconfigure the limits of acceptable economic policy and
state behaviors. Of the states analyzed here, only China’s policy documents give a clear
indication of the regime’s orientation to neoliberalism by name. As seen in Chapter 3, a recent
Chinese communiqué on the “ideological sphere” clearly stated that neoliberalism is a Western
inspired ideology that aims to “change our country’s basic economic infrastructure and weaken
the government’s control of the national economy” (ChinaFile 2013). Despite signs of
ideological retrenchment for the CPC, it is also clear that the Party endorses greater
marketization and greater foreign investment (T. Zhang 2016). Therefore, while the Party
officially rejects neoliberalism, they appear likely to continue piecemeal implementation of
neoliberal policies. Russia, likewise, needs access to global markets to export oil and gas and
generate reserves of foreign currency. However, Russian policy documents indicate that the state
is resistant to Western capitalist norms embedded in the global economic system (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2013). Meng and Rantanen (2015) have demonstrated the value of comparing
Russia and Chinese media, and here too comparison reveals states that act under similar
capitalist pressures but privilege a central role for state action in contravention of neoliberal
theory.
Germany and Qatar also engage in capitalist activity. Left-wing critics have accused the
German government, especially, of a neoliberal austerity agenda designed to discipline socialist
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parties and policies in Greece and the EU (see for example Allen 2012; Kontochristou and
Mascha 2014). Indeed, German government policies do show an inclination towards fiscal
discipline that aligns with the neoliberal outlook on budget balancing and private economic
activity (Merkel 2012; Schauble 2015). So while the social market economy may moderate these
sorts of policies, German governmental policy and politicians invoke neoliberal ideas and clearly
seek greater economic growth through trade and lowering trade barriers (Mahnkopf 2012;
Stanzel 2016). Qatar, involved in both the global oil economy and the stationing and sale of
American weapons, remains enmeshed in global capitalist economic systems and arguably enacts
neoliberal policies, especially on the movement of labor, money, and energy (Hanieh 2014). The
al-Thani family continues to use its oil wealth to build a Western knowledge based economy
reliant on Western university professors (Abduljawad 2015; Salama et al. 2016) in accordance
with neoliberalism’s emphasis on increasing commodification of social activities previously
dominated by the state (Tyfield 2010). In all four cases seen here, the state plays a clear role as
facilitator of capital, given their reliance on trade and investment, but the state may be a guider
of capitalism and resistant to neoliberalism, as in China, or arguably a clearly neoliberal state, as
in the case of Germany.
At the core of neoliberal theory is the view markets and private property create economic
prosperity and that states play a detrimental role in this process. In addition, private economic
actors, following their self-interest, are the real creators of economic growth, not states. That
said, China and Russia exhibit openly hostile stances to the USA led international order
influenced by neoliberal theories while Germany and Qatar are invested in it. Therefore, we
might expect that CCTV would feature political actors at higher rates than other channels and
would highlight the role of the state in economic activity. As we have seen, we can answer

159

negatively to the first proposition and positively to the second. CCTV relied more on experts
than other channels but did not show Chinese political actors at a substantially higher rate than
AJE. However, on CCTV the state is almost omnipresent, even if its members are not. Gains in
particular sectors of the Chinese economy featured in stories on internet banking depicting
customers and small economic actors are the result of state deregulation designed to open up the
economy to more citizen participants. Partly because the study period contains both the WEF and
Two Sessions, Chinese political leaders were regularly seen giving interviews or at press
conferences explaining government measures to guide the Chinese economy towards greater
marketization. Intersectional news items, those that cover China’s relationships with other states,
also emphasize the positive aspects of government stewardship of economic development.
However, Chinese government documents and independent scholarship both indicate that the
Party State sees its role as primary over the market (ChinaFile 2013; Rawnsley 2015b;
Shambaugh 2013). Therefore, while Chinese policies parallel neoliberal policy prescriptions
prima facie, on CCTV the state facilitates and fosters the market for the benefit of the Chinese
people and foreign investment. This illustrates the limits of neoliberalization, especially in the
case of states that are openly hostile to those policies. This is not to say, however, that neoliberal
policy proscriptions do not appear in the data set.
On RT, by contrast, the market and economic actors are essentially absent. Rather,
governments engage in economic activity through central banks and policy. In addition, RT
devoted barely any time to economic actors, preferring experts almost exclusively. The overall
focus on economic actors can also be accounted for given the subject of these news items (i.e.
economics and business). Often studio guests critiqued these policies, as when David Beckworth
of Western Kentucky University claimed that EU stimulus policy would exacerbate the
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continent’s economic crisis and implied that the ECB is willingly damaging countries like
Greece and Spain. Interestingly, Boom Bust does not appear to be concerned with the actual
people affected by these policies, undercutting its counter-hegemonic potential, as items remain
focused on elite action. Boom Bust’s guests, coming from both the academic left and elite
business, tend to pull the show’s items in different directions. Guests such as Victor Matheson, a
sports economist from Holy Cross University, questioned the tax breaks and governmental
support sports teams receive; while Ron Johnson, from the Institute for New Economic
Thinking, suggests that central bank policies mask the more efficient operations of markets in
allocating resources. On RT, governments, particularly developed ones, are predatory or
incompetent, and guest selection, as other analyses have shown (Nimmo and Eyal 2016), draws
on “fringes” from both the left and right. If some advocate for greater marketization, this does
not necessarily reflect Russian policies or preferences, merely their PD goal of undermining
narratives of Western legitimacy.
AJE and DW are not influenced by the Chinese state led model of journalism, or Russia’s
political goal of undermining American hegemony, and are actually invested in the global
capitalist system. In turn, both networks are more clearly neoliberal in that they interview
economic actors and tend to cover businesses in a positive way. However, both networks reserve
a role for the state as the progenitor of reform and security. AJE portrays the relationship
between economies and the state as one where the state has a role in fostering infrastructural and
economic development, such as the item on Nigerian or Danish energy where the state’s role is
to secure and plan for the nation’s energy needs. Presumably, such state action is to the benefit of
the economic actors from the global south that form a large part of their speaking actors, but the
use of ordinary people suggests a degree of editorial concern for the effects of these policies on
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citizens over economic actors. Like AJE, DW depicted the German state as a progenitor of
reform at home and abroad, but smaller scale economic actors overshadow the state as a site of
economic activity. When DW reporters address states it is often in terms of reforms or
development. On DW, the state bears responsibility for increasing internet connectivity for
example, or the Greeks and the French need to implement “unpopular reforms” as Germany did
in 2010 to improve economic growth. Nevertheless, the state is not the enemy of the market as
seen in American or British business media from the 1990s or 2000s (Fairclough 2009; Frank
2000).
In Chapter 2, I posited that neoliberalism would form a sort of outer boundary of
international broadcaster’s economic coverage, that a state would be less likely to project
messages that would jeopardize their attractiveness to capital. However, the data does not
support this hypothesis. CCTV follows traditions of Chinese journalism, aligns with the stated
interests of the CPC, and follows at least some conventions of financial journalism without
suggesting that markets should have primacy over the state. In contrast, Boom Bust arguably
does project neoliberal policy ideas when it undermines US and EU central bank policies.
Nevertheless, RT speakers frequently drew upon left wing or socialist theories of economics as
well as neoliberal theories to undermine USA and EU policies, the ideological content of the
message apparently being less important than the target of the message. DW journalists and
guests frequently admonished Greece on the need for “structural reform” just as Germany’s
ruling government does and, thus, they may be the most clearly neoliberal in their content.
However, the relationship between neoliberalism, an ideology that holds the state in contempt,
and international broadcaster’s economic news is clouded. Any clear connection between the two
appears moderated by state interests and ideologies as well as the media systems from which the
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broadcaster arises. Because of these factors, the homogenizing or Americanizing effects of
greater marketization and financialization feared by scholars such as Thussu (2007a) and
McChesney (2004) are not manifest in international broadcaster content. While Americanization
may occur in networks operating according to the profit motive, the evidence assembled thus far
suggests that state interests and journalism norms remain paramount in determining IB content,
even in the sphere of economic news.

4.2

Conclusion

The findings presented here suggest that there are different types and styles of
international broadcasting. AJE and RT differ from CCTV and DW in their omission of their
state sponsor, while AJE, CCTV, and DW distinguish themselves from RT in their use of onsite
reporting and interviews juxtaposed with in studio analysis. In addition, networks varied
substantively in terms of geographic focus, those who speak on the news, the framing of the
sponsoring state, and preferred reporting formats. As such, we see a glimpse of how IBs project
state narratives, presumably in an effort to establish their identities, preferred policies, and shape
the grounds on which states debate pertinent issues. In each case, international broadcasting
content did underscore state issue narratives, and in the case of two broadcasters, CCTV and
DW, with state identity narratives. The other two broadcasters did not directly address their
sponsoring state, but their content did conform on issue narratives in at least some cases. And
yet, no channel could simply be labeled “propaganda.” Instead, journalism norms informed by
respective state’s media system and the norms of financial journalism itself appear to mediate or
moderate any simple projection of governmental voices. My focus on economic news was meant
to test the boundaries of state narratives on the assumption that the hegemonic power of
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neoliberal ideology would delineate the limits of acceptable discourse for the business elites who
presumably form the core of each program’s audience. Given that all state sponsors seen here are
enmeshed in capitalist activity, I also suggested that the networks would likely use some content
to show the state sponsor as a desirable site for investment. While the clearly demarcated
ideological conflicts of the Cold War are not to be found, capitalism itself appears to be a
valuable site of inter-state conflict, just within the bounds of capitalist thinking. That said,
several examples show that neoliberalism’s dismissal of state guided or led economic activity is
not a component of state economic narratives. In short, the evidence suggests that even with
differing norms on the role of the press and different definitions of PD, each broadcaster reflects
and projects particularistic state narratives. In turn, media systems, definitions of PD, and
newsroom cultures shape the contours of coverage but apparently not the purpose of content that
addresses issues of explicit concern to the state.
Theoretical considerations of international broadcasting tend to focus on the use of
sponsored networks to improve a state or policy’s image for foreign publics. As such, we would
expect to see the state and it policies presented in news coverage. While CCTV and DW did
portray their sponsoring country, RT and AJE did not, instead favoring radically different
approaches to covering economic news. AJE conformed to expectations based on previous
research in that they did not cover Qatari affairs but covered a wide range of developing nations
(Painter 2008; Sakr 2007). RT seems to follow a similar strategy as AJE in not covering
domestic affairs, at least in this sample, but their laser like focus on the USA and EU suggests a
different set of priorities at play for the Russian channel. If AJE is “counter-hegemonic” because
it covers the under covered south, RT is counter-hegemonic because it covers the already
covered north in ways that deviate from normal economic news coverage. These findings suggest

164

both that counter-hegemony can be operationalized in different ways and that public diplomacy
strategies can incorporate international broadcasting without much coverage of the sponsoring
state. RT’s high audience reach and social media presence suggest, in turn, that audiences are
using RT content not to learn about Russia, as one might do with DW for Germany, but to find
different types of coverage on the USA and EU.
Public diplomacy theory suggests that IBs can serve as an advocacy platform for
sponsoring state officials to reach foreign publics (Cull 2009b). In addition, studies of IBs and
private economic news suggest that political leaders and economic elites should be more
prevalent in the sample than workers, academics, and ordinary people (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti
2010; Figenschou 2010). My findings suggest that the networks here are different from specialist
economic news given their use of independent experts, small-scale economic actors, and in the
case of DW ordinary people. As such, the programming analyzed here does not conform either to
PD or economic news studies. Again, this suggests varied strategies for engaging with foreign
publics by showing non-political speakers. Reception studies are needed to fully flesh out if
audiences view these speakers differently or if their presence affects the credibility of the station.
Work on strategic narratives emphasizes IB’s potential to disseminate narratives and
narratives about states are present in the data set (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012).
Like the findings on geographic focus, the strategic narratives present in the data work in
different ways, with DW and CCTV providing narratives of their respective state and AJE and
RT provided narratives of geostrategic rivals. The narratives seen here suggest that international
broadcasters can and do contextualize sponsoring state’s and their policies for foreign publics but
also that erasing the sponsoring state from coverage, in favor of rivals, is a viable strategy. It
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remains to be seen what benefits this might have for the network or its individual program
editors.
Finally, no network promoted a clearly neoliberal narrative. Instead, each broadcaster
framed the relationship between the state, markets, and people in different and complex ways.
Neoliberal discourse here is not like the valorization of the market and finance seen in economic
news. More analysis is needed but I would like to suggest that the unique ways in which media
marketization have unfolded in each of the sponsoring states shapes the contours of economic
news coverage seen in the broadcasters. Furthermore, each state’s engagement in capitalistic
activity did not preclude narrative conflict on economic issues; it merely constrained it and
undermined the possibility of truly debating the capitalistic basis of the global economy.
This complicates academic understanding of international broadcasting by showing the
variety of methods and techniques of news production that constitute a given network’s content.
In addition, while the broadcasters all engaged with some level of state narrative projection, they
did not have a completely free hand to do so being constrained by financial journalism norms
informed by capitalist practice. Yet, we saw in Chapter 3 that a variety of actors question the
foundations and role of the global capitalist system. Those criticisms often operate at a level
above any given individual state and all networks devoted attention to events outside their
borders, which is the topic of the next chapter.
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5

INTERNATIONAL VISIONS OF ECONOMY

In 2015 longtime leader of Singapore, Lee-Kwan Yew passed away. His death
represented a chance for news outlets to explore the economic and political development of the
tiny city state, which had emerged in the post-war world as a beacon of financial clout and good
governance, if not political freedom. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia also died in 2015,
prompting journalists to ponder the future of the oil rich kingdom seemingly beset on all sides by
rival states. In Ukraine, a simmering, protracted conflict weakened the economy prompting the
official government in Kiev to request emergency IMF assistance. Economic difficulties were
not limited to war torn regions as China’s economy continued to slow and the CPC met in their
annual political sessions to agree on a variety of reforms. These events are unrelated in
themselves but all received some coverage from the broadcasters analyzed in these pages. In
these disparate stories, we see how these channels cover global events that may or may not
directly be of interest to the sponsoring state because broadcasters must function as news outlets
as well as projectors of state narratives. It is in how networks cover and analyze these events,
related or unrelated to the sponsor, that we can see their potential to project state narratives by
diversifying news flows and how their dual role as a news outlet constrains their ability to project
state narratives.
Using the same variables as in Chapter 4, this chapter explores how IBs cover
international news. I examine how each broadcaster deploys (directly or indirectly) narratives
and frames surrounding the role of its respective sponsoring state within the international
economic system. Strategic narrative theorists suggest that actors craft and disseminate narratives
in order to constrain or enable certain behaviors by other actors at three interrelated levels: world
system, nation/identity, and issue (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013). Examining each

167

network’s geographic focus, speaking actors, and news norms demonstrates the form IB content
takes when it projects state narratives of the international system. To test the extent to which IBs
disseminate these state sponsored narratives, I examine two issue narratives: the development of
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the January 2015 election of the Syriza
party in Greece as a way to examine the larger narratives of the world system IBs project. These
specific news events speak to the structure of the international economic system and state efforts
to transform it or solidify it given their direct implications for state sponsors and the global
economic system as a whole.
My analysis of narratives also has implications for work on contraflow and counterhegemony and eyewitnessing. Contra-flow theorists often assume that media flows originating in
the East and South would have inherent counter-hegemonic qualities by virtue of their
oppositional flow. Rantanen (Rantanen 2007) and Thussu (2007a), for example, have both
suggested that RT and CCTV represent potential for contra-flows capable of weakening the
Anglo-American monopoly on global news. However, few have tested this assertion by
examining IB content. IB potential for counter-hegemony is all the more important when we
remember that three of the networks couch their editorial mission in the language of counterhegemony. AJE’s first station manager, Nigel Parsons, claimed the network was an opportunity
to create news “not filtered through the lens of the West” (as cited in Powers 2012, 19).
Similarly, CCTV materials claim the network is “China's contribution to greater diversity and
wider perspectives in the global information flow” (CCTV 2010). RT also promised to cover
news outside the mainstream (“About RT” 2016). In turn, the ability to witness news events
marks the journalist’s authority and credibility (Zelizer 2007). These statements show that some
international broadcasters use the language of counter-hegemony to establish their identity and
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purpose in international news flows by showing audiences news they might not otherwise see.
Furthermore, this suggests that some states view their IB’s role as being counter-hegemonic in
the service of projecting the sponsoring state. By witnessing news events CNN and BBC ignore
or omit, new IBs can create a space in international media that may subsequently support the
interests of their sponsor. Analyzing geography, speakers, and news norms allows us to see the
extent to which a channel is in fact counter-hegemonic compared to established global
broadcasters. In addition, understanding the form IB content takes allows me to determine the
ways broadcasters project preferred state narratives of the international system. We have seen
that IBs project state narratives of domestic economic news and, thus, attempt to legitimize
particular policies and identities for the state sponsor. How IBs choose to constitute that
authority in international news, and the degree to which international items conform to state
policies indicates how the broadcasters legitimizes or delegitimizes global economic issues and
which vision of the world system the state sponsor projects. Economic discourses are particularly
important as they are subject to a well-developed global governance regime that faced sustained
criticism from activists (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013) and particular states such as Russia
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013) and China (ChinaFile 2013). In turn, networks like RT and
CCTV may project narratives of the global economic system that legitimize their own particular
visions of it and do so by building their journalistic credibility through specific reporting styles.
I begin by analyzing the geographic focus of each network i.e. the single states and larger
world regions most commonly depicted in news items. Next, I examine the types of speaking
actors each network uses as well as the network’s news norms or journalistic style, such as onsite
reporting or studio items or reliance on interview. These variables permit me to test the extent to
which each network conforms to previous scholarship on global news. Given the data seen in
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Chapter 4, I expect each channel to continue to project state economic narratives via their
editorial decisions of which states they cover and who they empower to speak. Unlike the
domestic coverage examined in Chapter 4, which I had expected to project the sponsor state
itself, international news can project narratives to undermine rivals and the international
economic system as a whole. However, stories about Lee-Kwan Yew and IMF bailouts, for
example, indicate that a broadcaster cannot simply project state narratives. As news channels, a
broadcaster must be responsive to the economic news cycle and within that framework
disseminate state narratives. Examining how a broadcaster deploys eyewitnessing of particular
states and people provides a means to test the extent to which it conforms to scholarly
expectations of counter-hegemony and determine the extent to which that broadcaster uses
counter-hegemonic news as a tool of state power. Finally, I examine strategic narratives seen in
the news items themselves and analyze how neoliberal policies are present within them. I argue
that neoliberalism represents an outer limit of discourse as each state sponsor operates within the
global capitalist system. Within those limits, I test the degree of narrative conformity to state
interests and goals.

5.1

The World System and its Discontents

As in Chapter 4’s analysis of domestic news coverage, in this chapter, three variables
provide the means to test the form each broadcaster’s content in terms of its geographic focus,
speaking actors, and news norms. These variables serve as an indication of the relative
importance station manager’s place on specific world regions and which kinds of people become
the face of international news. These items may or may not involve the interests of the
sponsoring state, and potentially reflect the financial news cycle. For example, as outlined in
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Chapter 4, CCTV coverage examined China’s relationships to neighboring states in 28.7% of
news items,73 indicating China’s specific interests in the Asia-Pacific region. CCTV’s managers
also want the channel to at least appear to conform to traditional Western station formulas in
order to be more palatable to international audiences (Jirik 2005; Zhu 2012), suggesting that the
channel will cover international news stories not directly related to Chinese interests. At the
same time, CCTV brands itself as a station that diversifies global news flows by covering stories
not typically seen on Western stations. An IB’s international news coverage represents a
negotiation between the demands of the international economic news cycle, state interests, and
media system norms, each of these influence which regions receive coverage, who can speak on
the news, and the framing of that news should state interests be implicated. I address the actual
narratives later in this chapter. This section focuses on geography, speaking actors, and news
norms and style to determine the contours of IB coverage. Doing so allows a detailed analysis of
IB content and the degree to which it aligns with traditional news and if counter-hegemony is
instrumentalized for state economic interests.

5.1.1

Geography – Where is the Other Guy’s Country?

Networks’ geographical focus in economic programing suggests the prioritization of
certain regions by station managers and may reflect sponsoring state’s interests. CCTV coverage
of Japan, for example, can project Chinese views of Japanese policy, potentially shaping
narratives of Japanese policies in ways that benefit China. For channels such as AJE and CCTV,

73

Statistic counts all news items that included the following states: Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. While Russia may not be culturally
Asian, geographically it extends to Asia and it shares a border with China. Several states that could have
been included, for example Vietnam, did not appear in the data set.
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geographical focus may reflect broadcaster claims to provide coverage of underreported regions,
such as Africa or Asia. In this sense, channels such as AJE and CCTV have the potential to
represent a contra-flow from East to West or South to North and diversify global news content
(Thussu 2007a). Such diversification, however, is relevant to this study only to the extent it
reflects a broadcaster’s editorial mission or a state’s specific economic interests. As with
speaking actors and news norms, geographic focus serves as an indication of the
instrumentalization of counter-hegemony.
Table 5.1 shows each network’s varying levels of attention to their sponsoring nation
using the geography variable, which coded whether items focused on the state sponsor, the
sponsor and another state, or only non-sponsor states (see Appendices A and B). Most of AlJazeera English and Russia Today news items focus on events outside the sponsoring state
(98.2% and 96.1% respectively), while China Central Television and Deutsche Welle exhibit
greater balance between domestic and international news coverage and frequently highlight the
implications of international news events for their domestic economy through intersectional
news items.
Table 5.1 Geographic Frequency
AJE

CCTV

DW

RT

Domestic

0.0%

31.1%

51.7%

1.1%

Intersectional

1.8%

32.0%

31.7%

2.8%

Outside

98.2%

36.9%

16.7%

96.1%

N=

57

738

61

207

While DW and CCTV are more likely to present intersectional stories, each exhibits clear
geographic biases. In other words, they are more likely to report on regions where they have

172

specific interests such as Europe and East Asia. To illustrate the geographic focus of each
network, I coded each news item for its focus on the Global North or South, where state in the
North include Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Australia and New
Zealand (see Table 5.2 and Appendices A and B), and for the names of each country featured in
the report. This scheme was inspired by Cohen and Atad’s (2013) method of coding news items
for the primary country seen in the lead of the item first and then coding for each subsequent
state discussed in the item.
Table 5.2 Northern versus Southern Focus by Network
AJE
CCTV
DW
21.1%
23.6%
85.0%
North
56.1%
44.0%
3.3%
South
22.8%
32.0%
11.7%
Mixed
57
738
61
Total Items

RT
69.3%
7.3%
10.7%
207

As Table 5.2 shows, each channel focuses on the North or the South to different degrees,
suggesting their relative focus on and prioritization of different regions. AJE’s Counting the
Cost, as predicted by previous research (Figenschou 2010), focused on the Global South in over
half of its news stories (56.1%) and a mixture of North/South states in an additional 22.8%.
These distributions of coverage conform broadly to AJE’s editorial policy of reporting on the
Global South and providing coverage of under covered regions of the world. CCTV
demonstrated similar patterns: 44% of its news items focused on the Global South and an
additional 32% examined both North and South states. Because I coded China as part of the
Global South, I attribute CCTV’s geographic focus to its relatively high level of domestic news
items. DW and RT are on the other end of the scale with only 15.0% and 18.0% of items
focusing on the South respectively. Program coverage of specific countries and regions may
indicate the relative prioritization each program and/or network gives to that region or country;
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but it may also reflect the relative capacities of each network in the form of local journalists or
bureaus, which I discuss in more depth below.
Not surprisingly then, CCTV and AJE featured the most items covering Asia while DW
and RT focused primarily on Europe or North America (USA) respectively. CCTV showed
particular interest in East, South, and Southeast Asia featuring frequent reports on Japan,
Australia, India, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, among others. The data suggests that
CCTV does in fact examine Asia in accordance with its goal to emphasize “events taking place
in Asia” (CCTV 2010). Doing so gives China the ability, even if not always exercised, to project
state narratives on East Asian economic issues. Indeed, Global Business devoted regular
coverage to the Japanese, South Korean, and Australian economies and China’s relationship to
them. Asia-focused items also serve Chinese interests as their regional economic policy
emphasizes what President Xi calls the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (Xinhua 2014) or a deepening of
economic connections between Asian states designed to reduce the power of the USA in the
region (Tiezzi 2014). CCTV, in this way, directly covers countries of particular interest to the
Chinese state. However, CCTV did not cover African or Middle Eastern countries with greater
frequency, as we might expect given Chinese investment and interest in the African continent
(W. Robertson and Benabdallah 2016; Shambaugh 2013). The lack of Africa coverage might be
accounted for by the fact that Chinese investment accounts for only 3% of all non-African FDI in
Africa (Dollar, Tang, and Chen 2015). Other CCTV content may focus on African nations more;
however, dedicated economic news does not.
AJE included more coverage of Asian and African countries, with Iran, India, Japan,
Nigeria, Nepal, Ukraine, Bangladesh, and Kenya receiving the most individual news items.
However, there are not more than three items per state. This certainly owes to the relatively
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lower number of episodes in the sample, but indicates that AJE covers the Global South with
more breadth than depth.74 In these ways, CCTV and AJE do follow their editorial policies by
providing greater geographical variety in their coverage. This suggests that CCTV and AJE, with
their focus on Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, do provide coverage that operates as a contraflow bringing information from under covered parts of the world to the Global North (Thussu
2007a). Both of these networks appear to diversify global news flows, and in the process
arguably weaken Western hegemony over the global flow of information, a stated interest of the
Chinese state (Zhao 2012). In contrast, DW and RT remained focused on the Global North.
DW reported mostly on European states such as Greece, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and
the UK and then usually only in terms of that state’s relationship with Germany. RT covered the
USA, Greece, Germany, and the broader European Union most often, but also routinely
mentioned single nations as part of broader economic trends. When reporting on oil prices, for
example, hosts discussed states such as Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, as well as the USA
and European Union. However, as seen in Chapter 4, this should not be mistaken for depth of
geographic coverage as the most common states in news items remains Russian geopolitical
rivals such as the USA and UK. Even in those stories where RT journalists mentioned states
from the Global South there was little sustained attention. As such, neither DW nor RT economic
news content is geographically dispersed in the ways AJE and CCTV are and when viewed in
terms of other features coded in the sample neither channel engages with international economics
news in a sustained way. Their content choices intimate that the developed West is a singularly
important area to cover. Digging deeper, however, indicates that all of the broadcasters may
operate in a journalistic framework that elevates the West as a site of coverage.

74

In addition, AJE reporting potentially follows similar patterns of coverage as Western journalistic
enterprises (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014), as seen in subsequent subsections and Chapter 6.
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AJE and CCTV covered the Global South with greater frequency and more depth with
their use of onsite reporting and local speakers than DW or RT. As Sakr (2007) suggests,
however, simply meeting the threshold definition for a contra-flow is not the same as being
counter-hegemonic (i.e. providing information that challenges existing power structures). Table
5.3 shows that specific countries, notably the USA, China, Greece, Japan, Switzerland, and
Russia, actually receive the most AJE and CCTV coverage in terms of total amount of news
items.75 I based these figures on the “geography” variable that coded for the verbal and visual (in
words) of individual states (see Appendix A and B).
Table 5.3 Top Three Countries Reported
AJE
CCTV
China (7)
USA (43)
USA (5)
Japan (26)
Russia (3)
Greece (15)

DW
Greece (6)
USA (3)
Switzerland (2)

RT76
USA (66)
Greece (17)
Switzerland (6)

This may be a function of global economic events during the study period: news events
themselves constrain and enable coverage of particular parts of the world. Networks gave the
Greek Crisis, for example, ample coverage. The crisis was an ongoing story with conflict and
importance to business audiences in addition to the implications it had for Germany and Russia.
Similarly, stories on the deaths of Lee Kwan Yew and the Saudi king, oil prices, and Federal
Reserve policy received coverage. The news cycle accounts for at least some of this attention.
Nevertheless, the news cycle does not seem to be able to account for AJE’s frequent reports on
China or CCTV’s regular economic reporting on countries such as Australia, South Korea, and

75

Switzerland may seem to be an outlier given its relatively small size. However, the coverage seen in RT
and DW stems from moves by the Swiss banking authorities that “unpegged” their currency from the
Euro, a move that drastically increased its value in a short period. These stories were therefore event
driven as opposed to necessarily reflecting a deeper commitment to covering Swiss affairs.
76
Russia Today devoted substantial coverage to what could only be coded as “European Union” given the
new items focus on the broader governance of the European Union itself. These stories often combine
coverage with the Greek Crisis given Greece’s membership and reliance on bailout funds from the EU.
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Japan, none of whom were undergoing crises or policy shifts during the study period. Editorial
interests, for example CCTV’s claim to be a “link to Asia” and DW’s commitment to present
Europe play a part. Unlike domestic coverage, where state projection plays a direct role, news
cycles appear to interact with state interests to influence the geographical focus of coverage.
While key players in geopolitics and the global economy draw network’s geographical
focus, meaning that Western nations received the majority of coverage, we can see that each
network has particular geographic emphases. In this sense, there appear to be countervailing
pressures on news item selection. On the one hand, following the broader news cycle potentially
signals that the broadcaster should be taken seriously as a news outlet because it does not avoid
important stories. On the other, a network must still, in some way, fulfill its state mandated
editorial position. These facts call into the question the real potential of these channels as
potential contra-flows simply based on geography when editorial line and news cycles influence
coverage.
5.1.2

Voices of the World Disunited

All of the broadcasters analyzed herein have some degree of international news coverage,
though AJE and RT have significantly more. International news coverage can serve an editorial
goal, like CCTV’s coverage of Asia, or follow the international news cycle, as when three
networks covered the death of the Saudi king. As in Chapter 4, broadcasters empower speaking
actors featured in international coverage to frame news and project narratives. Unlike domestic
news, there is no clear presumption about which speakers networks would feature. International
news can surely serve some state interests, but the impetus to feature nationals of the sponsoring
state as advocates for that state (Cull 2009b) does not apply here. In its place, editorial mission,
journalism norms, as well as state interests seem the most likely pressures informing speaker
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selection. Because the programs under analysis in this dissertation are oriented towards
economic elite expectations, knowing who is empowered to speak is critical: who gets to explain
and eyewitness economic activity in global news is a critical part of shaping the news agenda
(Zelizer 2007). In other words, who has the credibility to explain global economic activity, who
is affected by the policies of states, and who are the heroes and villains of state narratives.
Ideological considerations may also play a role in speaker selection, particularly in outlets such
as RT whose coverage almost exclusively examine the developed West. Examining the extent to
which speakers counter trends documented in global news is particularly important because three
of the four networks under review, CCTV, AJE, and RT, claim an editorial mission of
diversifying global news content. Beyond public diplomacy considerations, speakers selected
from underreported regions or non-mainstream views represents the possibility of both contraflow and counter-hegemony in global news content in service of state interests.
Perhaps the most notable finding is the apparent network consistency in speaker selection
practices across domestic, intersectional, and outside world news items. As demonstrated in
Chapter 4, only DW and CCTV conformed to predictions by scholars such as Cull (2009b) that
IBs privilege the voices of domestic speakers. It also showed that DW, with no counterhegemonic mission, depicted workers and ordinary people at higher rates than any other network
and that RT used experts almost to the exclusion of other speaking types. AJE and CCTV
speaking actor selection fell in between these two poles. The types and numbers of speaking
actors remains relatively constant across reporting, owing I suggest, to the particular news styles
each network employs. RT’s near exclusive use of studio items and interviews mean their
journalists are unlikely to interact with ordinary people and workers. This stylistic choice
necessarily precludes people who are not political, economic, or experts. In contrast, exclusively
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on site reporting means working journalists can interview ordinary people and workers in
addition to elites. Choosing studio reporting does not need to constrain the nationality of
interview subjects, but in the case of Boom Bust producers have apparently chosen to use
American and British males to the exclusion of almost all other nationalities.7778 As seen in
Chapter 4, RT continued its practice of using experts, speakers who provide analyses of news
item, to testify to the corruption or incompetence of the managers of the global financial system,
while AJE continued to select equal parts experts and economic actors, following by political
figures, and lastly workers and ordinary people on site. DW used more ordinary people, speakers
who are citizens on the street, and workers while CCTV uses experts to a greater degree but not
as much as RT (see Appendices C and D).
Table 5.4 Speaker Frequency by Nationality
AJE
CCTV
DW
USA (10)
USA (175)
Greek (27)
UK (10)
UK (69)
UK (8)
Chinese (8)
Greek (63)
Polish (7)

RT
USA (133)
UK (9)
Greek (5)

Speaking actor variables show a consistent use of type across international and domestic
stories, but when we examine these numbers by nationality, claims of contra-flow and counterhegemony on the part of networks appear much weaker. Recall that nationality was determined
by features such as whether or not the speaker worked for particular governments, or secondary
sources and reportage, which pointed to their place of birth or identity. As seen in Table 5.4,
when we exclude nationals of the sponsoring state networks featured Americans and British with

77

Greeks, who accounted for five speakers on RT, really amount to one individual. Yanis Varoufakis,
former Syriza Finance Minister and professor of economics, frequently appeared on the program and
hosts called him “friend of the show.”
78
However, this does not mean that audiences engage with speaking actors in the same ways they would
with those same actors in domestically oriented stories. How they would receive these messages and react
to them is a matter of speculation.
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greater regularity than any other nationality.79 Speaker selections like this illustrate both the
dominance of the USA and UK in international finance, but also the importance networks place
on reaching out to English speaking audiences. AJE, despite its use of onsite reporting and high
number of items from Asia and Africa, routinely featured Americans and British for analysis
interviews, as did CCTV. Because speakers witness and build credibility for a network (Zelizer
2007), CCTV’s selection of foreigners reflects the broadcasters efforts to appear more Western
to increase its international appeal (Zhu 2012). AJE’s selection process is more opaque, but may
reflect its roots in British journalism. As such, even though both networks depicted under
reported parts of the world, the analysis of those events comes from people who commonly
appear in Global North news content. DW’s high frequency of Greeks stemed from their
reporting on the Greek debt crisis. As we shall see in the subsection below on the strategic
narratives themselves, many of these Greeks were small business owners who express fears
about the Syriza government’s policies and a potential exit from the euro. I have already
discussed RT’s use of American university professors in Chapter 4, but it is also worth noting
that Americans and British were still the primary, in fact only, speaking actors on stories that do
not cover the speakers’ country of origin. As such, each broadcaster selected Westerns to speak
and thereby eyewitness news and build credibility. In the process, channels that claim to
diversify news do not live up to that promise in terms of speaker nationality. DW, however, is an
interesting exception whose choice of Greek speakers serves German narratives about the Greek
Crisis. Again, counter-hegemony appears weak in terms of guest nationality and suggests that the
broadcasters follow traditional selection practices.

AJE’s ten direct reports from/on China account for the relatively high number of Chinese speakers. DW
featured its seven Polish speakers in reports on Swiss currency, and RT featured fifteen speakers whose
nationality could not be identified.
79
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While speaking actors provide analysis and credibility, journalists themselves are the
sluice through which news depicts non-journalistic speakers. Therefore, it is important to
consider the identities and depictions of IB journalists, where they are from, what expertise they
bring to news content, the newsroom cultures in which they operate. AJE is already known to
prefer hiring local journalists to report on events in their own countries or regions, even if behind
the scenes staff are often drawn from the developed world (Figenschou 2010; Powers 2012; Sakr
2007). Hiring international and diverse staffs is not limited to AJE as CCTV’s economic news
content features a variety of journalists from different countries. For example, Brit Jack Barton,
lead European affairs correspondent, and Greek Filio Kontrafouri reported on the Greek crisis
live from Athens. Shweta Bajaj, an Indian woman with 10 years reporting experience there,
appeared in onsite reports from India (CCTV 2014). While I will cover this in more depth when I
examine the news style each network uses, the use of local journalists to report on their countries
of origins does diversify news content and potentially means that IBs likes CCTV and AJE
depict economic news in ways that challenge traditional international news gathering. Local
hires such as these may also guide story selection as these journalists pursue stories of personal
and professional interest to them. This suggests a mutually constitutive relationship between
reporting style and contra flow in which hiring practices diversify news speakers while also
building credibility for the network and thereby by the capacity of the network to project state
narratives. RT and DW do not follow local hiring practices in economic news. Boom Bust
features only American journalists and (as seen in Chapter 4) rarely reports on site. DW’s
reporting style also eschews depiction of journalists. Although many reports are on site,
journalists rarely appear on screen and sometimes do not narrate the story.
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Each network has a particular style or pattern of guest selection, consistent with patterns
seen in Chapter 4, suggesting that the factors that influence speaker selection in domestic news
also shape selection in international news. All networks relied on expert opinion, but RT relied
on it almost exclusively and thus their economic news separated viewers from people who
experience the economic malfeasance their guests denounce. AJE, despite arguably being
counter-hegemonic, rarely features workers or ordinary people. Finally, despite some networks’
stated desire to diversify global news, each feature American and British speakers at higher rates
than other nationalities. This data leaves networks’ claims of diversity in global news speakers
suspect. In terms of state power and narrative projection, adopting the practices of older global
broadcasters may give networks greater credibility, as CCTV attempted by incorporating guest
interviews (Zhu 2012) and AJA did in the Middle East incorporating British journalism norms
(Sakr 2007). In turn, RT’s unique style means that the channel must build credibility through
different means. In the case of all networks, only RT truly operates counter-hegemonically, by
selecting academics over other elites. Nevertheless, weak counter-hegemony means that
networks cannot leverage their differences for greater credibility.

5.1.3

News Norms – Live from…

Chapter 4 demonstrated that each network’s news norms followed particular patterns; for
example, favoring onsite reporting versus studio reporting or combining onsite reporting with in
studio interviews. In that context, where networks cover domestic news, presenting the
sponsoring state and its policies is the foremost public diplomacy role of a network. Onsite
depictions of average Chinese or Greeks, for example, creates “proximity between the spectator
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and the scene” (Chouliaraki 2006a, 262).80 Therefore, when news programming presents people
in particular social roles, like politician or worker, it makes those people the face of the news
story. Likewise, Zelizer argues that eyewitnessing embodies the “on-site presence by which
journalists constitute their authority for reporting events of the real world” (2007, 410). The
feeling of proximity provided by eyewitnessing is particularly important when the goal of a
broadcaster is to provide audiences with information content that is typically absent from global
news flows, for example news from the Global South as AJE claims to provide (Figenschou
2011) or CCTV’s view from Asia. Showing those who are affected by global economic policy
living with the results of such policies could be a potent tool for legitimizing particular state
narratives while diversifying global news in the service of state goals.
Using the intersectional (sponsor and other state in item) and foreign (only non-sponsor
states), my analysis suggests widely varying capacities between networks to report onsite and
different degrees of willingness to allow unscripted interviews. Boom Bust, for example, uses
Americans and British reporters and guests on and that particular program is headquartered in
New York City. Their staff is presumably capable of traveling the country and interviewing
people directly.81 In addition, the program sent its own correspondents to events like the World
Economic Forum (WEF) in Switzerland or electronic expos in Las Vegas. RT journalists did not
interview anyone while on location, preferring to do standup interviews with their own
correspondents. CCTV’s coverage of the WEF, in contrast, interviewed several economic and
expert figures about the Forum’s agenda generally and about Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s

While Chouliaraki’s specifically focused on images of suffering in war, the key idea is that visual
framing of people can draw the viewer of those images into greater engagement with them. Any actual
engagement is not the subject of this dissertation but should be part of future research.
81
Indeed new items analyzed in Chapter 6 indicate that RT coverage of the Greek bailout, Ukraine
conflict, and Syrian conflict all use on the ground reporting combined with interviews.
80
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speech to the forum specifically. This indicates that Boom Bust’s choice of expert speaking
actors, notably university professors as seen in Chapter 4, and reliance on in studio news items
does not reflect limitations but rather editorial choice. That choice to strictly limit reporting to
the studio with interview guests suggests that Boom Bust’s news norms limit potential conflict to
project relatively narrow economic narratives.
Table 5.5 Intersectional and International Items by Story Type

AJE
Intersec
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

CCTV
Internat Intersec
0.0%
30.8%
46.4% 36.4%
25.0% 0.0%

DW
Internat Intersec
45.9% 5.3%
42.6% 57.9%
1.6%
0.0%

RT
Internat Intersec
10.0% 0.0%
30.0% 0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Internat
22.2%
Studio
0.0%
On Site
64.8%
Studio
Interview
0.0%
0.0%
12.4% 0.0%
5.3%
10.0% 0.0%
5.6%
On Site
Interview
16.1% 0.0%
1.6%
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.0%
Roundtable 0.0%
0.0%
12.5% 21.2% 8.2%
31.6% 50.0% 0.0%
7.4%
Mixture
At the other end of the spectrum, AJE brings the viewer to the location of events and
features speakers from a variety of different socioeconomic levels and nationalities. Table 5.5
shows that AJE does appear to shift the geographical focus of its coverage given geopolitical
interests, addressed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the types of new items Counting the Cost airs
invariably depicts people directly influencing and affected by the issue in question with 46.4% of
items on non-sponsor state being solely on location and another 16.1% combining on site report
with other news styles. RT’s Boom Bust presents economic news from a studio in New York,
debated by (mostly American, white and male) experts. The global economy presented is
abstract and abstracted; agents in the economy seemingly never speak for themselves, stories
presume victims of the Western capitalist system and do not depict them.82 RT’s eyewitnessing
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Why this should be the case is not especially clear as it would not be difficult to find average people
exasperated with capitalism, as the 2016 US elections show. The regular news items analyzed in Chapter
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credibility should diminish as the program does not witness anything on site nor did hosts
interview ordinary people or nationals of the states in the reports. Rather, the data suggests that
Boom Bust derives its credibility through experts based within the territory of Russia’s
geopolitical rivals. RT’s reliance on Anglophone experts in international news coverage is so
consistent, it suggests that editorial choice is the main cause.
DW and CCTV fall somewhere in between, combining studio stories, interviews, and on
site reporting. However, they diverge in their use of onsite reporting of international news
stories, suggesting that CCTV is more capable or more interested in international on site
reporting. In short, all networks other than RT invest in on site reporting of economic news.
Geographical focus, speaking actors, and news norms are the form that IB content can
take: onsite reporting with local people living through economic events or in studio interviews
with intellectual elites, whatever form it takes a strategic narrative must fit within the form a
broadcaster selects. Different forms suggest different methods of building credibility for a
broadcaster as well as the various limitations networks operates under. In the case of
international news we have seen how broadcasters focus on specific geographic regions, select
speakers, and use specific news style that may not be counter-hegemonic but do support state
interests in specific ways. These networks operate as public diplomacy tools in addition to their
role as news providers. Based on the data seen here and in previous chapters, practical
limitations and editorial choices shape the ways in which IBs project state and world system
narratives. To the extent that a given network claims to be counter-hegemonic, that is to diversify
news and challenge mainstream views of economic policy, it needs to be found in the narratives

6 do depict average people protesting government and capitalism as in their coverage of Greece. Perhaps
there is something to be said for cloaking oneself in the rational authority of economic expertise, as
McCloskey (1998) suggested about economists in general, when undermining narratives of the world
system.
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themselves. In turn, the possibility that states can use counter-hegemonic news styles to bolster
state economic narratives must be found in the ways in which networks narrativize specific news
stories about the global economic system.

5.2

Narratives of the World’s Economic System

My previous analysis in Chapter 4showed that each network’s domestic coverage
adopted an overarching narrative for its sponsoring state or, failing that, its geopolitical rivals.
CCTV depicted China as a peaceful rising power; DW constructed Germany as dynamic and
worthy of emulation; RT avoided discussion of Russia itself and focused instead on its main
geopolitical rivals depicted as either sinister or incompetent; and AJE scarcely covered Qatar but
spent some time on its opponents in the Syrian war, namely Russia who programming described
as a poorly managed pariah state.
In this section, I explore world system economic narratives, those strategic narratives that
describe and thus constrain the behavior of actors, within the global system. The variables above
– geography, voice, news norms – indicate the various forms that IB content takes. However, the
main argument I make in this dissertation is that these forms work in the service of state
interests. The form carries the narratives, and as a result shapes its form and credibility. I explore
those narratives through two stories that received coverage on most, if not all, channels. These
stories are the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Greek
debt crisis. The two stories received sustained coverage on most networks, and both directly
implicated a sponsoring state. Finally, the two stories enmesh national interests, the global
economic and political systems, and economic forces. As such, they offered fruitful grounds to
challenge the structure of the world system.
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5.2.1

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Founded by China and 73 other states, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
is an international lender intended to provide capital to infrastructure projects in the Asian region
(AIIB 2014; Wong 2016). The Bank’s genesis lay in part with US Senatorial intransigence in
ratifying changes to the IMF and World Bank governance structure that would have given China
greater voting rights in those organizations (BBC 2015d). CCTV, AJE, and RT devoted coverage
to the bank particularly during the last two weeks of March 2015 when several Western nations
such as the UK, France, and Italy became founding members over American objections. The
three networks reported on these basic facts but framed them differently and also contextualized
the AIIB items in ways that reflect different priorities in framing China in general.
CCTV, RT, and AJE all reported on AIIB with studio items, provided expert
commentary, and explored the geopolitical dimensions of the bank.83 In addition, all three
reported specifically on the UK’s membership, highlighting the country’s close relationship with
the USA. Finally, all three networks reported American resistance to the bank. On the surface,
reportage on the AIIB appears to be standard financial journalism in that it relied on elite
speakers, focused on the UK and USA as the lead of the story, and highlighted conflict between
states. Items also depicted states as the key actor in international economics; private companies
and market forces remain absent in all three networks’ reporting on AIIB. CCTV, in contrast,
combined studio items with onsite news reporting, which depicted ceremonies and political
figures working on the bank and its implementation. All networks used expert commentary, but
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Made in Germany did not provide any coverage of AIIB, though this does not mean that DW as a
whole did not cover the bank. We have seen that the program devotes the majority of its items to German
economic news
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RT and AJE’s guests, Eswar Prasad and Jack Kingston respectively, are both professors at
American universities invited to provide analysis. Neither broadcaster featured Chinese or nonacademic speakers on the subject. CCTV featured interviews with several Western and Chinese
political and expert speakers both onsite and in studio.84 Finally, all three networks covered the
UK’s membership in the bank, but only CCTV covered several European and Asian states
joining the bank in subsequent reports. Therefore, while there are similarities across the three
networks, CCTV’s reportage possessed definitive differences that bring their coverage in line
with Chinese state interests.
Each network framed the reason why countries joined, why China wanted the bank, how
the US reacted, and contextualized the AIIB items in ways that highlight different system
narratives. Boom Bust host Erin Ade, in the lead item of the March 24th episode, framed
European motivations for joining the AIIB as a desire for safer investment in Asian countries as
well as a recognition of Chinese power and stability. While this is a blow to US prestige, China’s
goals are not “altruistic” but reflect the need to invest in trade given the glut in Chinese
infrastructure. Similarly, Counting the Cost host Kamahl Santamaria calls the AIIB the “ultimate
geopolitical power play” that got worse when Western nations “broke ranks” with the US.
China’s motivation for starting the bank, Santamaria and his guest Jack Kingston tell us, is to
obtain greater representation in international financial institutions because the US Senate blocked
the vote to amend the IMF governing structure. European nations, again, desire access to Asian
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The list is long given that CCTV aired ten stories during the study period, however, it includes: German
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, European Parliament President Martin Schulz, Spokesman Chinese
Foreign Ministry Hong Lei, Country Director Asian Development Bank Hamid L. Sharif; Chinese
Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, Thai Finance Minister Sommai Phasee, Laotian Vice Finance Minister
Thipphakone Chanthavongsa; Spokeswoman US State Department Jen Psaki; US Treasury Secretary Jack
Lew, UK Ambassador to China Barbara Janet Woodward, IMF President Christine Lagarde, President of
Asian Development Bank Takehiko Nakao, and Choi Hee-nam of the South Korean Ministry of Strategy
and Finance. This list is not exhaustive.
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markets and investment opportunities. Despite the differences between each networks’ coverage
the issue narratives are similar; China wants greater power either in institutions or economic
profit, the USA feels “threatened” or has lost prestige, and European countries are interested in
the opportunities the new bank represents.
CCTV’s narrative of the AIIB varied in several ways and illustrates an alignment of news
content with the narrative of China’s “peaceful rise” (T.-K. Chang and Lin 2014), thus
highlighting Global Business’s role as a public diplomacy tool for projecting strategic narratives.
At the same time, CCTV coverage followed news events in that each story focused on new
information, specifically states joining the bank as founding members, and thus presented their
content as part of the regular news cycle. CCTV devoted ample coverage to the AIIB and its
ever-increasing founding members between March 16 and March 30, 2015. Note also that while
AJE and RT covered the UK, they did not cover Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, or
Austria joining the bank. AJE, being a weekly program, has more time constraints, but the daily
broadcast of Boom Bust could have and did not. This suggests that while the news of increasing
Western participation developed only CCTV continued to report on it. At one level, the reports
follow the news; it is arguably newsworthy if several Asian and European countries join the
bank. On another level, however, reporting on the new members projects the bank as desirable
and normalizes it while also sidelining American objections. Second, CCTV claimed that the
AIIB launched in Beijing with “China’s backing,” as opposed to being Chinese led, thereby
supporting the narrative of China as a responsible stakeholder in the global economic and
political system seen in Chapter 4 and which parallels China’s policy of increasing the number of
stakeholders in the global economic system. In addition, the reporting may be a manifestation of
President Xi Jinping’s recently reiterated directive that state media should serve as a tool for
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projecting Chinese ideas and supporting Chinese interests (Tiezzi 2016). In turn, CCTV mixed
content to report in varied geographic locations and uses a plethora of different expert and
political voices to project President Xi Jinping’s claim that the bank is “consistent with the
evolving trend of the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic
governance system more just, equitable, and effective” (Jinping 2016, 2).
In one report, the host claimed the UK’s membership has created “concerns” in
Washington over the role of the IMF and Asian Development Bank. However, the host then
shows George Osborne, the UK Finance Minister, who assures the audience that the bank will
complement those institutions and not threaten them. The host supported this line of argument by
concluding the report saying that the UK will join the other founding members later in the month
to finalize governance rules. This pattern, reporting on a new member, presenting positive
comments from members of government or experts, and using both to undermine US concerns
dominate CCTV coverage of the bank.
CCTV’s narrative, as seen in the above story, removes China’s particular interests at the
same time as it undercut American reactions as “concerns” over anger or being threatened.
Additionally, the host’s positioning of the UK as a founding member negotiating governance
rules gives the impression of multilateralism instead of the geopolitical confrontation seen in
AJE or RT. The report suggested that CCTV characterizes the world economic system less in
terms of conflict and more in terms of cooperation for trade and development in line with
Chinese calls for greater multipolarity in international institutions (Sutter 2010). In this system,
states cooperate, or at least can cooperate, to achieve larger goals for international finance.
Furthermore, CCTV repeatedly used both mainland Chinese and Westerners to support the bank.
Guests such as the Australian and UK Finance Ministers defended their countries’ decision to
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join. Expert testimony included Ding Yifan of the Institute of World Development Research
Center, which is connected to the CPC State Council, and Wang Jianhui of private investment
bank Capital Securities. CCTV drew these interviews from press conferences, studio and on site
interviews, and provided some on-site reporting.
In this way, CCTV projected a narrative that both normalizes China in the international
economic system and the AIIB as a part of international development infrastructure in line with
stated policy goals. In turn, the use of pro-bank non-Chinese political and economic actors
provided wider credibility for the AIIB. While AJE and RT characterized the AIIB as an issue of
geopolitical power, CCTV used speakers to project a narrative where Western states shared
American concerns about the bank’s governance, expressed by State Department spokeswoman
Jen Psaki, but participated anyway to help shape those same governance rules. Chapter 3 showed
that RT content attempts to pick at the liberal democratic values by empowering “fringe” experts
(Nimmo and Eyal 2016). However, this does not explain AJE’s similar framing of the AIIB as a
direct threat to American power, or CCTV’s more conciliatory tone. The regular role of
unfolding news events help to legitimate CCTV’s coverage of other states joining the AIIB, but
the data on the Greek elections and bailout, as well as the coverage of economic protest in
Chapter 6, suggest that direct state interest has a clear, though not quantifiable, effect on
international broadcaster content.

5.2.2

Narrative Divergence and the Greek Debt Crisis

All four networks devoted considerable attention to the ongoing Greek debt crisis over
the course of the study period. In particular, I focus on the period of the Greek election in
January 2015 when the Syriza party was elected on a platform of debt renegotiation and anti-
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austerity and the negotiations following Syriza’s electoral victory.85 The reporting of each
network on the Greek debt crisis differs from reporting on the AIIB, in large part due to most
networks’ use of onsite reporting. While the Greek Crisis is similar to the AIIB in the sense that
it is technocratic and subject to complex negotiations over economic issues, austerity measures in
Greece clearly affected the population directly. In addition, the elections that ultimately led to
Syriza’s rise to power arguably provide an impetus to interview average Greeks. These factors
may account for the increased usage of onsite reporting on the elections by all networks other
than RT and each network’s use of economic speaking actors in addition to experts. However,
economic actors often occupied a petit bourgeoisie role, being the owners of small shops or
entrepreneurs. Only DW and CCTV interviewed ordinary people during the Greek election
period.
Broadcaster narratives of the Greek crisis revolve around two ideas with DW and RT
operating at opposite poles on this issue. This is, perhaps, the clearest example of IBs projecting
competing strategic narratives in this entire study. The first issue is the righteousness of the
German government’s versus Syriza’s positions on austerity, whether Berlin is “punishing”
Greece as a show of force for greater influence and power in the EU, or is Greece trying to shirk
its obligations at the expense of European taxpayers. Second, the consequences of a Syriza
victory for the larger European project, specifically will Grexit lead to the breakup of the larger
union. In this case, the question is whether Syriza’s proposals for debt negotiations will mean a
“Grexit” and the overall demise of the euro or will strengthen the Union by challenging
unchecked power in Brussels. Undergirding all of these issues is the European Central Bank’s
plan to buy debt from member states, a move that would make the ECB more like the Federal
I analyze Syriza’s July acceptance of further austerity measures for additional bailout funds and the
subsequent demonstrations against those measures in Chapter 6.
85
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Reserve, an institution capable of managing the European economy at a macro level by
controlling debt and the cash supply.
In various onsite and mixed news items, AJE, CCTV, and DW frame Syriza as a
“radical” or “far-left” political party who wants to eliminate their debt rather than pay it and with
few realistic policy proposals to address the crisis. DW provides the clearest example of this
framing. As seen in Chapter 4, DW projected a narrative of the German economy as model and
Greece as in need of reform. A particularly interesting example comes from the January 20
episode of Made in Germany where host Monika Jones juxtaposed a story on German
“frugality,” as read through the archetype of the Swabian homemaker, with a story on Greek
business people’s fears of a Syriza victory. Jones introduced the second Syriza item with a quote
from Alexis Tsipras blaming Angela Merkel for the European crisis, but then states that it is “no
wonder Europeans are looking wearily” towards the Greek elections. One week later, January 27,
following Syriza’s election host Ben Fajzullin introduced a report that continued to undermine
Syriza’s anti-austerity platform, suggesting that European leaders view Syriza’s platform as
unrealistic. One final example comes in a report on Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis,
who the program characterized as “preach[ing] his government’s new dogma” while Germany
has tried “for years” to get Greece to reform its economy. AJE and CCTV maintain the pattern
seen here, introducing Syriza as fringe or dangerous for Europe and European lenders
exasperated with their election. On January 18, Counting the Cost reported that Syriza was a far
left party, as did Global Business on February 2. Even with this framing, CCTV and AJE
differed from DW in selection of pro-Syriza speakers, in turn suggesting that the first two
networks were following the news cycle over direct state interests in their reporting.
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While DW did interview a founding member of Syriza and conducted vox pop interviews
with average Greek following Syriza’s election win, none of the economic actors interviewed, in
contrast to AJE, or in the extreme position RT, were pro-Syriza. Experts were typically against
Syriza as when DW followed one onsite report with an interview with Jorg Rocholl of the
European School of Management and Technology. In this interview, like many featured on DW,
the key term is “reform,” which encapsulates policies of privatization of state assets, fighting tax
evasion to increase revenue (but not raising taxes), and reducing benefits. Economic figures on
DW, including many small business owners, universally rejected Syriza’s solutions, even as the
same news items reported that upwards of 70% of Greeks supported Syriza. AJE, likewise,
features guests such as EU Budget Committee member Siegfried Mureșan who endorsed the
New Democracy party’s program of privatization, stability, and competitiveness. CCTV, while
they devoted over thirty news items totaling around 4% of their total items, also featured more
speakers who opposed Syriza than agreed with the party’s platform. In these ways the coverage
of the three networks conforms to our basic understanding of how news routines for each
network operate, and conform to a more neoliberal reading of economics. In turn, DW coverage
supports the German position that austerity is a necessary policy (Al-Jazeera English 2015) as do
AJE and CCTV during routine reporting. RT does not follow this pattern.
RT’s coverage of the election is almost diametrically opposed to the other networks, and
in challenging EU and German policy broadcaster coverage projects a deligitimization narrative
of German policy. Instead of on site reporting, Boom Bust used studio items and interviews
where experts characterized the bailout as punitive and designed by Germany as a power play
and Syriza policies as a reasonable alternative to austerity. News items on the Greek crisis
account for slightly over 10% of all RT news items, suggesting the programs editors felt the
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story deserved sustained attention. Like other items analyzed in Chapter 4 and above, Boom Bust
uses in studio reporting and featured American and British experts, as well as their own staff, to
the exclusion of other speakers. Notably, the only Greek who appeared on the program was
Syriza Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis.86 Other guests included Tim Duy of the University of
Oregon, Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri, Marshall Auerback of Institute of New
Economic Thinking, and Mark Weisbrot of Co-Director for Center Economic and Policy
Research. No guest supports German actions, but they are not ideologically consistent,
representing extremes pro-market and anti-EU views. However, Boom Bust does not need to be
ideologically consistent. The purpose appears not to be to promote Russia as a state or member
of the community of nations. Rather the overarching purpose is to undermine the post-war
European consensus (Amann 2016; Gummer 2015; Pomerantsev 2014). The narrative, to sum
up, pits suffering Greeks against a cabal of international creditors, corrupt governments, and
bullying neighbors.
RT and DW provide competing strategic narratives that either support or undermine the
legitimacy of the European project and economic system. In turn, RT and DW’s content
illustrates the limitations of economics as a ground for competing state narratives. Neither rejects
capitalism, so the conflict is not over the hegemony of capitalism or neoliberalism but rather
competing versions of these systems projected with different styles of reporting. This suggests
IBs build their credibility in different ways and that eyewitnessing news events is not the method
all networks might take. Boom Bust’s narrative suggests that Greeks are victims, and then does
not feature Greeks, instead its focus remains on experts. Economic issues, in RT coverage,
appear inscrutable and they do not depict the real world effects of austerity policies by
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Varoufakis was a frequent guest on the show in the months preceding the study period, a fact host Erin
Ade routinely highlights.
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visualizing workers or ordinary people.87 DW and the other networks also privilege elite figures,
but do so on site thereby creating a sense of event that studio coverage may not obtain (A.
Robertson 2015). The coverage of the Greek crisis calls international broadcasters counterhegemonic potential into question as it neither seriously challenged German policy nor did it
support Syriza policy, with the exception of RT. However, RT’s ideological inconsistency
suggests that their counter-hegemonic potential, laying with guests and narratives over news
style may also be undermined as the raison d’etre of the channel is not simply to report the
unreported but use it to undermine geostrategic rivals.
The network coverage also suggested differing public diplomacy strategies in terms of
content’s framing of the sponsoring state and the positions of its rivals. A proactive framing, as
seen in DW and CCTV, placed the state sponsor in the center of coverage, projected nation
narratives, and promoted state interests and positions. Reactive broadcasters, RT and AJE,
omitted and mask the state, project delegitimizing narratives of rivals, and undermine rival
narratives. The AIIB and Greek crisis stories, as issue narratives, provided insight into how each
network fashions these competing narratives of the world system in a proactive or reactive way.
CCTV reported on China’s AIIB as a multilateral, though Chinese “backed,” institution Western
nations seek to join. The US may show “concern” but is not damaged, as it is in RT coverage.
CCTV reports, when read through this particular program’s coverage, implies that the AIIB is a
needed part of multilateral global economic system, and those who oppose it are not responsible
stakeholders. AJE and RT, in contrast, depicted Western nations’ entry into the AIIB as a blow
to US prestige. The system here is a zero-sum game, a competition for global economic
influence and power. This is not to say that China does not see itself in competition with the
A particularly odd choice on BB’s part given that regular news coverage, as seen in Chapter 6, does
report live from Athens.
87
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USA, it does and is pursuing a policy of deepening trade and diplomatic links with countries
around the world, particularly in Central Asia, to undermine US hegemony (Shambaugh 2013;
Tiezzi 2015; Winter 2016). Rather, what the approach taken to AIIB reporting detailed here
suggests is that CCTV content, in part, is trying to ameliorate that perception.
Russia’s leadership, similarly, sees itself in competition with the USA and the EU; but
unlike CCTV, RT’s narrative addresses Western audiences by providing an expert approved
narrative that undermines rival. Coverage of the Greek crisis seen through DW juxtaposed to RT
conveys oppositional narratives of the crisis. The scholarship on public diplomacy suggests that
states will use those assets to influence global audiences to approve the sponsoring state’s policy
and narratives. In this case, RT projects a different narrative of legitimacy to undermine the
German narrative, and in doing so, arguably undermines the dominant narrative of European
unity. What scholarship has left under examined, in this case, is how IBs shape the narrative
through speaking actors, news norms, and geographic focus.

5.3

Neoliberalism in the Narrative

As noted in Chapter 2, neoliberalism is a dominant if not exclusive means of
understanding economic action and policy, hence why the literature on the subject constituted a
large share of the material in earlier chapters. Harvey (2007, 2016) argued that neoliberalism is
fundamentally a political project of the transnational capitalist class to undermine state based
welfare systems, and it is neoliberalism’s character as a capitalist class project, as opposed to say
a nationalistic one, that makes economic news a valuable site for analyzing state narratives.
Because neoliberal economic orthodoxy rose to such prominence prior to the 2008 Financial
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Crisis, and arguably maintains this position though challenged by movements such as Occupy,88
it limits and enables discourse. In terms of public diplomacy, neoliberalism limits the available
rhetoric for strategic narratives as each state here remains enmeshed in global financial and
economic structures and relies on them to maintain economic growth.
Chapter 3 showed that each state sponsor in this study connects itself to the global
economy despite differences in political systems, economic power, and geopolitical interests. As
in the developed West (Aune 2001), neoliberal theory has entered into policy making circles in
the four state sponsors analyzed here. In brief, China relies on foreign investment and relatively
open trade to export goods, Germany continues to pursue a strong European economy and
increased trade between itself and Asia, Qatar seeks to move away from petroleum and to
diversify its economy into a financial and knowledge hub, and Russia requires oil and gas
exports to earn foreign currency. These factors intertwine with financial journalism norms (Lee
2014) and suggests that no network would be promoting the interests of the sponsor state if its
content was truly anti-capitalist. Yet, the analysis above, particularly in the case of the Greek
crisis, indicated that networks can project conflicting economic issues narratives. As such, to
determine the degree to which networks’ content conforms to neoliberal visions of the world
economic system we should consider the extent to which network content conforms to both
neoliberal theory and state economic policies. At the same time, AJE and RT, as well as CCTV
to a degree, all market themselves as broadcasters capable of covering the under covered and
providers of diversification of global news operating outside the mainstream. These two
pressures, capital and editorial mission, shape each broadcasters use or misuse of neoliberal
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Chapter 6.
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ideology but ultimately economics serves only a limited role as a site for geopolitical
contestation as each state accepts the basic norms of capitalism.89
No networks’ content explicitly undermines capitalism broadly or neoliberalism
specifically. However, each network does have a different approach to discussing capitalism and
specific neoliberal policy prescriptions. However, given that two networks are proactive,
projecting the sponsoring state directly, and two are reactive, with the sponsoring state generally
absent, the networks’ promotion of state policy operates differently. In the case of DW and
CCTV, both promote trade, but China promotes a multipolar system of economic governance as
seen in AIIB coverage and rejects neoliberalism as a Western danger to the Party’s control of the
state (ChinaFile 2013). Both promote economic reform guided by the state to enhance
competitiveness and both of their content conforms readily to government policy positions. What
is interesting is that CCTV must answer to government directives and promote the CPC party
line and maintain the “media’s Party spirit and social responsibility, and that in political matters
it must be of one heart and mind with the Party” (ChinaFile 2013). A key feature of the Chinese
media system is its alignment of media with the interests of the Party so as to promote the state
(Zhao 2012). Xi Jinping reiterated this view recently, saying the media needs to fashion the
“Party's theories and policies into conscious action by the general public while providing
spiritual enrichment to the people” (Xinhua 2016). As such, CCTV promotes government
economic policies but does so in a media system that expects them to promote social and
political harmony. DW, on the other hand, is protected by the DW law and is guaranteed
freedom of expression by Article 5 of the German Constitution (German Federal Republic 2004).
Yet, DW hosts and guests promote current German policy. Official German policy promotes
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international trade and development (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015) in addition to structural
reforms of European states, as Germany did in 2010, thereby serving as a model for economic
development (Schauble 2016). As seen here and in Chapter 4, DW guests and journalists
advocated for Greek structural reforms and presented Germany as a model capitalist economy.
This suggests two things. First, that DW journalists follow the government line without coercion
either out of belief or journalistic and media system norms, illustrating the power of journalistic
norms to constrain the ideological range of economic news. Second, that neoliberal thinking
about the benefits of trade and markets is present but is also presented in specific ways that
account for the needs of the sponsoring state. Additionally, DW and CCTV reports fashion the
state as the handmaiden of markets and as a mechanism of marketization as opposed to its
opponent, for example when CCTV reports favorably about CPC free trade policies. In these
cases, the state guides capitalism and neoliberal reforms of welfare, taxation, and trade and
speakers both foreign and domestic support these policies and provide them with credibility.
For the two reactive networks, AJE and RT, the picture is more muddled. Neither
network directly challenges capitalism as a system. However, because the sponsoring states are
missing from their own content it is not readily apparent when that content supports particular
state policies. Given the lack of a clearly articulated ideological position, it is difficult to say that
RT content conforms to Russian state positions. Content undermines geopolitical rivals but does
not speak of Russian policies. The 2013 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation” echoes anti-sanction sentiment in Article II paragraph 12 which states “we are
witnessing imposition of various unjustified restrictions and other discriminatory measures” even
as states seek economic diversification (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). That same document
says Russia’s key goal is rapprochement with the USA and EU, and Foreign Minister Sergei
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Lavrov promoted “prospects of harmonizing European and Eurasian integration processes in
order to eventually form a common economic and cultural space from the Atlantic to the Pacific”
(Lavrov 2015). Certainly, several guest on RT questioned the merits of anti-Russian sanctions.90
The content, or more specifically the guests’ proclamations, stand in sharp contrast to the
conciliatory tone seen in official documents or Lavrov’s comments. Some guests argue for
unrestrained markets and others critique markets from the left and because many guests are
“fringe” in their views (Nimmo and Eyal 2016) any credibility in the content suggests that RT
activates previously held biases against particular Western attitudes or policies. Even if the
content does not expressly analyze capitalism, the critiques seen in Boom Bust bely any
consistent ideological position on capitalism or alignment with official Russian policy beyond
West bad Russia (presumably) good by default.
Likewise, Qatar remains absent in Counting the Cost’s reporting, but the analysis so far
already calls the network’s counter-hegemonic status in question and thus the ways it markets
itself. In broad terms, however, the program’s content does seem to support Qatari official
positions as other studies have shown (Samuel-Azran 2013). Economically, Qatari policy seeks
to diversify the economy away from oil into a financial and knowledge hub based on deals with
Western nations and universities (Ibrahim and Harrigan 2012; Vora 2014). As a micro-state,
Qatar must also align itself with powerful actors for security and needs to avoid antagonizing
neighbors (Kaussler 2014). These pressures might explain why AJE content does not condemn
capitalism, as we might expect a counter-hegemonic channel to do, but does not show how AJE
projects an ideal of the state as guide of development. In their coverage of Nigeria, Nepal, or
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Bangladesh Counting the Cost routinely places responsibility for development on to
governments just as DW and CCTV do, and draw their credibility from a mix of experts on site
and in studio. However, the state is not meant to supplant the market, rather the goal is create one
for the purposes of development. Conversely, AJE portrays the Russian state, as seen in Chapter
4’s analysis, as corrupt and venal, dominated by a strong man with bad intentions suggesting that
AJE content can bend to reflect Qatari interests.
Each network appears to allow state interests to undermine financial news and media
system norms, but those norms otherwise operate conventionally. Taken together, no network
challenges or undermines capitalism and all suggest different forms or levels of neoliberal policy
such as greater marketization and trade to structural reforms of labor and tax codes. These
endorsements of neoliberalism are not the full-throated ones seen in the American business press
of the 1990s (Frank 2000). Instead, news norms, media systems, and state interests mediate and
moderate neoliberal policy positions and thereby construct it into a state specific form, verifying
in another way Ong’s (2006) view that neoliberalism operates in different ways in different
places to shape perceptions of right economic action. In this sense, networks who stake their
editorial identity on diversifying global news and challenging mainstream news coverage cannot
follow this mission in an economic sense as each state’s reliance on global capitalism limits their
potential to do so. On the other hand, each network does have the public diplomacy potential to
project state economic narratives. These two potentialities, economic counter-hegemony and
state projection, sit uncomfortably together as the former reflects a clearly stated opposition to
dominant economic frameworks and the latter reflects entities enmeshed in those same
frameworks.
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5.4

Conclusions

I have shown in this chapter that international broadcasters do project state narratives
concerning regions or issues of interest to the sponsoring state. In addition, it is clear that states
use international broadcasters to undermine rival power economic narratives, as seen in the
oppositional coverage broadcast by RT and DW on the Greek Crisis. In this sense, my analysis
supports the scholars of public diplomacy (Cull 2009b; Nye 2009) and strategic narratives
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Pamment 2014) who argue that international
broadcasting is a crucial tool for projecting state narratives. As in Chapter 3, IB content
conformed with state positions on economic issues such as the AIIB and Greek Crisis. At the
same time, several factors constrain broadcaster’s freedom of action.
First, the global economic news cycle draws journalists’ attention away from the purely
sectarian interests of a given state. CCTV, for example, covered the Greek Crisis or Ukrainian
bailouts, or any story of economic significance, and operated less as a tool of state power and
more as a news channel. Doing so gives CCTV, with its high levels of government control and
Chinese journalism norms, the appearance of Western news outlets. Nevertheless, when the topic
involves state interests, such as the AIIB, CCTV’s coverage conformed to state interests. This
suggests that states may selectively activate an IB to project strategic narratives as desired.
However, the stated counter-hegemonic mission of some broadcasters, the goal to
diversify global news as a means of increasing state power, appears overstated. When the topic is
the global economic system, only RT directly challenged global powers such as the USA and
EU. However, those challenges operated within the ideological framework of capitalism and
never seriously suggested any alternatives. As in Chapter 4, economics discourse does not appear
to be a valued site of geopolitical contestation as it constrains possible state narratives. That AJE,
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CCTV, and RT all claim to diversify news or report outside of the mainstream did not affect
coverage of routine economic news. AJE, for example, despite their claim to represent the
“people” (Figenschou 2010) as a counter-hegemonic journalistic source privileged the German
narrative of the Greek debt crisis and had echoes of the Russian narrative of the AIIB. The same
is true of speaking actor selection as it conforms to expectations based on previous work on AJE
(Figenschou 2010) and financial journalism (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010). CCTV may
arguably be counter-hegemonic in that their reporting on AIIB rejected a confrontation narrative
in favor of one that emphasize multilateralism and undercut the presence of American anger at
its allies joining the bank. Taken together, this chapter poses serious questions about the
possibility of instrumentalizing of counter-hegemony to project state power.
Where divergence from news norms did occur was when issues directly affected state
interests. The Greek Crisis, for example, did not lead either AJE or CCTV to seriously question
Germany’s strategic narrative. However, when RT reported on the Crisis the program’s framing
and speaker selection provided ample criticism of German and EU policy. Likewise, CCTV was
the only channel to reject a confrontation narrative on the AIIB in favor of one that attempted to
co-opt American misgivings about the Bank. As such, state interests are apparently the
paramount consideration in determining the farming of economic issues. At the same time,
journalism norms, the news cycle, and media system shape the contours of content. This and the
preceding Chapter demonstrate that IBs do project state narratives, but also that a variety of other
structural factors must be accounted for to appreciate the form content takes. One factor that
remains to be explored, however, is the essentially elite oriented nature of economic news
content. All content analyzed thus far focused on states and their relationships with each other.
Action in the global economy remains the reserve of state or economic and political elites.
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Broadcasters did not depict action from the grassroots, from below elite governing structures. In
this sense the image of the global economy each broadcaster projects remains incomplete.
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6

PROTEST COVERAGE FROM THE TOP

In his book on the history of Voice of America, Heil (2003) begins with the story of how
VOA reported on the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He relates a harrowing tale of
journalists from around the world assembling on the ground in Beijing, airing rigorously checked
facts, and providing both rural and urban Chinese with needed information. His telling is worth
quoting at length. He writes:
The latest news is a lifeline of up-to-the-minute information on the revolution, which
is centered in this teeming plaza. A reality check. Hourly newscasts chronicle what is
happening throughout China, and for many right there, what is happening almost
within their sight, in the square. Around the clock, live reports from VOA
correspondents in Chinese and English stationed in Beijing surge through busy
phone lines to Washington. Within minutes, and sometime live in split seconds, they
speed back around the Earth on electronic wings via the miracle of international
radio to eager ears at Tiananmen. And America’s Voice… reaches millions more in
China beyond Tiananmen and around the globe during the Beijing spring of 1989
(2003, 8).
In 1989, the world watched as student demonstrators were attacked by the People’s
Liberation Army of China, and in Heil’s account, VOA did its best in impossible circumstances,
pushing its reporters to the limit without compromising their journalistic integrity. This story
serves as an example of the power of IBs to provide information to publics otherwise denied
said information. It also illustrates one of the great values of an IB, to cover dissent and civil
disorder in rival nations to undermine their government.
Indeed, Chinese and Russian frustrations with Western coverage of internal discord
partially motivated the creation of their IBs. Rawnsley (2015b, 276) points to Tiananmen as a
signal to the Chinese leadership that it needed public diplomacy programs. As Hu Jintao
proclaimed “We must be sober enough to see that international hostile forces are intensifying
the strategic plots to Westernize and divide us” shows the sense of being surrounded by
antagonists in Beijing (cited in Shambaugh 2013, 208). Likewise, Russian PD efforts derived
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from the perception that their positions were not reflected in Western media after the color
revolutions (Saari 2014) and their failure to develop a strategy for the Ossetia conflict in
Georgia leading to media criticism in the West (Avgerinos 2009).
In short, international broadcasters engage in the documentation and dissemination of
protests, including economic ones. Harnessing global news’ power of eyewitnessing
(Chouliaraki 2006b), states can use IBs to both undermine a rival as both Russia and China,
claim the West did in their moments of crisis. In addition, as demonstrated by previous chapters,
economic news and events remains a province of elite action and elite opinion, separate from
workers and consumers, who are routinely left out of coverage, even in the self-proclaimed
counter hegemonic networks, leaving it an open question as to how networks and journalists
might leverage this capacity.
This chapter examines the extent to which coverage differs during times of economic
crises, in particular economic protests. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated that IBs’ financial journalism
broadly conforms to the interests of their state sponsors, but did so only for elite economic
activity. Economic protests, on the other hand, illustrate economic discourse from below and,
therefore, illuminate economic conflicts, not between states, but between citizens and states.
These kinds of conflicts, as in the Tiananmen case, present opportunities for IBs to undercut
rivals, but also to live up to, and ultimately insturmentalize, their counter-hegemonic editorial
missions. Likewise, the ways in which an IB frames a domestic protest illustrates the potential of
a broadcaster to frame internal discontent and potentially sway foreign public opinion to accept
the sponsor’s views.91 Finally, and as a matter of analysis crucially, there exists a vigorous
literature on news coverage of protests, called the protest paradigm, which provides a reference
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Indeed, one wonders what CCTV would have done had it been as robust in 1989 as it is now.
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for evaluating new IBs’ economic news coverage. Economic protests, therefore, represent a
useful site for examining the ways in which an IB may directly challenge state rivals, serve as
platforms for government policy and positions, and the degree to which new IBs in fact diversify
news.
I begin this chapter with a brief summary of the ways in which news typically covers
protests and specifically economic ones. Next, I describe each protest and explain their
suitability for study. I then examine the content from all four broadcasters’ coverage of four
different protests, from Greece, Brazil, Germany, and Hong Kong. Analysis indicates that each
channel, in their own unique ways, undermine protests that challenge the state sponsor or do not
directly affect the sponsor. Only when state interests are at play do we see divergence from the
status quo of economic protest coverage.

6.1

The Economic Revolution will not be Televised

Protests signal to their viewers that discontent is in the air, that the system as it exists
does not meet the needs or desires of a polity. And yet, protests would have limited impact
without mediation to carry them further than their immediate locality, hence the sometimes
outlandish modes of protest seen in media (DeLuca and Peeples 2002). While protests, especially
economic ones, have arguably increased in recent decades (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013),
scholarly examination of protest suggests that media typically fails to fully articulate the causes
and nature of protest movements. In terms of international broadcasting, however, protests
represent two opportunities. First, to live up to a counter-hegemonic mission statement.. Second,
to use counter-hegemony as a justification for covering protests to undermine a rival
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government.92 To contextualize my findings, we must first examine the ways in which media
cover or fail to cover protests to provide a baseline for content comparison.
After 2008, there has been a renaissance of scholarship on economic protests, as austerity
arguably opens up spaces for political action (Giugni and Grasso 2015). In particular, Occupy
Wall Street and related movements addressing wealth inequality, tax evasion, and banking have
received ample attention from a variety of perspectives. However, scholarly analyses of
economic protest news coverage indicate that networks typically framed economic discontent as
political discontent, with concerns about economic systems or morality typically subordinated
(Boykoff 2006; Skonieczny and Morse 2014). Such coverage conforms to the “protest
paradigm,” a package of news tropes that marginalize protest movements and frames them as
deviant or outside of the mainstream. If a broadcaster were to live up to a counter-hegemonic
mission statement it, ideally, would not marginalize protestors and their grievances.
A prescient example of the protest paradigm comes from the Arab Spring. Western media
coverage of these events favored technological and political factors as the cause of the protests
(see for example Gustin 2011; Marzouki and Oullier 2012).93 However, even if economics was
not the primary cause of the Arab Spring, it is also clear that economic stagnation and dominance
of economic activity by state elites in places like Tunisia and Egypt fostered anti-government
resentment in those populations. As Joffé argues:
Ever since the debt crisis emerged in the developing world in the wake of the global
oil price shock of the 1970s, all three [IMF, World Bank, and EU] have tried to
prescribe economic development policies based on neoliberal economic principles,

Whether this was the actual case, China’s government perceived VOA coverage of Tianamen and the
start of Radio Free Asia as direct threats to the regime’s stability and legitimacy (Price, Haas, and
Margolin 2008).
93
Subsequent articles sometimes questioned the role of technology in the Arab Spring (Beaumont 2011).
92
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associated with the ‘Washington Consensus’ and designed to improve general
levels of prosperity (2011, 509).94

These policies, however, did not lead to economic growth and youth unemployment remained
high even in rich states like Saudi Arabia, thereby fostering resentment towards the state
(Partridge 2011). As such, Western reportage showed a tendency to elide the various and
complex causes of these revolutionary movements, particularly the role of Western backed
economic policies in youth unemployment. This is all the more curious when one considers that
a fruit seller sparked the Tunisian unrest when he immolated himself after a state official
attempted to extort him. In other words, news content decoupled the economic sphere from the
technological and political spheres of Arab life; this chapter takes these insights and examines
the extent to which IBs replicate pattern. While not a perfect example, the Arab Spring illustrates
the ways in which media often overlook the causes of protest movements and rely on tropes over
on the ground reporting in their reportage.
However, the protest paradigm is only important for this study to the degree it allows us
test the projection of state narratives and to see the extent to which IBs conform to those
narratives. In some ways, international broadcaster may already be contributing to increased
information about economic protests. Russia Today received an International Emmy nomination
in 2012 for their coverage of Occupy Wall Street. In 2011, as the network’s web page tells it:
“RT begins its intrepid coverage of the Occupy Wall Street protests while they are still largely
ignored or dismissed by the mainstream media” (“About RT” 2016). Given the content analyzed
in the preceding Chapters, RT’s early and sustained attention to Occupy presumably serves the
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This pattern, where debts to large international creditors came due in the 1970s, were not repaid, and
required further intervention by international lenders was repeated in various African and Latin American
states and according to Prashad (2008) signaled the end of any kind of cohesive socialist Third World
Development project.
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channel’s mission of damaging the image of the West. However, even if we might impugn the
motives of RT, especially in light of the coverage analyzed thus far; there is an element of truth
to the statement. Many news organizations cover protests poorly and belatedly if they receive
any coverage at all, and sometimes they elide the causes of said protests. For our purposes then,
we should test IBs counter-hegemony in terms of their deviation from the protest paradigm and
then examine the degree to which state interests may or may not have influenced that content.

6.2

Protests on Global Television: Victims of Circumstance and Routine

Protests present opportunities for IBs to frame citizen discontent in rival states, as VOA
did for the Tiananmen Square protests, and these opportunities appear to be increasing in many
regions of the world. At the same time, three networks – RT, CCTV, and AJE – promote their
networks as alternatives to mainstream Western news, in Thussu’s words as counter-hegemonic
(Thussu 2007a). As such, its here where counter-hegemony comes to the fore in my analysis as
IB’s coverage of protests represents a chance to live up to stated editorial missions to diversify
news as well as a prospect to underline discontent in rival states. The key issue, then, is whether
IBs depictions of protests diverge from Western norms and if state interests influence the nature
of that coverage.
Unfortunately, for those who had hoped these new channels would break with Western
traditions, the three weeks of coded newscasts and my subsequent analysis of their framing and
narratives of protest suggest that each network dissociated economic protests from economic
causes (for comprehensive description of these categories see Appendix E). In addition, when
news items did cover protests their framing tended to undermine and marginalize protestors’ in
line with predictions of the protest paradigm. In this sense, my findings support Skonieczny and
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Morse’s (2014) argument that there is “remarkable consistency in media portrayal of social
movements and protests to the detriment of the various causes and in support of the status quo”
(2014, 676). The exception, and an important use of IBs in public diplomacy, was when the
protests directly involved the sponsoring state’s interests, as the Umbrella protests do for China
or Greece does for Germany and Russia. In these cases, networks offered alternative framings
that either undermined the protest or supported as interests dictated.
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of news sections in the coded data and shows that
economic news encompassed approximately one tenth of all stories for all four networks in their
regular newscasts. These are stories where the anchors lede emphasized business, finance, or
economic data (see Appendix E for a complete description of each type). This value is higher
than seen in previous research by Figenschou (2010) who found that nine percent of AJE news
items were devoted to economic coverage or Robertson (2015) who found that AJE and RT
economic crisis coverage accounted for three and six percent
Table 6.1 News Section Frequency
AJE
2.9%
Art/Culture
10.5%
Economics
1.3%
Media
Politics/Domestic 0.3%
66.9%
Politics/World
3.5%
Science
14.1%
Sport
311
Total

CCTV
6.3%
13.8%
2.1%
13.2%
59.3%
5.3%
0.0%
189

DW
6.5%
13.0%
0.0%
0.7%
55.8%
3.6%
0.7%
138

RT
1.8%
9.4%
5.3%
1.2%
77.6%
4.1%
0.6%
170

of crisis headlines respectively. Robertson’s work did not find such high levels of economic
news, however, the economic focus of my study periods probably accounts for this discrepancy,
though further analysis is needed to verify this. In addition, my own coding scheme places a
majority of all news items in the “world/politics” category, meaning that the news item led with
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the work of government and politicians at an international level as opposed to domestic level.
Figenschou’s coding scheme for newscasts included a category for “armed conflict,” which
accounted for one fifth of all AJE stories in her data while Robertson had similar findings for
AJE and RT. When I examine the main topic of each story, I found that common stories included
events of terrorism, conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, and the multilateral conflict against
ISIL. These types of stories accounted for between 16.7% of DW’s items to 23.8% of CCTV’s
items. The coding scheme employed here was not explicitly designed to detect stories of war or
armed conflict, but the results tentatively correspond to previous studies of AJE and RT.95
As seen in Table 6.2, at least one network covered each protest though broadcasters did not cover
the protests equally, suggesting that practical capabilities, like journalist access to protest sites, or
a lack of editorial interest limit IB coverage of economic protests. In turn, fewer news items
meant fewer speaking actors as well. The broadcasters devoted the majority of their coverage to
the Umbrella and Greek protests, with thirty-seven and eight news items respectively. The low
number recorded for the Greek protests reflects the coding scheme’s attention to protest
specifically i.e. the Greek crisis itself received a great deal of attention, but the actual strikes and
protests after the Greek Parliament’s acceptance of bailout terms were not as widely reported.
The complete lack of CCTV Greek protest coverage is the result of an apparent programming
change on the network’s part during the period between March and July of 2015. The network
changed the programming at 7:00PM CET from the Global News to Asia Today; and this data
was not immediately available. Nevertheless, Umbrella as a protest movement and the Greek
Crisis as a news event were covered the most by each network, with Brazil and Blockupy
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To date, there have been no comprehensive studies of DW or CCTV content and so comparison here is
not possible. However, given that the differences seen so far are slight, it is possible to speculate that DW
and CCTV would be similar in their story focus to AJE and RT. In turn, this suggests that the real
differences between the networks lay in their actual discourse and narratives.
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receiving less coverage during newscasts, possibly due to the relatively brief nature of the
protests themselves. Other programming could have covered these events so we cannot conclude
that they were unimportant to the broadcasters. Consequently, Greece and Hong Kong will
receive the majority of my attention. Table 6.2 illustrates these features using speaking actors
(discrete individuals speaking in news items) and news items (discrete stories signaled by the
first few sentences of a report by and anchor), which I define further in Appendices A and C.
Table 6.2 Speaking Actors and News Item Frequencies
Blockupy
Umbrella
Speaking News Speaking News
Actors
Items Actors
Items
3
1
21
11
AJE
0
0
21
16
CCTV
0
1
4
5
DW
2
1
0
5
RT
5
3
46
37
Totals

Brazil Protest
Speaking News
Actors
Items
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3

Greece Protest
Speaking News
Actors
Items
4
1
0
0
7
3
14
4
25
8

In the rest of this section, I examine the speaking actors seen in protest news coverage
and find that elite voices remain dominant in the news items. Networks particularly used
governmental voices as seen in other studies of protest news coverage (Boykoff 2006; Brasted
2005). Protestor voices are seen in items but they are often marginalized, ironically, they are
often counter-protestors airing their grievances against disturbance to the status quo.

6.2.1

Institutional Voices and Protest Opposition – or Only Those Approved

We have already seen that economic news coverage broadly conforms to financial
journalism norms and privilege political, expert, and economic voices over those of ordinary
people or workers. However, when an international broadcaster covers an incident of economic
protest, as with all news coverage, they select specific individuals and provide them with a
platform to analyze and contextualize the protestors and their grievances. Given the counter-

214

hegemonic mission of three of the broadcasters, economic protest coverage arguably should
highlight protestor voices, and yet this is not the case. Deeper analysis undermines the claims of
AJE, RT, and CCTV to diversify the voices in the news broadly or in protest coverage
specifically. In turn, the potential of states to use a counter-hegemonic news strategy to project
strategic narratives also appears weak. Journalists routinely undermined protestors’ voices and
privileged elites, similarly to norms seen in dedicated financial journalism. Only in instances
where a state’s direct interests are affected do broadcasters break with the protest paradigm. In
short, the broadcasters’ economic protest coverage conforms to previous studies of economic
protest that demonstrate consistent undermining of protestors and their grievances (Brasted 2005;
Xu 2013). In turn, we can conclude that IBs do project state narratives, but only in as much as
they directly affect the sponsoring state.
Despite AJE’s promise of counter-hegemonic journalism, the network consistently
undermines protestors’ positions and grievances in each of the protests under analysis. During
March 18 coverage of Blockupy, for example, framed the protestors as ineffectual and
unreasonable, similarly to framing of anti-globalization protestors in the late 1990s (Rauch et al.
2007). A reporter interviews the male protestor, unnamed in the report, who claims that that ECB
is a symbol for monetary policy and power politics of capitalism and that it is important that
people from different countries get together to fight against these policies. Subsequently the
reporter, Dominic Kane, attributes these views to “some” protestors and then shift to a press
conference in the new opened ECB with Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, claiming it “has
always been understood” that austerity is the fault of individual nations’ decisions. The story
concludes with a short standup interview with Kane who references Draghi’s position that
money should be spent on building the European economy, but “this isn’t enough for the
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protestors” whose protest was fruitless. AJE’s framing of the Blockupy protestor conforms to the
protest paradigm in framing activists as a “deviant group of outsiders” (Brasted 2005, 387). At
the same time, institutional voices, in the form of Draghi and the reporter, suggest that the
protestor is unreasonable given the common understanding of who is at fault for the European
Crisis or their unwillingness to listen to Draghi. Kane, therefore, sided with elite interpretations
of events of the protests, indicating a potential drive in newsroom culture to conform to standard
Western reporting practices. In addition, these specific protests do not directly affect Qatari
interests and thus do not present an opportunity for AJE to project a strategic narrative.
Another example comes from an October 2 report on Umbrella, Divya Gopalan
interviewed Jesse Chu, a self-described protestor who says that he wants the protests to “go
further” with actions such as building occupation. The news item intoned that enhanced protest
could lead to violence, thereby suggesting that the protestor is either for violence or callous to its
potential effects. Similar coverage of Greece features an interview with “Stella,” who is again
undercut by the reporter saying that the protests are noisy but unattended by unions who could
have mobilized more people. As such, a channel that promises to be the “voice of the voiceless”
grants protestors space to speak but then undermines their messages by following more
traditional patterns of protest coverage.
The protest paradigm predicts that media frame protests in terms of disruption or
unreasonable demands as a means of marginalizing the protest. Xu, for example, found that New
York Times and USA Today coverage of OWS emphasized lawlessness, used official sources,
and highlighted public disapproval of the protests thereby marginalizing the protestors
messaging. Therefore, it is unsurprising that many stories feature counter-protestors. On AJE,
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coverage of Umbrella featured Leticia Lee of the Blue Ribbon Campaign.96 In the interview, Lee
castigates the protestors as anti-democratic in their unwillingness to engage in dialogue with C.
Y. Leung, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and encourages the “silent majority” to speak out.
CCTV similarly uses counter-protestors to undermine the Umbrella movement. On the October 2
newscast, an unseen reporter interviewed an unnamed “HK resident” who says the protestors do
not know the law and not “even the color of the cover of the law book.”97 The counter-protestor
continues, saying the protestors want democracy but are not qualified for it, and concludes that
they are being used, but does not say by who. Another interviewed HK resident says that the
protestor were “rational” at first but now are unruly and that she is protesting to stop there
“disorderly conduct.” A final example on CCTV comes from a social media figure named
“Worried HK Uncle,” who claims only people who want instability would support protests.
CCTV aired his video subtitled where Uncle says, “your parents and family want you home and
are worried about you.” Worried HK Uncle may be an odd outlier, in addition to be genuinely
odd he is the only social media sourced information in any reporting on Umbrella in any
network. Nevertheless, the use of counter-protest voices in networks that are counter-hegemonic,
AJE, as well as those with a stake in undermining the protests, CCTV, illustrates the consistency
of the protest paradigm in international broadcasting, complicating comparative analyses in other
studies which showed the protest paradigm had limited applicability outside the USA (Ghobrial
and Wilkins 2015; Shahin et al. 2016). These speakers also illustrate how following the protest
paradigm can project state narratives as when CCTV privileged official voices or AJE provided
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The Blue Ribbon Campaign is the name given to those who protested the Umbrella Movement, the
latter of whom wore yellow ribbons (Liu 2015).
97
This is a reference to the Basic Law, the legal framework for the one country, two systems model of
Chinese government in the HK Special Administrative Region.
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balanced interviews. Both CCTV and AJE followed the protest paradigm, but only in CCTV’s
case did it project state interests by undermining the protestors.
As examples, these leave aside other networks and protests but in the other two networks,
we can clearly see a privileging of political or economic figures as expected in the literature. In
these cases, following the protest paradigm model of coverage also serves state interests by
undermining protestors who critique the sponsoring state’s policies. In the Greek case, DW
interviewed a shop owner named Klonos Nikos in his shop as he watches images of the riots on
television on their July 16 broadcast. Nikos says he is angry but not at the current reforms but
with the previous government that created the situation. This simultaneously undermines Greek
anger at the reforms, while also privileging an economic actor, similar to DW’s framing of
economic news seen in Chapters 4 and 5. As with CCTV interviews of Umbrella counter
protestors, DW’s interviews with economic actors opposed to Syriza policy allows Made in
Germany to project narratives that delegitimize the Greek position and support Germany. In this
way, following the protest paradigm can support state interests by undercutting protestors’
grievances. The reporter concludes the item, saying that on the streets, tensions are high and
there is anger and disappointment with the “heavy clashes between police and demonstrators”;
but Nikos and shop owners have resigned themselves to situation.
AJE and CCTV also featured economic actors in their coverage of Umbrella. For
example, AJE interviewed Simon Wong, a restaurant owner, while CCTV interviewed a jewelry
shop owner as well as a pharmacy owner. Economic actors, when featured at all, are most
common in Umbrella coverage, possibly due to the decreased tourism from mainland China the
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protests precipitated.98 Interviewing economic actors who are negatively affected by the protests
follows the protest paradigm, but it also supports Chinese policy on Hong Kong. What does not,
however, is AJE’s use of economic actors. Both broadcasters, therefore, followed the protest
paradigm. However, when CCTV follows the paradigm, they utilize a ready-made formula that
undermines the protestors, which also serves China’s direct interests. While it is possible that
Qatar simply did not want to anger China, we’ve also seen that Qatar has been accused of using
AJA and AJE as a public diplomacy tool for delegitimizing rivals such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia (Booth 2010; NDTV 2010; Fahmy 2015). Al-Jazeera’s flirtations with direct
propagandization in the Middle East notwithstanding, it appears that when its direct interests are
not at stake, the network follows the traditional Western journalistic modes as seen in its
conformity with the protest paradigm. Whatever the case, each economic interview subject, even
if they considered the protestors work important and necessary, decried the disruption of their
incomes, thus undermining the protests.
Likewise, experts played an oppositional role on most networks but appeared on AJE and
CCTV in reference to the Umbrella protests most often. This is possibly due to the protests
continuing for the whole week of the sample, giving the opportunity to the channels to secure
interviewees. While this is true for all for networks, DW and RT did not feature expert
interviews; and in fact, only DW interviewed anyone related to the Umbrella protests. CCTV,
unsurprisingly, featured experts who decried the protests as “illegal,” which turned into a
recurring trope during their coverage. Raymond Yeung, Senior Economist ANZ Banking Group,
suggests that interviews with businesses indicate that there have been drops in sales during the
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Reports coded suggest that late September to early October are particularly busy times for mainland
Chinese tourism in Hong Kong. Only AJE reports that the CCP banned travel to Hong Kong by mainland
tourists while CCTV and all other networks ignored this information.
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protests. As the new item continues, the reporter suggests that investors are also concerned as the
Hang Seng Stock Exchange99 has dropped in value and Merrill Lynch estimates economic loses
around $500 million. David Lau, Managing Director JP Morgan, claims the protests are
undermining the fundamental assumption that rule of law can function and claims the protestors
are violating the law, even as polls show Hong Kong residents are against the protestors. In
addition, CCTV coverage uses foreign media and academic sources such as Martin Jacques of
the Guardian and Miguel Alfredo Velloso of the University of Salvador. Both of these men
undermine the protests, Jacques by pointing to the undemocratic British history in Hong Kong,
and Velloso by emphasizing the increased wealth and status the island gets through its
association with the mainland. In this case, as with AJE coverage of Umbrella, the experts tend
to be economic thinkers, and as we shall see this is the means by which Umbrella is constructed
in economic terms in all news items that do so. The consistency seen in speaking actors across
type, going from ordinary people, to protestors and counter-protesters, to economists and other
experts persists across all networks excluding RT.
Shifting focus back to Greece and Blockupy and to DW, political actors come to the fore
and continue to undermine protestors. For example, when DW covered the Hong Kong protests
they only featured three speaking actors in total, and two times this was C Y Leung’s, Executive
of the SAR, press conferences. DW’s Greece coverage features several political figures, most
notably Alexis Tsipras, President of Greece.100 In press conferences, the President made clear
that he did not like the bailout deal but also stressed that there was no other choice. Many of
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Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
This not to say that there were no other political actors. As noted previously all networks except CCTV
covered the Greek bailout negotiations and subsequent parliamentary votes, in the case of DW showing at
least a surface level of balanced reporting. However, this reporting did not engage with the protests or
strikes following the vote. They contain useful context, but are not directly coded as having the presence
of the event.
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Tsipras’ own Syriza party members, such as former Finance Minister refused to vote for the deal,
leading Stavros Theodorakis of the allied River Party to proclaim that the Hellenic Parliament
had “political conspirators, populist and rats, who conspire against you [Tispras].” AJE, for
example, featured figures such as Chinese president Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chun-Ying, and ECB President Mario Draghi in their reports. CCTV showed
press conferences form C Y Leung, Hua Chun-Ying, and HK police officials Cheung Tak-Keung
and Hui Chun-Tak in their reports.
RT has not figured prominently in this sub-section for the simple reason that they used
very few speaking actors overall, particularly compared to AJE or CCTV. However, RT featured
figures like Tsipras as well as the aforementioned German politicians seen on DW, but also left
wing Greek politicians, angry unnamed Greek protestors, at least one member of Golden Dawn,
the quasi-fascist party elevated to Greek parliamentary seat holders over the past five years
(Smith 2015). Indeed the Greek Crisis contains all of the coded speaking actors for the protest
events. The network featured no interviews during Umbrella or Brazil, and only two political
figures during Blockupy.
Despite the relative lack of speaking actors in RT and CCTV’s programing change
leading to no relevant coverage of Greece, the data here shows remarkable consistency. Some
networks depicted protestors for purposes of balance as in the case of AJE, or depicted
oppositional voices in politics like DW’s Greek coverage. However, each network undermined
protest positions through juxtaposition with other speakers or with contextual details provided by
the reporters. CCTV’s coverage of Umbrella fits expectations for how the CPC would use the
network to present official government positions to global audiences. However, AJE and DW, in
line with the predictions of the protest paradigm, also undermined the protests, potentially a
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reflection of a professional culture that question protestors and their activities. At least in terms
of speaking actors, these results suggest that typical reporting practices internalized in global
newsrooms undermine protests while states can still use IBs as political instruments to project
government narratives when the protest directly implicates the sponsoring state’s interests. This
evidence further suggests also that global news networks cannot simply be viewed as neutral
eyewitnesses, if such was ever done, but cannot likewise be seen as simply counter-hegemonic or
not because states may activate the network to support their interests. Nevertheless, scholarship
on the protest paradigm also suggests that journalists themselves undermine protestors through
framing that removes protestors’ grievances thus making them appear out of touch with the
mainstream.

6.2.2

Protest Frames, Justifiable Protest, and Activated Narratives

So far, each broadcasters’ content has followed the protest paradigm model of coverage;
undermining protestors and framing their grievances as unreasonable. Broadcasters followed this
model when the protest did not implicate direct interests, as in DW coverage of Umbrella, and
when the protestors challenged state policies, as in DW’s coverage of Greece or CCTV’s
coverage of Umbrella. In the end, following the paradigm appears to function as a standard
approach to protest coverage as well as a tool to undermine oppositional protestors. In addition,
broadcasters typically did not frame protests in economic terms. This serves to elide the
economic concerns of protestors and thus undermines criticism of economic issues. In short, IB
content either follows the protest paradigm when protestors do not follow state interests or when
protestors challenge the sponsoring states. However, only one example in this data set involves
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protestors challenging a sponsoring state’s rival and this shows that IBs can, and do, frame
protests in ways that undercut rival states.
Both DW and RT, as parties interested in the ultimate shape and dimensions of the
European project, presented the Greek protests as economic in nature, but radically diverged in
their framing of the protests and strikes following the vote, in turn making RT the only network
to operate outside the protest paradigm. Alternatively, when DW and RT reported on Umbrella
they put the protests into political terms and gave less attention and time to them. RT did not
even send a correspondent, which would seem to be within their capabilities. CCTV took a much
different approach to Umbrella as we shall see, but they are not averse to covering protests
directly, as when there were routine reports on protests against amending the Japanese
Constitution in July of 2015.101 Ultimately, the data analyzed here suggests that economic
framing, and thus opening a space for discussion of protestor grievances, is dependent on the
nature of the protest itself, but is also subject to the particular interests or narratives of the
sponsoring state.
First, we should test the extent to which CCTV, AJE, and DW followed the protest
paradigm in their coverage. Following the paradigm, arguably, would include overlooking the
economic origins of the protests. Economic framing is most prevalent during the Greece protests
with all networks framing the bailout negotiations, subsequent demonstrations, and
parliamentary votes in Germany, Greece, and France in economic terms. CCTV provided sparse
coverage of Greece in July but other items found in other study periods show that CCTV devoted
copious coverage to Greece. AJE ran eight items during the week of the bailout negotiations in
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The particular issue in question involved amending Article 9 so as to allow Japanese deployment of
military assets abroad, a controversial decision of the Abe government both in Japan and China (ABC
2015).
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July, all of which framed it in economic terms, though still conformed to the protest paradigm.
The AJE newscast on July 13, for example, lead with a story on the successful negotiations
framed in terms “marathon talks” leading to a bailout deal; in return, Greece must “reform” with
privatization, liberalization, pension, and labor market measures. On July 15, the date of strikes
and protests, AJE led their newscast in the same way, political debate over economic policies,
the results of which are unavoidable given the political calculus of the Greek Parliament. The
view that austerity was inevitable marginalizes protests by giving an official account at odds with
protestor positions, as seen previously. This is when reporters interviewed Stella the protestor
and subsequently undermined here position as shown above. In addition, the report featured
Panos Skourletis, Greek Minister of Labor, and George Petropoulos, member of the Public
Sector Union, both of whom suggest that austerity for bailouts was an unescapable outcome. As
such, AJE contrasts protestors with official and institutional voices who accept the policy, even
as they decry it. In this instance, the reporter followed the protest paradigm suggesting that
standard Western journalistic practices were operating over specific state interests. Reporter
Mohammad Jamjoom, in a standup interview discussing the protests, claims that real “question”
of the protests is if they will grow given anarchist involvement, but he intones, “there is anger
but also weariness.” The implication Jamjoom makes here is that increased violence is likely to
occur with the addition of anarchists who arguably fall in the deviant or freak frames seen in
previous studies (Boykoff 2006). By marginalizing protest voices, emphasizing institutional
political voices, framing austerity as inevitable and connecting anarchists to protestors ultimately
marginalizes the protestors even as the economic dimensions of the protest remain at the
forefront. Importantly, following the paradigm allowed DW to challenge protestors’ specific
anti-German grievances and thus challenge an oppositional narrative.
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In contrast, RT coverage of the Greek protests and Blockupy is unambiguously in favor
of the protestors. We’ve seen throughout, Russia routinely suggests that it wants greater
cooperation with the West, but their PD efforts typically present a fragmented and refracted
vision of its Western rivals including Germany (Amann 2016). Likewise, DW has an obligation
to present Germany and German policy in a positives light (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015). In this
sense, both RT and DW address the Greek crisis and these protests according to their respective
state interests, illustrating the value of IBs as a tool of narrative projection. I have discussed how
DW covered both in the speaking actor section above and therefore will examine RT in more
depth here. Analysis shows that RT does not use the protest paradigm and instead focuses on the
division between state actors while emphasizing the damage done to Greece by austerity. In their
lead news story from July 12, RT’s Richard Hawkins is live from Brussels reporting on bailout
negotiations. The report itself is characterized by frequent use of opposing opinions expressed by
European leaders including those of France, Germany, and Greece as well as lead EU figures
such as Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Junker. RT emphasized the divergence of opinion among
European elites and the report gives space to figures such as Lode Vanoost, former speaker of
Belgian Parliament who claims “ideologues are willing to put the EU at risk just to make a point
about countries staying in line with their vision of EU.” Others included anti-EU UKIP politician
Ray Finch. Hawking concludes the report saying “amongst political posturing the Greek
situation is worsening with banks shut and capital controls in place.” As seen in Chapters 4 and
5, RT places its attentions on state actors, while emphasizing conflict and questioning their
motivations so consistent as to indicate a pattern in RT’s approach to Russian rivals.
Nevertheless, we should also consider Abby Martin’s claim that she worked with “passionate
American journalists,” who, “can speak out against different things that other corporate entities
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can't speak out against that are beholden to their advertisers or parrot the establishment line”
(Mayer 2014).” Certainly, Russia may benefit from undermining the legitimacy of rival’s
policies, but they have also, arguably, hired journalists whose work suggests they feel strongly
that German policies are in fact damaging Greek quality of life.
On July 15 and 16, RT reported on the bailout deal, parliamentary vote in Greece, and the
strikes and protests for approximately half of their newscast.102 In what is the only clear
deviation from the protest paradigm in the sample, RT mounted a concerted attack on the deal,
featuring fiery denunciations of the deal from Greek politicians and protestors alike, as well as
guest experts like Michael Hudson, Professor of Economics at University of Missouri, and Ann
Pettifor of the New Economics Foundation.103 All of these speakers are, without exception,
against the deal and, Hawkins reports that “some people” are saying the deal is fascistic and that
Germany has a “colonial policy” towards Greece.104 An unnamed male protestor shown on the
streets proclaimed that the EU is “not a home of the people it is a prison for workers right.” The
language of colonialism, prisons, and fascism are a common feature here, but directed against the
EU and Germany. Unlike any other network, RT shows opposition to the deal uncritically. Given
this evidence, and other insights (Borchers 2011), the conflation of Russian geopolitical rivals
with fascism appears to be a common trope when Russia’s direct interests are threatened.
If the examples of RT coverage provided here appear extreme, it is because in many ways
they are. No network sampled here goes to the extent of calling its rivals, or using proxies to do
so, fascists. Nevertheless, it does show that state interests influence the tone and style of protest
coverage. Another way of seeing this kind of interest, or lack thereof, in action is in RT and
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This is actually a common pattern in both RT and CCTV newscasts and economic programming.
RT uses these last two expert speakers frequently on Boom Bust.
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On a side note, a March 18 report from RT addressed Donald Trump’s stated desire to run for the
Republican nomination.
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DW’s coverage of the Umbrella protests, which closely followed the protest paradigm
privileging official sources and framing the protestors as ineffectual or deviant. RT coverage is
perfunctory at most, staying in studio, paraphrasing official government statements concerning
the illegality of the protests, and devoting little time to reports before moving on to other items.
It is only when state’s direct interests are involved, as with Russia in the Greek protests, does a
network go against the protest paradigm. RT’s support of the protestors, then, undermined its
german rival while also serving its larger economic interests by calling the EU’s motivations into
question. DW’s coverage, though on site in some reports, likewise airs official positions over
protestor positions. Most importantly, the grievances of the protestors are limited to politics, and
in the case of RT are not actually stated in reports.
In terms of the Umbrella protests, AJE and CCTV provide the richest data, showing both
the persistence of the protest paradigm in the former case, and the influence of state interests in
the latter. Both networks mixed political and economic stories on the protests, though in both
cases the economic dimension serves a disruption frame that marginalizes protestors. In AJE’s
case, their reporters are simply following the protest paradigm: showing disruption,
marginalizing protestor rhetoric through oppositional interviews, and airing official positions.
The network newscast aired one story per day on the protests. In this sense there is little to
suggest that AJE was counter-hegemonic towards China, though their use of protestors and
onsite reporting means that they did effectively witness the protests themselves.
CCTV, as a channel whose sponsor has a clear interest in public perception of the
protests, did none of these things, suggesting that the channel was “activated” in the way Price
(2014) suggests, as noted in the introduction. Specifically, examination of the frequency of
reports during the study period indicates that CCTV steadily increased the number of stories on
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the protests. From two on September 30 to a high of six on October 3. This suggests that as the
protests continued, and international media coverage increased, CCTV acted to promote their
own version of events.
CCTV covered the protests, as noted, but did not visually depict them as DW or AJE do.
Instead, their imagery consisted of reporters in studio, video of official press conferences,
shopping districts denuded of customers, and concurrent National Day celebrations. Instead of
relatively peaceful occupations, viewers witnessed economic hardship, calm government
officials, and patriotic celebrations. On October 4, Chief Executive Leung, and often the news
anchors themselves, decried protestor caused violence and implored protestors to “see the big
picture and stop rallies,” and claimed the government must restore order. The news anchor in this
item concluded that if the protests continued they will spiral out of order, instead the right way to
solve disputes is through rationale communication and not in the streets. These examples show
that CCTV used the protest paradigm, but also appear to actively desire to counter the protest as
it continued, and doing so allowed it to subsume economic concerns into a disruption framework
and elide a potent rationale for the protests.

6.3

Conclusions: Economic Protests and the Blindspot

We saw in Chapter 2 that scholarly attention and analysis of international broadcasters
rose commiserate to their increased prevalence. However, Chapter 3 and 4 illustrated that IBs
typically conform to state strategic narratives, calling their editorial independence into question,
as well as their potential to diversify news flows. While those finding show the IBs do work to
project state narratives, the data in this Chapter fundamentally undermines particular network’s
claims to diversify news and offer alternatives to mainstream Western news. The economic
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dimensions of protests are typically lost when either the protest is not explicitly economic or
when attention is merely perfunctory or in keeping with the global news cycle. The only
exception to these findings comes from RT’s coverage of Greece protests in July 2015. The
factor that most readily accounts for this exception is Russia’s specific interest in undermining
the EU to remove them as a potential rival for influence in Eastern Europe. In RT coverage, the
protestors are right and the EU is a quasi-fascistic and unelected organization that punishes
Greeks while benefiting the rich.
It is unlikely that any outlet would wholeheartedly endorse a protest in their sponsoring
state, but the likelihood rises when the protest happens in a foreign country, and potentially rises
even higher when a direct state interest in a rival is present. Projection of preferred state
narratives is one of the key purposes of public diplomacy generally and international
broadcasters specifically, and it is, therefore, not surprising that we should see it here.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of the protest paradigm and apparent role of state interests in
influencing coverage indicates that the counter-hegemonic potential of international broadcasters
is weaker than previously thought and that newsroom cultures in IBs may be more homogenized
than editorial statements suggest. While these networks do provide greater variety for
international news consumers, the possibility of truly challenging both traditional journalism or
capitalism as currently practiced remains elusive, suggesting that in the end international
broadcasters are more tools of the state than vectors for challenging journalism.
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7

THE TWILIGHT OF WORLD ORDER

In mid-March 2015, Russia Today’s Anissa Naouai concluded her program with a short
editorial statement on the possibility that Donald Trump would run for President of the United
States. She stated that Trump’s grasp of foreign and domestic affairs, including his analysis that
Putin had “eaten Obama’s lunch,” qualified him for President. While no more than an anecdote,
the election of November 2016 put Naouai’s editorializing into a far different light than when I
viewed this clip in a Stockholm office in March 2016. In some ways, it is easy to dismiss RT, a
channel that seems almost a parody of news rather than the real thing, and yet Donald Trump
won the 2016 election. Despite international broadcasting’s apparently low ratings or limited
reach, Trump’s election, Brexit, and the political transformation of the last two years show that
how and where we get our information is one of the most important drivers of political and
economic change. Russia, China, Germany, and Qatar all recognized this essential truth and used
their considerable resources to strengthen their position in the global media system through
international broadcasting; it is likely that conflict between these state based outlets over the
hearts and minds of publics around the world will only continue. This dissertation was a
contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon.
In this concluding chapter, I draw together the various threads of my data to illustrate the
broader significance of my dissertation. While my evidence shows that IBs can function as tools
of state power, they do not do so in the same ways. Instead, their “news norms” – the ways in
which they cover news with interviews, on site reporting, and speaker selection – vary widely
and indicates that each network uses different norms to project state narratives. In addition, while
state sponsorship influences content, several other factors such as domestic media system,
journalistic training, and editorial positions shape IB content. All of these factors taken together
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show that scholar cannot dismiss IBs as government mouthpieces, even should they come from a
state with thorough control of media like China. The variations seen here suggest that we should
begin a typology of international broadcasting to improve our ability to analyze IBs, their
content, and their relationship to state sponsors.
I begin this chapter with a summary of my dissertation, the literatures I draw from, my
methods, and expectations. Next, I describe my findings and their significance for the fields of
international relations and global media studies. I conclude with recommendations for future
research, limitations, and concluding thoughts.

7.1

International Broadcasting: State Tool, Media Outlet

My purpose for this project was less to prove a specific argument than to test a set of
theoretical assertions about international broadcasting as a tool of state power projection. In
short, scholars theorize international broadcasters exist to project the state and its interests,
though there had been little analysis of the actual broadcaster content. Through a thoroughgoing
comparative case study that drew upon the complementary, yet often disparate, literatures of
public diplomacy, strategic narratives, contra-flow, and global media studies (broadly
conceived), this dissertation examined the degree to which IBs projected their state sponsor’s
interests. I also examined the degree to which these theories accurately appraised IBs
characteristics and purpose. The first group of literatures composed of strategic narratives, public
diplomacy, and contra-flow scholarship, accentuates the role of states as agents in the global
system. The second group is a loose confederation of theories that position IBs within the
broader global media system. These thinkers emphasize the ways in which global media can
eyewitness distant events, build cosmopolitan identification, or the extent that specific networks
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operate outside journalism norms and expectations. The first group’s emphasis on states
presumes that IBs support state interests, but provides little insight into what forms and kinds
such support may take. However, given their relative lack of content oriented analysis, do not
specify the methods and forms of international broadcasting, their particular function as
journalism outlets, or the ways in which coverage of specific nations or people may or may not
support state interests. The second group of literature, on the other hand, focuses on IBs status as
journalistic outlets in the context of global media. IB’s role as state actor is not the focus of their
analyses. The second group elides the role of the state and omits what the first would argue is the
key feature of international broadcasting as a media phenomenon, its role as a state tool. My
dissertation addressed these shortcomings in the literature by asking a simple set of questions.
Does international broadcaster content support state interests and policies? In addition, what
journalism techniques do international broadcasters use in their content and how do such
techniques ultimately present the state sponsor?
To answer these questions, however, I wanted to avoid the more common news beats and
genres scholarly inquiry explores, namely political conflict, elections, or armed conflict. While
worthwhile subjects in their own right, they have also seen sustained attention and, in any case,
provide no clear limits to the content states can, in theory, project. Economics, specifically its
hegemonic neoliberal variant, provided those limits. While its dominance has come under
increasing scrutiny since the 2008 Great Recession, neoliberal economic ideology contributed to
a reshaping of global financial, business, and political norms for states both large and small. At
the same time, states, including those in the current study, implemented capitalism internally and
engaged to ever-increasing degrees with global markets from the 1980s to the present day. All of
them have acquiesced, to some degree, to global capitalism and, therefore, cannot fundamentally
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question its premises. Even the three broadcasters with stated counter-hegemonic missions –
AJE, CCTV, and RT – must confront the limits imposed by neoliberal economic doctrine.
Economic news, therefore, provides a boundary against which state discourses must push against
to be counter-hegemonic but also can serve state interests by making the sponsor appear more
attractive to capital.
To bring the two groups of literature – in IR and global media studies – together I
developed a mixed methodological approach using content oriented studies developed by
Figenschou (2010) and Robertson (2014, 2015) and combining them with critical discourse
analysis derived from Fairclough (1989, 2010). The results of coding the news items indicated
specific patterns in coverage, such as the degree to which broadcasters presented their state
sponsor, and then guided a deeper discourse analysis. My discourse analysis answered whether
or not IB content supported state economic policies and interests, but it was also attentive to
questions of power exercised via language to support state and/or economic interests. Combining
the rigor of content analysis with the CDA’s attentiveness to power allowed me to see both the
form of content, its use of on site or studio reporting, invited speakers, and journalism style, as
well as how news items framed economic news.
Given previous research and the particulars of my methodological approach, I had several
specific expectations for the results of my analysis. First, I expected IBs to support their state
sponsors, the question that remained was how. Would broadcasters use onsite reports and in what
proportion to other kinds? Would broadcasters give their country’s nationals prominent roles
political figures, independent experts, or common people, and which would appear with greater
frequency? What would be the balance of domestic to international news? Given the record of
several broadcasters founding, such as RT or CCTV, it was clear that grievance against the
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Western dominated global media was a powerful motivation in creating IBs and broader public
diplomacy strategies. In this context, supporting the state seemed axiomatic as the motivation for
founding the IB directly related to a perceived invisibility of the state sponsor, a condition a
broadcaster had the potential to rectify. As such, my second expectation was that the state
sponsor would be present in economic news content. Certainly, there was precedent for the
opposite as AJA was known to omit Qatari affairs in its coverage (Sakr 2007). Nevertheless, it
seemed more likely that IBs, especially those charged with correcting an unequal global news
coverage or presenting their nation to the world, would at some level need to show their state as
a rational, righteous actor.
My third expectation, and a key rationale for selecting economics as my subject, was that
both financial journalism as a specific form of news production and the state sponsor’s
capitalistic commitments would limit ability of broadcasters to contradict the principles of
capitalist activity. However, these commitments would not necessarily preclude the IB from
criticizing the policies and international role of other states, so long as it was within the
framework of capitalism. Again, it was not clear how states with clear counter-hegemonic
missions would respond to criticisms of the capitalist system. Similarly, coverage of economic
protest defied easy predictions. Its incorporation was meant to check the elite driven economic
news programs by illustrating different kinds of economic activity. At the very least, it should
have varied by broadcaster; DW should have been free to criticize capitalism but was embedded
in neoliberalism. RT and CCTV, in contrast, illustrated a geopolitical contradiction as Russia and
China both tacitly rejected communism but have emerged as crony capitalist states while
concurrently we are looking at a period of Soviet and Chinese nationalist nostalgia. As Chapters
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4, 5, and 6 showed, the content met many of these expectations but not without important
exceptions.

7.2

International Broadcasting: Projecting Domestic Media

My findings reflect the variety of scholarship that informed this dissertation.
While I do not upend the arguments of IR scholars who contend that IBs function as tools of
state, or global media scholars who question an IB’s place in the global media system, I do
complicate both literatures through comparative analysis of content. In the following
subsections, I detail my findings and their significance for scholars of strategic narratives, public
diplomacy, contra-flow, and global media studies. I also take these findings and propose a
typology of international broadcasting taking into account the variety of factors that influenced
IB content like journalism norms, media systems, and state interests.

7.2.1

International Broadcasting: Different Strategies of State Projection

Literatures that analyze IBs as tools of state power formed a constitutive part of my
research given its direct analyses of IBs’ purpose as a tool of state power projection. At the most
fundamental level, my analysis verifies that IBs do indeed project states, their interests, and
policies in ways that appear to mirror sponsor rhetoric and policy. For those scholars interested
in international relations, this dissertation illustrates that the news norms IB content take reflect
domestic media structures, professional norms (both national norms and professional ones), and
the news cycle itself. In short, IBs do serve states but not necessarily under conditions of their
own choosing and most definitely not in a uniform way, indicating that IBs can be sorted into
various types.
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Table 7.1 shows the varying strategies, interests, and news reporting patterns of each IB.
Of the four networks, CCTV and DW operated as traditional public diplomacy instruments,
projecting their sponsoring states in news items in positive ways and using items and guests to
air particular strategic narratives. DW’s economic news concentrated on Germany and its
relationships to other states (51.7% and 31.7% respectively); while CCTV’s coverage was more
balanced (31.1% and 32.0% respectively). Both used combinations of onsite reporting (47.4%
for CCTV and 55% for DW) and studio interviews or items, theoretically building credibility
with audiences through eyewitnessing and authoritative testimony. AJE and RT operated
differently, eschewing domestic reporting and focusing on foreign news (reported foreign news
98.2% and 96.1% respectively). However, these two networks diverged in their reporting styles
and invited speakers; AJE relied on reporting onsite (47.4%) and used a relatively even grouping
of experts (29.8%), political figures (21.4%), and economic actors (29%) while RT relied on
experts (89%) more than any other network and almost never reporting onsite (only 1%). In
addition, AJE spread their stories around the world, covering Asia and Africa with some
frequency, while RT covered Europe and the USA to the exclusion of other countries. All four
networks spent more individual items on the biggest economic actors including the USA, EU,
UK, Germany, and China as well as states where economic events elicited coverage such as
Greece, Switzerland, and Singapore.
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Table 7.1 Summary of New Techniques
AJE
China, USA,
Geographic
Russia, Asian
Focus
and African
nations
intermittently
Evenly
Common
distributed
Voices1
between
economic and
experts, small
amount of
workers and
ordinary people;
Americans and
British, , notably
no Germans
despite reporting
on Greece
Style of
Reporting

On site reporting
combined with
interviews in
studio

Common Story
Topics

Various national
economies,
Greek crisis,
AIIB, housing,
oil and
commodity
prices

Characterization
of Global
Economic
System

Seen through
events in
individual
nations, rarely
characterized
directly, requires
governments and
entrepreneurship
to improve

CCTV
China
(intersectionally),
USA, Japan,
Greece, EU, and
S. Korea
Mostly experts
followed by
economic and
political figures;
mostly mainland
Chinese,
followed by
Americans,
Germans,
Greeks, Hong
Kongers,
Australians, and
Japanese1

DW
Germany
(intersectionally),
Greece, USA,
Switzerland, and
EU
Mostly economic
figures, high
presence of
workers and
ordinary people;
mostly German
followed by
Greek, Polish,
and British

Mostly studio
items balanced
with on site and
mixture items,
small number of
interviews
National
economies,
currency, Greek
crisis, Two
Sessions,1 and
World Economic
Forum

On site combined
with interviews
and studio
analysis

Prosperity
increased with
development and
trade; states
needed to
manage
economies,
China is
responsible
stakeholder

RT
USA, UK,
EU, Germany,
and Greece

Experts
especially
university
professors of
economics;
mostly
American or
British

Studio
reporting and
interviews,
separation
from events
on the ground
Greek crisis and Greek crisis
elections, various and elections,
national
EU policy, oil
economies, oil
prices, gold
prices, and Swiss prices, World
franc
Economic
Forum, and
technology
System fair but
Dominated by
needs innovation powerful,
and
though
entrepreneurship incompetent
to grow and
governments
adapt to
& central
globalization,
banks,
Germany serves
especially the
as model of
USA,
economics
Germany, and
UK
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Features such as speaking actor selection, on site reporting, in studio interviews, and
geographic focus mean that all of these networks operate as public diplomacy tools, projecting
narratives about the state or its rivals, but that they do so in their own ways, informed by their
media systems and editorial positions (see Appendices A and C). However, counter-hegemony,
as theorized by scholars (A. Robertson 2014; Sakr 2007; Thussu 2007a), is not apparent in
geographic focus or speaking actors, and is uneven in news norms. Instead, counter-hegemony
appears in the narratives themselves, but only when direct state interests are at stake. Several
examples illustrate this.
Take, for example, coverage of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). AJE
and RT’s coverage emphasized the potential damage to American and Western hegemony the
Chinese led project represented through its provision of alternatives to the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their framing of the AIIB underscored state rivalry over the
structure of the global economic system. CCTV broke with this narrative by stressing
cooperation and potential rapprochement with the USA instead of conflict narratives. America
had “concerns” about the bank, CCTV’s journalists told us, but news items scrupulously avoided
saying or implying that the AIIB represented a threat to US interests. The total number of items
CCTV aired on the AIIB (11 compared to the single item each for AJE and RT) also shows that
presenting the bank as a multilateral and well governing institution was a priority for CCTV’s
editors and producers. In this example, CCTV’s coverage directly underscored the Chinese
leadership’s view that the AIIB was a complement to Western dominated structures rather than a
threat.
The ongoing reporting on the Greek crisis, both in the economic news programs and in
protest coverage, and each networks’ coverage of the Hong Kong Umbrella protests also
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demonstrate the apparent influence of state interests in determining the tone of IB content.
Indeed the Greek protests indicated that the only time a broadcaster broke with the “protest
paradigm,” the collection of news tropes that undermine protesters and their grievances and thus
preserve the status quo, was when said broadcaster’s strategic interests could be served. While
DW’s coverage of the Greek crisis and protests undercut opposition to Germany’s austerity
policies, RT directly challenged EU economic policy and clearly articulated support for Greek
protests in opposition to German dogmas by featuring oppositional voices like Yanis Varoufakis,
Tim Duy of the University of Oregon, Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri, Marshall
Auerback of Institute of New Economic Thinking, and Mark Weisbrot. Likewise, CCTV covered
Umbrella with content that directly undermined the protestors’ grievances. In addition, CCTV
coverage escalated over the course of the protests (16 total over the course of that week) and
never directly interviewed or depicted the protestors themselves, as other networks’ coverage
did. RT, DW, and AJE all covered the protests, but instead of CCTV’s direct assault on protestor
positions, these three networks fell into a simple pattern of covering the disruption of the protests
as well as their economic costs. In the end, these patterns support Price’s (2014) argument that
broadcasters may function as, more or less, typical global news outlets that then get activated
when specific state interests are at play. While these broadcasters did support state interests, they
did not do so independently of other factors like domestic media systems or editorial positions.
While I have verified IRs basic argument that IBs exist to support the state, I have also fruitfully
complicated it by illuminating other relevant influences on IB content. Given these newly
described features of broadcasting, we can begin to outline how differences between IBs can be
systematically catalogued.
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7.3

Protests and State Relations

This chapter includes a comparative analysis of four economic protests, one each from
Germany, China, Brazil, and Greece.105 While I described my methodological procedure in
Chapter 2, in this section I examine each protest in terms of its causes, economic dimensions,
duration, tactics, and suitability for analysis. In particular, each protest has specific connections
with each state sponsor, thereby allowing me to test the extent to which state interests influence
content.
Blockupy is a pan-European anti-austerity movement that seeks to challenge the capitalist
structure of the European Union (Blockupy 2015). It includes over 90 organizations ranging
from anarchists to more traditional left-wing political parties (Sky 2015). The March 2015
protests were part of a larger and ongoing campaign to reverse austerity policies around Europe,
but were notable specifically for their specific targeting off the inauguration of the new European
Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. In addition,, this particular event received
media coverage from several media outlets including IBs like DW, RT, AJE, CCTV and Telesúr
(see for example AJE 2015; CCTV 2015b; Drozdiak and Sloat 2015; Roos 2015; Sky 2015; RT
2015). Blockupy organized protests continue in many European cities.
The Umbrella Movement is an ongoing student led protest that seeks to ensure Hong
Kongers, instead of Beijing, can select their own candidates for their Legislative Council
elections. Starting in late 2014, the protests were shut down by police in early 2015 and have
proceeded intermittently since then (BBC 2016b). As we shall see, the movement used
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This chapter relies on data drawn from the coding of 807 total news items. I followed the same
analysis procedure as in Chapter 4 and 5, coding each episode as described in Chapter 2, making minor
modifications to code for the news “beat” of the story such as science, domestic, world, or arts/culture. I
also coding for common metaphors, arguments, visuals, and discourse in each item.
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occupation of public spaces like Occupy Wall Street and this allowed them to receive sustained
media coverage, which some studies suggest could potentially provide more opportunity for
media to report on them with depth and nuance (Gottlieb 2015; Rauch et al. 2007).
In Brazil a series of pro and anti-government protests in March 2015 are, like Blockupy,
singular protests, which drew international news attention. During this week, allegations of
political corruption and manipulation of state oil firm Petrobras led to dueling protests in Sao
Paolo and Rio that were widely reported in international news (Arvanitidis and Ford 2015;
CCTV 2015a; Deutsche Welle 2015b). President Rousseff was subsequently impeached under
murky circumstances that some have called a “coup” and so this situation is ongoing (BBC
2016a; Boadle 2016; Eakin 2016; Gallas 2016; Trevisani and Lewis 2016).
Finally, the Greek protests of July 2015 were a reaction to the Syriza party’s acceptance
of new bailout terms offered the European Central Bank and Germany to Greece. This specific
protest gained media attention because of its proximity to those bailout negotiations (BBC
2015c; Oyedele and Udland 2015; Triandafyllou and Tagaris 2015). Nevertheless, the specific
events analyzed here are merely one in a series of anti-austerity protests in the country stemming
from the European Debt Crisis. As with the Brazil protests, the political and economic issues
underlying the events have not been resolved.
These four protests provide fertile ground for analysis for several reasons. First, the
Greek and Umbrella protests are part of long lasting protest movements while Blockupy and
Brazil occurred on one or two days of activity. Differences in the length of protests lead to
differences in total amount of coverage, in turn, allowing us to see how narratives of protest
movements take shape under different conditions, as long term protests like Occupy or the Arab
Spring fall into different narratives over time (Gottlieb 2015). While Blockupy and Brazil
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protests reflect long present socioeconomic and political divisions in their respective societies,
the actual events of civil disorder and protest occurred so quickly that new narratives arguably
could not take shape. These conditions are important limitations on news discourse, which often
changes and molds itself to events over time.
Second, the protests are geographically dispersed, in some cases directly affecting
sponsoring states as with the Greek and Umbrella movement for Germany and China
respectively. In other cases, sponsoring states are connected indirectly or obliquely to protest
events; for example, Greece to Russia and the Brazilian protests to all sponsoring states. They
also reflect a spectrum of economic development with Greek and Blockupy protest action taking
place in the developed world and Umbrella and Brazil in developing though emerging
economies.
Third and most importantly, each has a clear though often underreported economic
dimension. The Greek protests and the Blockupy protests are the most directly economicallybased protests in the sample. Blocupy’s stated mission is “to connect our struggles and powers
beyond nation-state lines. Together we want to create a common European movement, united in
diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity
from below” (Blockupy 2015). In addition, they direct their protest against an official symbol of
international finance, the European Central Bank. The Greek Debt Crisis is also directed at
economic institutions like the IMF and ECB, but is also directed at the current German
government (Kutter 2014).
Brazil’s recent and ongoing political turmoil, though often framed in terms of political
corruption, reflects class divisions within Brazilian society. While some Western outlets suggest
that anti-government protestors grievances lay in corrupt use of funds from state firms like
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Petrobras to finance political candidates (BBC 2016a). At the same time, some protestors cite a
recent recession and weakening economy as the cause of their anger (Watts 2016). Meanwhile,
Rousseff’s draws protest support stems from the trade union networks and groups sympathetic to
her Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) who protested in “defense of democracy and the rights of the
working class” (Douglas 2016). As we will see in the analysis, the colors protestors wore to
rallies carry symbolic power as Rousseff’s supporters wore the red of the labor movement and
her opponents wore the yellow of the national flag.
Likewise, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong reflects overlapping layers of
grievance on the part of protestors, though there are competing interpretations. For example, Li
writing in the Washington Post argues that the “central theme” of democracy in the protests is
misguided as the region has greater representation than the mainland. Instead, he suggests that,
“General discontent has provided fertile soil for this movement, and the sources of that
dissatisfaction have nothing to do with imaginary diktats from Beijing. Hong Kong is going
through a tough period of economic and social dislocation” (2014). In contrast, Cheung writing
in the Diplomat argues the protests are a “warning of the comprehensive breakdown of
confidence in Hong Kong’s governing institutions – it reflects growing public disillusion with
the institutional means of making their voices heard” (2014). At the same time, those same
governing structures reflect the collusion of Hong Kong’s wealthiest with the Beijing leadership
to maintain both stability and economic growth. As David Zweig of the City University of Hong
Kong observes, “The conservatives, the tycoons, the business elite can really control the
legislature and prevent any kind of social welfare policy… Beijing has to realize that they have a
social problem—it’s not just a political problem” (quoted in Schroeder 2014).
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Each of the four protests – Blockupy, Umbrella, Greece, and Brazil – embody economic
conflict between the grassroots and national, sometime supra-national, elites. However, despite
clear economic dimensions, no IB economic news program devoted any coverage to them. While
previous scholarship suggests that financial journalism would be unlikely to cover protests in
general (Lee 2014), three networks have a stated counter-hegemonic mission suggesting that
their journalists would devote some time to protests. Instead, factors like the protest paradigm
and state interests indicate that simple counter-hegemonic goals are no guarantee of protest
coverage. As the analysis below illustrates, state interests are likely the paramount consideration
in terms of protest news content.

7.3.1

Proactive or Reactive: Towards a Typology of International Broadcasting

The patterns seen here – presence of state sponsor in content, adherence to journalism
norms in coverage (protest paradigm), and divergent narratives in content directly related to state
interests suggested, ultimately, the beginnings of a typology of international broadcasting. Table
7.2 breaks down several factors that influence IB coverage. Rather than being simple
mouthpieces for government propaganda, IB content reflects a variety of influences, divided here
into three factors – internal IB factors, media system factors, and international journalism factors.
I do not want to make a claim that any one factor is necessarily more important than another, but
rather that all of these factors need to be accounted for in an analysis of international
broadcasting. Based on my findings and these factors I want to begin to schematize a typology of
international broadcasters that will be of use for future researchers in the field.
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Table 7.2 Typology of International Broadcasters
Factors in International
Broadcaster
➢ State – Broadcaster
Relationship
➢ Legal Framework of
Founding
(constitutional
protections)
➢ Degree of Sponsor
Presentation
➢ Degree of Rival
Presentation
➢ Editorial Mission
➢ Political/Social
Exigence of Founding
➢ Journalist Sourcing
and Hiring

Media System Factors
➢ Mass Circulation
Press
➢ Political Parallelism
(Advocacy v.
Neutrality)
➢ Journalistic
Professionalism
➢ State Interventionism
➢ Transitioning State

International Journalism
Factors
➢ Anglo-American
Model of Journalism
(CNNI and BBCW)
➢ Journalism Genre
Norms (i.e. Finance,
War, Politics)
➢ News Events and
Cycle

I divide these four broadcasters into two broad categories based on the presence, or lack
thereof, of their state sponsor. AJE and RT do not present the state, or at least do so without
sustained attention to domestic political or economic coverage; I call these reactive broadcasters.
In contrast, DW and CCTV consistently, and presumably consciously, devote substantial
attention to domestic news; I call these proactive broadcasters. My findings illustrated a
bifurcation in this most basic sense, some IBs present the state, how they do so is not relevant
right now, and others do not, or at least omit their sponsor from serious coverage. Sakr (2007)
suggested, now ten years ago, that AJA’s omission of Qatar could be seen as an attempt to
increase credibility by removing the possibility of hypocrisy on the part of its journalists.
Reception studies are required to illuminate this possibility, but we can see that omission of the
sponsor is one method of projecting specific strategic goals and narratives.

245

While neither AJE nor RT present their state sponsors, at least in the content analyzed
here, this does not mean they are alike in their approach to supporting their sponsor. AJE, for
example, operates as a global news channel, dispersing its coverage and following news events
just as the BBC does; I call this neutral in the sense that news cycles and media system norms are
the dominant factors shaping coverage. RT, on the other hand, has an obsessive focus on
Russia’s geopolitical rivals in Europe and the USA; I call this a Rival Targeter given that news
cycles and Russian media norms, which support the state directly, do not shape coverage as
much as state interests. These facts suggest another layer of the typology, that even if editors and
journalists omit the sponsoring state they still must choose where to focus their coverage.
Speculatively, these divergent approaches may yield different benefits in addition to removing
the sponsor from news content. What I call “neutral” reporting potentially appeals to audiences
that desire news, which does not diverge from global norms as crafted by CNN and BBC.
Coverage appears to follow news as it happens and builds credibility through a variety of
speakers and journalism norms. In contrast, RT’s editors and journalists narrowly cover rivals
and build credibility through experts from those rivals, typically Americans. In this case, network
credibility is authoritarian, using “fringe” speakers from rival states to craft an alternative
narrative that is unresponsive to contradictory evidence or arguments. Importantly, both can
serve the interests of their sponsors, as we have already seen, but they do so in different ways.
Likewise, CCTV and DW cover their sponsors in divergent ways. DW, at least on the
surface, follows the German model of journalism and provided two or more sides to a given
economic dispute (even if the actual structure of the item ultimately supports the interests of the
German state). CCTV’s approach to domestic and international news, however, constrains
possible debate. Even with the use of live interviews, previously not present in CCTV content
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(X. Zhang 2011), economic news uncritically supported Chinese policies, framing them in ways
that underplayed potential conflict or incompetence on the part of the CPC, as in their frequent
coverage of the many CPC led economic reforms in the beginning of 2015. While the end result,
based on my findings, is the same in that both networks supported their state sponsors’ policies,
they also differed in how they attempted to do so. Different media system norms most readily
explain the divergence and, in turn, serves to illustrate that while IBs do support the state, they
do not do so in the same way.
Table 7.3 Typology of International Broadcasting
Proactive (CCTV, DW) – Depicts the
Reactive (AJE, RT) – Does not or rarely
sponsor in coverage
depicts the sponsor in coverage
Chauvinist (CCTV) – Neutral (DW) –
Rival Targeter (RT) – Neutral (AJE) –
Uncritically supports Provides apparently
Tightly focused on
Provides broad
sponsor in coverage
balanced coverage of geopolitical rivals to
coverage of many
sponsor
undermine their
areas, can be
credibility
activated to support
state interests

Table 7.3 provides a preliminary schematic of my typology with names and descriptions.
It is at these two most basic levels, presentation of the sponsor and the modes in which it is done,
that the four broadcasters differ. However, the common feature of all four was their general
adherence to projecting their state sponsors’ interpretation of economic policy and support for
their sponsors’ policies. While other factors like media systems and journalism norms influence
IB content, they do so within the bounds of state sponsorship. This central fact shapes IB content
to such a degree that broadcasters’ status in the global media system, particularly in terms of
their capacity to diversify global news, requires reexamination.
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7.3.2

Counter-Hegemony in Question

While my contribution to global media studies is more limited than my contribution to
theories of strategic narratives, public diplomacy, or contra-flows, it is nonetheless important.
For my purposes here, it centers on the possibility of IBs to both diversify global news flows in
terms of their geography and speaker and to provide counter-hegemonic coverage that challenges
current power structures. First, because state sponsorship is a critical factor in IB content,
especially in terms geographical focus and speaking actor selection, future analyses need to read
content in terms of potential state interests. This is not to say that state interests are the
controlling factor in all IB content, we have already seen that myriad other factors play a role in
shaping coverage. Nevertheless, state interests do influence IB content, and need to be more fully
accounted for in new scholarship.
Second, and related to the first point, the potential power of these new broadcasters to
eyewitness or create a global community must be seriously questioned given broadcasters’
connections to their state sponsor. While I want to be optimistic about the myriad potentials of
new televisions stations, internet platforms, and other media tools, my analysis illustrated the
folly of untampered sanguinity. Most notably, the uncritical view that RT, CCTV, or AJE may
represent a form of counter-hegemony, broadcasters that provide a true alternative to mainstream
journalism, appears profoundly weakened. A counter-hegemonic editorial mission, to the extent
any network claims to provide such content, appears to be more branding exercise than reality.
While CCTV, for example, certainly does diversify news given its fulsome coverage of Asia,
said coverage also reflects and projects the interests of the CPC. Likewise, RT’s critical coverage
of American and European policy may appeal to many around the world, however, similar
examples of repression in the Middle East, China, and Russia itself go unreported or
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marginalized. Certainly, the criticisms of an Americanized infotainment driven set of private
channels cannot simply be swept aside. Nevertheless, hope likely does not exist in these
networks, they appear to be the news, and often do perform critical journalistic functions, but
carry within them the desires of their state sponsor and only move against journalism norms
when those desires are in play.

7.4

Limitations: The Need for Holistic Analysis

Despite these contributions to the field, there are some limitations in this dissertation, and
to my methodological approach in particular. While the mixed methodological approach utilized
here fruitfully combined content and discourse analysis to examine IB content, this is also a key
limitation. Miskimmon et al. (2012), in addition to developing strategic narratives as a theory,
argue that narratives go through a process of initial formation in government, projection via state
actors (including IBs), and finally reception by audiences. The analysis presented in previous
chapters focused steadfastly on projection of narratives themselves and thus missed the two other
phases Miskimmon et al. describe.
In terms of the first phase, formation, content and discourse analysis can deconstruct the
result but not the process by which is was made. Put another way content and discourse analysis
can only find patterns and, in turn, can only infer the intentionality of said patterns. If DW’s
coverage, for example, minimized Greek concerns about austerity and EU policy, as I argue it
did, the possible reasons for that pattern are not completely in focus. I argued that factors such as
the relationship of a broadcaster to its sponsor, journalism norms, and professional training,
among others, explain at least some the patterns detected in coverage. Nevertheless, other factors
like collusion between broadcaster and state, journalist’s status as citizens of the sponsoring
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state, or work norms could all illuminate the causal relationship between IB content and IB
structure and work culture. This opacity is well represented by the quotations from RT
journalists seen in Chapter 2. RT journalist Liz Wahl, for example, claimed that “‘They [RT] will
find ways to punish you covertly and reward those that do go along with their narrative.’”
(Kirchick 2014). On the other hand, Abby Martin claimed after her on air criticism of Russia’s
Ukraine policy that she received no punishment and was pleased to “have my network recognize
that it’s good to have dissent” (Mayer 2014). Analysis of content, while critical, can only tell us
so much about the work place culture of these newsrooms and we must be cautious about
jumping to conclusions.
The point on newsroom cultures needs some elaboration. Several studies have shown that
the ways in which journalists perceive of their own role, how they are socialized into a particular
work environment, influences the ways in which they craft journalism (Baumann, Gillespie, and
Sreberny 2011; Dencik 2013). In addition, several of the scholars whose work I have cited have
conducted ethnographic newsroom studies (Figenschou 2012; Powers 2012; A. Robertson 2010)
and organizational setting are underexplored in the literature on journalism (Örnebring 2012).
While I did use some of this work to illustrate the structural forces that shape IB content, I did
not use these sources to full effect. One reason is that the extant literature asks different
questions and explores newsroom from varied perspectives and so comparing between these
works, while instructive, would suffer problems with generalizability. Nonetheless, the work
developed from this dissertation will take these studies into account.
Likewise, this dissertation did not engage with audience reception. Here, again, we are
replete with anecdotes of effectiveness. If YouTube subscriptions are any kind of indication of
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popularity and credibility, RT enjoys more than either AJE or CNN with 2.03m106 subscribers
compared to 1.2m107 and 1.8m108 respectively. Evidence such as this, though provocative,
illustrates a broader issue with media analysis. To fully understand the role of media, including
IBs, in society we must also understand how people perceive and use that content. Conducting
reception studies is, however, costly, difficult, and time consuming. Using proxies as I did above
is not a substitute for engaging with actual people who view these channels and probing their
beliefs, presumptions, and their use of IB content.
On final limitation is my lack of attention to Miskimmon et al.’s (2013) concept of
narrative alignment and non-alignment, where when actors’ narratives are aligned each actor is
then empowered to act on those narratives; hopefully leading to non-violent change in the global
order. My analysis does show some types of narrative alignment, between AJE, CCTV, and DW
in terms of anti-austerity protests in Greece, arguably across all four networks in terms of
neoliberal economic policies, across AJE and RT on the challenge to American hegemony from
the AIIB, and several others. These convergences, between content and economic philosophy
and between states themselves, present a chance for actors to change the global economic
system. While narrative alignment is an important component of strategic narrative theories, I
omitted it for two reasons. First, and more practically, my study period is relatively recent in
time and many of the issues at play in IB content had yet to resolve. Compared to Miskimmon et
al.’s (2013) analysis of the Iran nuclear negotiations, which had the benefit of many years of data
to draw upon, my data is rather limited. In terms of the research questions I sought to answer,
alignment is not my key object of inquiry, or at least not between states or between states and
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Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/RussiaToday.
Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/AlJazeeraEnglish.
108
Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/CNN.
107
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agent of international capitalism. Instead, my inquiry concerned the degree to which broadcasters
project economic policies and positions and if they so, how? Narrative alignment signals the
potential for strategic narratives to be effective means of achieving policy goals; my dissertation
was not focused on the effectiveness of narratives, however, it was concerned foremost with their
presence and mode of transmission. With these three broad sets of limitations in mind, I would
like to suggest the following for future research.

7.5

Future Directions: Greater Variety and Access

I foresee several directions for my future inquiry into international broadcasting. First,
more IB studies are needed that continue the work on economics with particular attention to the
ways in which its contestation works horizontally (between actors of like kind as in states) and
vertically (with protests, activists, and populist movements) against states and supra-national
institutions. Chapter 1 illustrated that scholarly analyses of IB, public diplomacy, and global
media provide sustained attention to states as political actors. While political conflict between
and within states is a vital site of analysis, this has sometimes come at the expense of seeing
states and conflict between and within them as economic actors. Particularly as states across the
developed world continue to be embroiled with populist and activist movements ranging from
UK and US Uncut, Podemos, Blockupy, Alternative for Germany, Syriza, Trumpism, antiTrumpism, Bernie Sanders’ campaign, and Occupy understanding the role and place of economic
rhetoric is crucial. Judis’ recent, careful examination of both left-wing and right-wing populism
in America and Europe suggests that anti-elite movements, no matter their stripes, implement
economic rhetoric to characterize their opponents in a negative light. Should the movement be
left-wing in its approach, then the enemy is a feckless and greedy elite, too deferential to capital.
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Should the movement be right-wing, enemies are seen in both the immigrants who compete for
jobs, and the greedy elite who facilitates their arrival for personal enrichment. In either case,
economics forms a constitutive part of the movement’s rhetorical repertoire. This is not to
dismiss the very tangible bigotry members of some populist movements profess, it is real and
must be challenged. However, the rhetoric of a movement like Brexit, for example, used a canny
combination of both cultural and economic argumentation to provide space for individuals to
invest in the movement and deny unsavory, xenophobic elements within it. The movements that
have sprung into existence since the 2008 financial crash, coupled with the possibility of the
developed West retreating from its traditional policies of lowering barriers to trade and capital,
both indicate that vital work must be done to incorporate the, admittedly obtuse, language of
economic rhetoric into scholarly analyses of states and global media.
Future studies that include a larger number of or different set of broadcasters would
increase the comparative value and explanatory power of and test the basis for my typology.
Broadcasters could be both IBs or private channels, but increased use of comparative and holistic
work remains a necessary, if perilous, means of checking our assumptions and seeing media
outlets in situ (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Hanusch and Obijiofor 2008).
Concurrently, and in recognition that IBs are only one component of larger public
diplomacy efforts, a multi-platform content analysis of a single state is needed to situate IBs
deeper within their sponsoring state structures. RT, while it serves as a handy lightening rod for
critics of Russian information policy, is merely one part of a large, well-financed operation. It
also includes the wire service Sputnik, the Arabic and Spanish arms of RT, think tanks and
policy institutes, loans to European political parties like France’s FN, and targeted programing in
countries such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia (Borchers 2011; Pomerantsev 2014; Ioffe 2010;
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Lukin 2013; Rawnsley 2015a). Surely, such a project would be difficult for a single person to do
and would require multiple language competencies, academic and journalistic training, and
access to Russian government documents and political actors. However, analyzing broadcasters
in isolation means that our picture of individual state efforts will necessarily be incomplete and
fail to provide the whole picture of the many different arms of state public diplomacy policy.
At a far more fundamental level, we also need better access to IB material in the first
place and should develop a comprehensive archive of international news content, supported by
fair use laws in a variety of countries. My own research used each broadcasters’ online archive
of economic news programs. Luckily, all of them had approximately three to four months of
content. However, all networks removed the episodes from their websites, making retrieving
difficult if not impossible. Likewise, regular newscasts are often unavailable and need to be
recorded as they air to be of use to researchers. My own research relied on Alexa Robertson’s
generosity in using the archive she manages at the institutionen för mediestudier at Stockholm
University. While this trip was rewarding, interesting, and ultimately cost neutral for me, not all
may be so lucky. My initial, incomplete proposal would be for a major American university,
preferably in an international travel hub such as Atlanta, to host an archive with similar scope to
Stockholm University. It would record and catalogue a number of global news channels with the
intent of making these records available for research. Should researchers find it too difficult to
visit the archive directly it will become necessary to provide advice on how to access content and
how to use fair use laws to limit legal liability. Failure to achieve this goal will leave scholars,
journalists, and activists unable to check the media operations of the most powerful states in the
world, leaving them unchecked and us all the more impoverished.
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7.6

Final Thoughts

I began this dissertation with a quotation from then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in
which she exhorted her audience to realize that the USA was in an “information war” with Iran,
Russia, and China, a war which it was losing. That was in 2011. In 2017 that war appears to be
continuing unabated and on more fronts that ever before. The right-wing populist wave that has
seized parts of Europe, the USA, and other countries around the world and the left-wing
populists who arose after the 2008 financial crash each reflect, in their own way, this information
war. With each group siloed into their respective echo chambers, much commentary speaks of
fake news, social media algorithms, or alternative facts. However, we must also consider the
power of states to finance information brokers, such as international broadcasters, and to, in
some small way, furnish the information that undergirds these movements. In the chaos of
information available to us, state sponsored news, especially when it seems to say what no one
else will, may seem a light in the darkness, a place to flee where certainties shield us from the
unknown. But this is a false hope. My dissertation illustrates this through its analysis of IB
content, which follows the interests of states and their policies. This is not to say one cannot
learn from watch these channels, or that they engage in outright falsehoods. It is to say that IBs
are no less connected to agendas and ideologies than private stations, even though many of the
journalists working for these channels presumably have high minded ideals about journalism. In
these new uncertain times, where old truths and ideologies falter, states such as Russia, China,
and Germany’s use of media to contest people’s loyalties is only likely to increase. It my hope
that this dissertation helped to illuminate the precise ways in which they do so, so that we might
be better equipped to distinguish truth from falsehood.
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APPENDICES: CODING SCHEMES AND SHEETS

Appendix A: Economic News Programs Coding Scheme
Economic news items are treated as the individual data points with the subcategories
considered the variables.
•
•

•

•
•

•

ID Identification – alphanumerical code for individual episode ex. CCTV01-12-15-01
Issue(s) - Issue
o The economic topic identified as subject of news item, for example: “net neutrality,”
“trade,” or “quantitative easing.” These are usually stated in the episode description
on the respective webpage or within the first few seconds of the news item by the host
or reporter. They will be coded for precise phrasing used.
Geography Geography – The category refers to the entity that the news item frames as the
primary subject of the story. This information is usually found within the first few delivered
lines of news content, either as a set up by the anchor or the reporter.
o Domestic – host nation only; coded with value 0
o Intersectional – host nation and outside state, institution, or actor; coded with value 1
o Outside world – no reference to host nation, only involves outside actors; coded with
value 2
o Missing/unknown = 99
GeoName Geography Name – codes for name of main subject nation and all nation’s
subsequently mention in report
GlobalNorS Global North or South – codes for geographic specific geographic regions. The
USA, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea are North.
All others are South.
o North – coded as 0
o South – coded as 1
EconSource Economic source data – This category refers to sources for economic data. Each
source used will be coded for the following.
o EconSourceName Name – this is the stated name of the source as shown in the
episode null value = 99
o EconSourceGeo Geographic level – This set of set of codes parallels Robertson’s
(2010, 2014) coding schema for both news construction of the global and economic
news.
▪ Sub-national – Think tanks or universities; coded with value 0
▪ National – Central banks or government ministries; coded with value 1
▪ International – Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, or United Nations;
coded with value 3
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•

o EconSourceGlobalNorS Global North or South – codes for specific geographic
regions, see above
▪ North – coded as 0
▪ South – coded as 1
NewsType News item type- This category codes whether the story is presented only in studio
with narration, or outside the studio, at the site of the news.
o Studio is coded as 0
o Site is coded as 1
o Studio interview coded as 2
o On site interview coded as 3
o Mixture of these coded as 4
o Roudtables coded as 5
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Appendix B: Economic News Programs Coding Sheet
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

Issue(s) _____________________________
Geography ____
GeoName ________________________
GlobalNorS ___________
Economic source data
o Name _____________
o Geographic level ____
o North or South _____
“Speaking actors”
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) ________
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) ________
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) ________
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace, members,
politicians, activists) ___________
News item type _____________
Discourse ____________________
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Appendix C: Speaking Actors Coding Book
•
•
•

•

109

Each speaking actor is considered a separate data point with the subcategories considered
variables.
ID Identification – alphanumerical code for individual episode ex. CCTV01-12-15
SpeakActType “Speaking actors”109 – These are those speaking actors who are not either
anchors or reporters for the network. Each actor has its own individual code
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) coded as 0
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) coded as 1
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) coded as 2
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace, members,
politicians, activists) coded as 3
“Speaking actors” demo data – Every individual speaker will be coded for the following
data.
o SpeakActName Name – Name given in episode. Normally stated and found in a
banner underneath speaker.
o SpeakActOrg Organization – This is the professional association given underneath
the name in the episode. Coded with name of organization or work identification.
o SpeakActNet Network – They appear on this network.
▪ CCTV = 0
▪ AJE = 1
▪ DW = 2
▪ RT = 3
o SpeakActGen Gender – This is their gender, coded with 0 for male and 1 for female
and 2 for ambiguous
o
SpeakActNat Nationality – The presumed nationality of the speaker as
determined from statements during the episode, subsequent research into their identity, or
association with particular governments. Coded as name of nation. If indeterminable null
= 99
o SponGovAff Sponsoring Government Affiliation – Works for sponsoring
government organization No=0 Yes=1
o SponGovAffOrg – Sponsoring Government Affiliation Organization – if yes the
name of organization if no value = 99

In the context of an economic news show the host does not need to be coded, but who they quote, their
guests, and their sources will be.

300

Appendix D: Speaking Actors Coding Sheet
“Speaking actors” subset data – Every individual speaker will be coded for the following data.
o Speaker 1
▪ Name _________
▪ Organization __________
▪ Network ____________
▪ Gender __________
▪ Nationality ____________
o Speaker 2110
▪ Name ___________
▪ Organization _____________
▪ Network ___________
▪ Gender _____________
▪ Nationality _______________

110

This can be repeated as needed.

301

Appendix E: Economic Protest News Coding Scheme
•
•

•

•

•

•

Economic protest news will be coded for the following:
Issue - The economic topic identified as subject of news item, for example: “net neutrality,”
“trade,” or “quantitative easing.” These are usually stated in the episode description on the
respective webpage or within the first few seconds of the news item by the host or reporter.
They will be coded for precise phrasing used.
Topics
o Network – Name of network where story appears.
o Protest Presence – coded for presence of one of the given four protests in the item
o Geographic Level
▪ Domestic – caused by domestic conditions or state; coded with 0
▪ Intersectional – caused by relationship between protest site and international
actor; coded with 1
▪ Outside World – caused by forces outside protests site’s control; coded with 2
Economic source data – This category refers to sources for economic data. Each source used
will be coded for the following.
o Name – this is the stated name of the source as shown in the episode
o Geographic level – This set of set of codes parallels Robertson’s (2010, 2014) coding
schema for both news construction of the global and economic news.
▪ Sub-national – Think tanks or universities; coded with value 0
▪ National – Central banks or government ministries; coded with value 1
▪ International – Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, or United Nations;
coded with value 3
“Speaking actors” – These are those speaking actors who are not either anchors or reporters
for the network. Because any given news item might contain multiple speakers, this
particular aspect of the news text cannot be coded with simple values that express categories.
These categories need to be coded with a continuous variable beginning with “0” for no
people fitting the description and going up to code the total number of people who fit the
category.
o Political (government members, politicians, activists)
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners)
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists)
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace)
o Worker
“Speaking actors” subset data - Every individual speaker will be coded for the following
data.
o Name – Name given in episode. Normally stated and found in a banner underneath
speaker.
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•

o Organization – This is the professional association given underneath the name in the
episode. Coded with name of organization or work identification.
o Network – They appear on this network.
o Gender – This is their gender, coded with 0 for male and 1 for female and 2 for
ambiguous
o Nationality – The presumed nationality of the speaker as determined from statements
during the episode, subsequent research into their identity, or association with
particular governments. Coded as name of nation.
Discourse – Contains notes of interesting discursive features and patterns used for subsequent
CDA. Coded as notes and observations.

303

Appendix F: Economic Protest News Coding Sheet
•
•

•

•

•

•

Issue _________________
Topics
o Network ____________________
o Protest Presence _____________________
o Country subject __________________
o Geographic Level
▪ Domestic ____________________
▪ Intersectional ______________________
▪ Outside World _________________
Economic source
o Name _______________________
o Geographic level
▪ Sub-national _______
▪ National _____
▪ International ______
“Speaking actors”
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) __________
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) _________
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) ________
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace) _____
“Speaking actors” subset data
o Name _______________
o Organization __________________
o Network _____________________
o Gender _____
o Nationality ___________________
Discourse ________________________

